Challenges, Inertia, and Corruption in the Mexican Federal Judiciary by Ferreyra-Orozco, Gabriel (Author) et al.
  
Challenges, Inertia, and Corruption in the Mexican Federal Judiciary  
by 
Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved May 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Doris M. Provine, Chair 
John M. Johnson 
Carolyn M. Warner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
August 2012  
  
i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis examines the Mexican federal judiciary and the problem of 
corruption in this institution, particularly related to cases of drug trafficking. 
Given the clandestine nature of corruption and the complexities of this 
investigation, ethnographic methods were used to collect data. I conducted 
fieldwork as a “returning member” to the site under study, based on my former 
experience and interaction with the federal judicial system. I interviewed 45 
individuals who work in the federal courts in six different Mexican cities. I also 
studied case files associated with an important criminal trial of suspected narco-
traffickers known in Mexico as “El Michoacanazo.” My study reveals the 
complicated nature of judicial corruption and how it can occur under certain 
circumstances. I conclude that the Mexican federal judiciary has become a more 
professional, efficient, and trustworthy institution over the past fifteen years, 
though institutionalized practices such as nepotism, cronyism, personal abuse of 
power, and gender inequalities still exist, tending to thwart the full 
professionalization of these courts and facilitating instances of misconduct and 
corruption. Although structural factors prevent full professionalization and 
corruption does occur in these courts, the system works better than it ever has 
before. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this dissertation is to investigate corruption in the 
Mexican Federal Judiciary (MFJ) using a qualitative approach via ethnographic 
methods. A particular goal is to research corruption related to drug trafficking and 
drug cartels in order to determine whether corruption exists, and if so, how 
prevalent it would be. After preliminary fieldwork in Mexico City during the 
spring of 2011, I realized that collecting data  would be extremely complicated  if 
I focused solely on the topic of corruption because judicial employees would be 
reluctant to talk about this subject, let alone talk about corruption in drug-related 
trials. In addition, feedback from people working in the federal courts during the 
preliminary fieldwork emphasized that I should present my research as a project 
to study the entire MFJ, and corruption as merely a part of it.  
As a result, I decided to expand the scope of the research to include other 
topics that were important for interviewees in order to create a common ground 
for the conversation. Therefore, I shifted the framework of the research to study 
the Mexican Federal Judiciary as a whole, paying attention to particular 
phenomena, such as cronyism, traffic of influence, and influence peddling, which 
were indirectly intertwined with corruption. Had I just focused on the topic of 
corruption, most respondents would have been suspicious of my intentions.  
 This shift was strategic for two reasons: one, it led me to include themes, 
such as salaries, professionalization, and career civil service, of interest for 
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respondents, which eventually facilitated approaching the topic of corruption with 
them; two, the focus of the research became the institution itself rather than just 
corruption, which expanded the range of the study to gain more understanding of 
the setting. These two strategies permitted the gathering of in-depth information 
that allowed a better understanding of corruption, and related phenomena, in a 
contextualized setting.  
 The initial fieldwork plan was to interview only judicial employees 
working in criminal district courts, but the shift to broaden the research to the 
entire institution required the inclusion of a diverse sample. Thus, I had to include 
respondents from different trial and appellate courts as well as key informants 
who were knowledgeable about the MFJ.  
 Likewise, part of the research project was to collect archival documents to 
look for written records about how the MFJ has officially addressed corruption 
cases within the institution. The idea behind this strategy was to do a 
methodological triangulation of the collected information to compare and contrast 
it with official documents in order to have a more accurate depiction of the 
research topic. However, the quest for these records bore few results for several 
reasons. First, judicial corruption is not considered a major problem in the MFJ, 
and the official stance on the issue is that corruption is a bad apple phenomenon 
that only rarely occurs in the federal courts (Begné Guerra, 2007). Second, 
corruption is difficult to prove because it usually occurs clandestinely. This 
condition makes it hard to document cases of corruption in an institution in which 
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lawyers are the employees. Finally, the public record does not accurately 
represent the existence of corruption because government agencies tend to hide 
misconduct and wrongdoing to avoid public scrutiny. Additionally, there are not 
many archival documents related to corruption available to the public.  
During fieldwork, I had the opportunity to examine the files of one of 
those rare cases where corruption can be documented. Thus, I decided to include 
in the research a case study called the Michoacanazo, which is a federal trial that 
became infamous in Mexican society for the misconduct and probable corruption 
of most parties involved in the trial, including federal judges. The core of this case 
was a criminal investigation against state and local officials from the state of 
Michoacán who were accused of having ties with a powerful drug cartel. The trial 
pitted the federal government against the state government of Michoacán and the 
federal judiciary. Chapter six consists of a thorough description and analysis of 
this case, its implications, and its aftermath. 
Why Study Judicial Corruption? 
My interest in researching corruption in the MFJ stems from a variety of 
academic concerns. First, corruption in Mexico is a common problem that has 
become so normalized that most people reluctantly tolerate it as a natural 
characteristic of Mexican culture. I believe that it is important to bring attention to 
the negative effects of corruption in order to raise awareness that can change 
people’s attitudes and, eventually, create adequate policies to address this issue. 
Second, after experiencing corruption in the Mexican judicial system first-hand 
  
4 
for many years, I have been motivated to study, understand, and confront this 
problem from a scholarly perspective in pursuit of improvements to the Mexican 
judiciary. Finally, despite the widespread presence and tolerance of corruption in 
Mexican society, most people acknowledge that this practice is a self-defeating 
phenomenon because it thwarts any effort to consolidate the political, economic, 
and social systems.  
It is important to mention that the perception of corruption in Mexico has 
a doubled sociocultural dimension: on the one hand, corruption is accepted and 
used by many people as an ordinary tool to deal with the bureaucracy, institutions, 
and government agents. On the other hand, corruption—official and unofficial—
is a constant topic of conversation among Mexicans, who usually condemn it and 
imply that it should not be tolerated. This double dimension produces a sort of 
bipolar attitude towards corruption: if one offers money to a police officer to 
avoid a deserved ticket, this action is usually rationalized as a tip or gratuity, but 
not as corruption; conversely, when someone else does it, then it is defined as 
corruption. The implicit message of this example is that there are different social 
standards to measure corruption, and this complicates any attempts at change 
because corruption is both accepted and rejected at the same time. This mentality 
can be applied to any gubernatorial setting, such as the Mexican federal judiciary, 
and this research looks at unveiling how and why this mentality occurs in this 
institution. A vivid example of how people perceive corruption, particularly 
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judicial corruption and the system of courtrooms, is the story of a documentary 
released in early 2011, which neatly depicts people’s perception of corruption.  
The Social Perception of Corruption in the Mexican Judicial System 
 In late February 2011, a documentary called Presunto Culpable (Presumed 
Guilty) was released in Mexican theaters. The documentary tells the story of 
Antonio Zuñiga (a.k.a. Toño), a 26-year-old street vendor in Mexico City who 
was sentenced to 20 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Toño 
contacted two young Mexican lawyers to help review his case. After a thorough 
study of the case, these lawyers found legal inconsistencies in the trial that led to 
an official reopening of the case and a new trial. The film captures the 
proceedings of the new trial and the interactions between the defendant, the 
witnesses, the judge, and the Mexican criminal justice system. The documentary 
presents the dysfunctions of crowded prisons in Mexico City and the struggle to 
prove the defendant´s innocence.
1
 
 A few days after the documentary began to play in theaters, controversy 
arose when a federal judge ordered that screenings of the film be halted (Mendez, 
Martínez, and Olivares, 2011). It turned out that one of the key witnesses in the 
case had requested that the film not be shown because he had not given his 
permission to be filmed during the retrial. Some media outlets and political 
pundits saw this judicial action as blatant censorship against the legitimate right to 
denounce and expose the injustices of the Mexican criminal justice system. Due 
                                                 
1
 The film can be watched online with English subtitles in YouTube under the tag: MEXICO CORRUPTO 
QUEMATELA. 
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to bureaucratic procedures, halting the exhibition of the documentary took several 
days, which kept the film in theaters. The controversy generated in the media 
encouraged thousands of people throughout the country to pour into cinemas to 
watch it, and the documentary became one of the most watched films in Mexico 
in recent history.   
 Watching Presumed Guilty confirmed many viewers’ pre-existing view of 
the Mexican judicial system as an unfair, bureaucratic, discriminatory, and 
Kafkaesque institution. Although Mexican people are aware of the prevalence of 
corruption in societal and governmental settings, and of how corruption is used as 
a tool to navigate the political and social systems, the content of the documentary 
was still shocking in several ways. First, the storyline was compelling because of 
the context and circumstances of the main character. Second, it was a true story 
that resonated in the minds of Mexicans due to the familiarity of the case; that is, 
people believed it because similar stories are not uncommon in Mexico. Third, 
many people found the fact that a judge wanted to prohibit the showing of the 
film was suspicious—regardless of the legal justification behind the action—
because they saw this action as a cover-up.  
No other institution in Mexico generates as much discontent and lack of 
trust as the criminal justice system and its component agencies. These agencies 
are the police, the prosecutor’s office, and the judicial system. When dealing with 
any of these agencies, most Mexicans assume that corruption plays a role at some 
point in the process and thus affects the outcome. For different reasons, many 
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Mexicans are unaware that the criminal justice system is not a monolithic 
institution but instead is a complex organization composed of an array of 
governmental agencies belonging to different branches (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2012). 
A common misunderstanding is to assume that the prosecutor’s office belongs to, 
or is part of, the judicial system. There is a connection between the two of them 
because the work of the prosecutor affects and determines the work of the 
criminal courtrooms; however, these are two separate government agencies.   
This confusion has led many people to think that when a criminal walks 
out of prison unpunished, during or after a trial, it is because the judicial system is 
corrupt or inefficient. This is not always the case; many times, legal technicalities 
ignored by the prosecutor before the indictment can force the judge to free 
someone who might be responsible for a crime. The reasons behind these legal 
technicalities can vary; they range from gathering evidence without adhering the 
rule of law (e.g. the use of torture to obtain confessions of crime), to exhibiting 
poor forensic science, to official corruption.  
  To make matters worse, the judicial system in Mexico is a branch of 
government with which many people are completely unfamiliar. During the 
authoritarian regime, the judicial system was subordinated to the President, with 
little or no political power and was defined as an inferior branch to the executive 
and the legislative branches. What most Mexican people know about the judicial 
system comes from negative news in the media due to injustices or to high-profile 
cases in which criminals walk away free. For instance, most people fail to 
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distinguish that there are two different jurisdictions and judicial systems operating 
simultaneously but separately. One is the federal judicial system in charge of 
federal trials and headed by the Supreme Court of Justice. The second is the 
network of state judiciaries, one in each of the 31 states in Mexico plus another 
one for the Federal District (Mexico City), all of which are in charge of trials that 
do not belong to the federal jurisdiction.  
This lack of knowledge has led to misunderstandings. For example, the 
retrial and proceedings presented by the documentary Presumed Guilty take place 
in a state courtroom in Mexico City. However, the injunction that halted the 
showing of the film in theaters was issued by a federal judge based on an 
injunction derived from an Amparo suit (I explain this concept a few pages 
ahead). When society learned about the content and the controversy of the 
documentary, most people did not know that the judicial system that had 
sentenced Toño was different from the one that had ordered the injunction. Many 
Mexicans thought it was the same authority that wanted to keep the documentary 
out of view to hide wrongdoing.   
  When Mexican people are asked what they think about the judicial system, 
most of them confuse state and federal judiciaries and have a negative opinion 
about both of them. This attitude is illustrated by a 2008 survey from the Citizen 
Institute for Studies on Public Safety, which showed that only 8% percent of the 
population has high confidence in the judicial system (Instituto Ciudadano e 
Estudios sobre la Inseguridad A.C., 2008). This means that the vast majority of 
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Mexicans distrust the judicial system as a whole, whether is at the local or federal 
level. This distrust is unfair because the federal judiciary has become a more 
independent and effective institution compared to most of the state judicial 
systems. This does not mean that the federal judiciary is free from flaws, but it 
has improved its performance in the last decades, and surely, it has higher 
standards of professionalism than state judiciaries.  
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter One and Two 
The first chapter is the introduction and offers a brief description about the 
content of this dissertation. Chapter two provides an examination of the topic of 
corruption to introduce readers to an academic contextualization of this problem 
and prepare them for the discussion of the main findings of the research. The 
chapter begins with an explanation of why corruption has resurged, mostly in 
politics and economics, as an important topic of analysis. Next, there is a 
literature review on the different conceptualizations of corruption in political and 
economic scholarship. The final section argues for a change of paradigm in 
studying corruption, suggesting more interdisciplinary and holistic approaches 
that include people, cases, and direct information from those who deal with 
corruption in their everyday lives. 
Chapter Three 
The content of this chapter is meant to set up the methodological and 
theoretical tools as well as their mechanisms as they are used in this dissertation. 
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The chapter begins with a discussion of the challenges of studying corruption and 
the research methods used in this dissertation, which are basically three: first,  
returning membership; second, interviews; and third, a case study. The first refers 
to my experience as a former litigant in Mexico. In this role, I was part of the 
judicial world and had member knowledge. The second method, interviews, is the 
most important because it is the source of most of the data. In total, I interviewed 
45 people during the fieldwork part of the study in six different Mexican cities: 
Nogales, Tijuana, Mexico City, Puebla, Acapulco, and Morelia. The third method 
is a case study called the Michoacanazo, which I have already briefly explained.  
Next, there are different sections that address several themes: the kind of 
questionnaire used during interviews, the theoretical approach, the 
methodological practices, and four heuristic questions—instead of hypotheses. 
Then, there is a brief description of the intricacies of doing fieldwork in an 
institution such as the MFJ, which is characterized by hermetic rules and 
resistance to outside scrutiny. Following this description, there is a section 
addressing how access to potential interviewees took place and the use of a 
snowball approach as well as other strategies in order to obtain a higher rate of 
respondents. Finally, the last part of the chapter explains the criteria for selecting 
the six cities where fieldwork was conducted. There is also an itinerary and 
timetable, as well as a description of why the sample of interviewees and the 
interview locations are representative of the institution under study.      
 
  
11 
Chapter Four 
The fourth chapter is a detailed description of the political and legal 
structure of the Mexican federal judiciary and its administrative organization. In 
order to place the current state of affairs of this institution in context, first there is 
a brief explanation of the differences between the state and the federal judiciaries. 
Then, there is an argument about the powerful influence the former authoritarian 
regime had on the judicial branch during the twentieth century. This authoritarian 
regime refers to the party-state called Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional—PRI) that governed Mexico during the 71 years 
leading up to 2000, when an opposition party won the presidential election. This 
analysis includes a discussion on judicial independence as a yardstick to evaluate 
how independent the MFJ has been from the influence of the two other 
governmental branches.  
Next, there is an examination of a judicial reform that took place within 
the MFJ at the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995. This reform was a turning 
point that marked a new epoch for the federal judiciary because structural changes 
occurred, slowly but steadily, that transformed this institution into a different 
government setting. After more than 15 years of this reform, the changes are still 
reverberating and a lot of the data collected during fieldwork referred to this 
reform as the source of a more efficient and honest judiciary. Despite this reform, 
there are issues that persist from the inertia of the past, reflected in some practices 
such as cronyism and political influence in appointing justices and council 
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members. In the latter, there is still influence from the executive and legislative 
branches that affects the federal administration of justice, and an argument is 
presented to illustrate this process.  
Additionally, to have a better understanding of the different layers and 
hierarchies of the MFJ, there is a detailed description of the system of courts that 
composes this institution, beginning with the Supreme Court down the 
hierarchical ladder to the lowest trial courts. This explanation includes an analysis 
of the Council of the Judiciary, the new unit created by the 1994-1995 reform in 
charge of administrative duties. This agency is important for this research project 
because it was constantly mentioned by respondents throughout the fieldwork as a 
controversial office that has brought up positive and negative effects within the 
MFJ. The final section discusses the structural mechanisms behind the strong 
hierarchies that characterize the MFJ. There is also a brief analysis of the 
demographics and how, despite the fact that women make up more than half of 
the labor force, only 20% of them occupy high-ranking positions. 
Chapter Five 
 This chapter, which is divided into two parts, presents the main data from 
the research. Part one delves into internal practices within the MFJ that have 
become part of the institution. Not all of these practices—such as excessive 
workload, hectic work schedules, high salaries, and a management style among 
judges that may be defined as tyrannical—are necessarily negative. However, 
they are important because they have shaped how employees behave and how the 
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federal administration of justice is handled. Interviewees mentioned these 
phenomena as part of their everyday activities and defined them as distinctive and 
central to the federal judiciary.  
Part two discusses phenomena—such as traffic of influence, the use of 
connections, and nepotism—which could be defined as wrongdoing under certain 
scenarios, but which might not have the same meaning at the MFJ due to their 
institutionalization. In the same vein, there is a description of a type of 
misconduct among high-ranking officials that does not seem to be prevalent but 
occurs. This misconduct derives from the fact that sometimes a justice, 
magistrate, or judge provides legal counseling to private parties in exchange for 
favors or economic benefits, a practice prohibited by law. To support this 
argument, I present the case of Justice Balderrama, including an interpretation of 
why this case is probably true. 
Next, there is an analysis of corruption in the federal courts based on the 
collected data, explaining general trends about what respondents thought of this 
phenomenon. To make the data more visual, I include a detailed table of 
information highlighting whether or not corruption occurs, what the categories of 
corruption are, the frequency of corruption, where it happens, etcetera. 
Complementing this analysis is a discussion on how corruption is defined, the 
perception employees have of this problem, and how it relates to judicial 
independence.  
  
14 
Following, there is an examination of corruption in relation to drug 
trafficking trials with an argument suggesting that it is unlikely, but not 
impossible, that people working in the MFJ could accept bribes from drug cartel 
members. In relation to this argument, I explain how the MFJ has coped with the 
threat of drug cartels and what actions the institution has taken to protect its 
employees. The final part of the chapter contains a section discussing the 
significance of the findings from this research.  
Chapter Six 
 The sixth chapter, also divided in two parts, focuses solely on the 
Michoacanazo case study. Part one opens with a brief explanation of what this 
case is about. Then, there is a justification to contextualize the sociopolitical 
setting where the Michoacanazo occurred. This contextualization is important 
because it provides readers with background on drug trafficking in Mexico, the 
proliferation of drug cartels, their use of extreme violence, and a summarized 
history of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), a drug cartel was operating in 
Michoacán when this case took place. Because the case study under analysis 
describes concrete facts and events only known to those who are familiar with the 
sociopolitical conditions of Mexico and the state of Michoacán, I considered it 
indispensable to explain this background.  
This background explanation begins with a concise description of drug 
trafficking and how this activity has been tolerated by Mexican authorities for 
decades. Next, there is an account about the rising power of new drug cartels and 
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why they have become extremely violent and acquired a bad reputation as 
criminals. Part of the problem has been that drug traffickers have created strong 
alliances with politicians, resulting in a new phenomenon called narco-politics, 
which is explained here. For instance, the LFM drug cartel has used this strategy 
successfully to co-opt local and state officials; the Michoacanazo is a documented 
example of that approach. There is an argument about how this case happened in 
the first place and the reason why I undertook the analysis of this case.  
Part two of the chapter examines the content of the Michoacanazo trial 
using copies of documents from the original file provided by one interviewee. 
First, I explain how I gained access to the file and written evidence, and then I 
provide an analysis of the police operation and subsequent legal actions that gave 
rise to the trial. Next, there is a discussion and analysis of all the evidence, such as 
police reports, witness testimonies, and other objects of information, presented by 
the prosecutor’s office to support the indictment. Following, I argue that some 
federal judges (I call them ad hoc judges) tend to favor the Attorney General’s 
Office requests to issue arrest warrants in cases that involve politicians from the 
opposing parties. I support my argument with a couple of similar high-profile 
cases, one of which is related to the Michoacanazo trial. After this, I discuss the 
proceedings of the trial and the different verdicts that acquitted all the defendants.  
Based on information from interviewees, I assert that the judge in charge 
of the Fifteenth District Court in Morelia, where the Michoacanazo trial was 
decided had a reputation for being corrupt, and that given the circumstances in 
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which the case was handled, in all likelihood corruption played a role at some 
point in the proceedings. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence for this 
argument, the trial’s context such as the powerful parties involved—including a 
local drug cartel, and the interests at stake—support the involvement of some sort 
of political corruption or bribery. I present several reasons for this argument. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a section called “The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly of the Michoacanazo Case.” The idea behind this section is to 
present the positive, negative, and unintended consequences of this case, and how 
despite efforts by the MFJ to eliminate corruption, when certain conditions are 
met, the possibilities that this phenomenon occurs are high.  
Chapter Seven 
 The final chapter presents the conclusions of the dissertation. The first part 
addresses the four heuristic questions presented in chapter two, placing the 
responses under the following four headings: 1. The Ambiguity of Corruption, 2. 
Payoffs, 3. The Impact of the War on Drugs, and 4. Gift-giving in the Judicial 
Process. Each of these sections is intended to provide a closing argument for some 
of the major findings from the fieldwork by showing how all of this information is 
interconnected to wrongdoing and corruption. One way of supporting this 
evidence is by looking at the official response to corruption and other misconduct 
by the head of the MFJ. Under the headings Institutional Accountability and its 
Limitations, there is an analysis of the official response based on statistical data 
posted by the Council of the Judiciary on its website, which shows some 
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inconsistencies between complaints against employees and the outcome of those 
complaints.     
 Comparing and contrasting the collected data, it was possible to deduce 
the existence of old patterns and practices, such as antiquated legislation and 
procedures, which have thwarted some functions of the MFJ to become more 
effective and modern. This conclusion is discussed under the headings New 
Council, Same Old Procedures and When the Rule of Law Leads to Impunity. 
Next, there is an analysis of a generational gap among high-ranking officials that 
has led to administrative and justice conflicts within courtrooms that several 
respondents brought up and thought important to voice.  
 To support the argument that the institution cannot address corruption 
without first changing some practices that reinforce wrongdoing and misconduct, 
I introduce information found during the fieldwork not mentioned previously 
about institutional inequalities, gender discrimination, and sexual harassment. 
These practices have become normalized and, despite the acknowledgement by 
the head of the MFJ that they are inappropriate, the federal judiciary has done 
little or nothing to eliminate them. At the end of the chapter, I include a section on 
What We Have Learned about Corruption from this research, followed by a final 
discussion about the positives changes that have taken place after the 1994-1995 
judicial reform, as well as the challenges ahead.  
 To reiterate, corruption in the Mexican federal judiciary is at the heart of 
this research, and given that this practice is prevalent in Mexican society, by 
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studying and understanding its mechanisms in this particular setting and context, 
it can be possible to conceive more effective solutions to address it. To have a 
more successful rate of interviewees, the research was expanded to study the 
entire federal judiciary. This shift turned out to be positive because it was possible 
to document other phenomena, such as nepotism and cronyism, which intertwine 
with corrupt practices. This ethnographic project is significant because it 
contributes to the literature of corruption from a singular qualitative approach that 
borrows from different social disciplines, such as sociology, law, anthropology, 
and political science. Let us proceed to chapter one.          
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Chapter 2 
CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION IN MEXICO 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis and discussion of the 
concept of corruption and its multi-faceted definition. Corruption can have 
multiple meanings depending on context, situation, culture, social rules, and other 
variables. Many of the existing approaches that study corruption have not 
examined exactly how people in particular settings actually think about the nature 
of corruption. One of the contributions of this research project is to include what 
people in the Mexican federal judiciary have to say about this phenomenon. 
Because the central theme is corruption from an ethnographic perspective, a 
discussion of this concept is unavoidable. 
Corruption and its Resurgence Worldwide 
To contextualize the general topic of corruption, the chapter begins with 
an analysis of corruption and why this problem has resurfaced in public debates 
during the last two decades. Etymologically, the word corruption comes from the 
Latin corrompere (Lomnitz, 2000) which means to destroy or break. According to 
Lomnitz, corruption has a long history that precedes the creation of nation-states, 
and the word has had many different meanings. Among them are the following: a) 
the state of being in decay or putrid; b) something or someone with extreme 
immorality or which has been depraved; c) something affected by venality; d) 
morally invaded by evil, perversion or malice; e) a text or language that has lost 
its original form; f) the loss of innocence; g) any kind of adulteration; and h) a 
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legal term used in civil codes or laws referring to dishonesty. In most of these 
cases, it is implicit that secrecy, discretion, and complicity are involved in 
carrying out corrupt acts (Lomnitz, 2000).  
 There are different approaches to why the problem of corruption has 
become part of the recent worldwide political agenda. Glynn, Kobrin, and Naím 
(1996) have summarized the best-known examination of this concept; they argue 
that corruption erupted in the worldwide arena during the 1990s because of the 
political and economic changes that took place during the decade’s globalization 
process. They contend that at the end of the Cold War, democratization processes 
in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, as well as the digital 
transformation brought on by the Internet in terms of available knowledge and 
information, were all key factors in creating awareness of this issue. In particular, 
they assert, the pernicious effect of corruption in the world economy pushed the 
national governments to set up rules and coordinate efforts to tackle the problem 
at the institutional level. The rationale behind this course of action was that in an 
integrated global economy, corruption would negatively influence market 
competition and disrupt the free flow of investment and trade.  
Within this perspective of economics, corruption was identified as a threat 
to capitalism because it interrupted the course of the “invisible hand,” so to speak. 
The construction of this narrative was essentially a capitalistic view that 
industrialized countries imposed upon Third World nations that did not share the 
same political, social, and historical circumstances (Nuijten and Anders, 2007).  
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This effort to shed light on corruption as a worldwide problem was mostly 
carried out by international organizations, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and Transparency International (TI). The mechanism 
used to implement this effort was based on anti-corruption campaigns in which 
the main objective was promoting domestic and institutional reforms with good 
governance and transparency.  
These reforms focused on two realms: politics and economics. Political 
reforms promoted democracy and empowered citizens to elect governments that 
would be accountable and responsible. Economic reforms, on the other hand, 
“eliminated regulations and simplified bureaucracy while taking away the 
discretionary decision-making processes from dishonest public servants, thereby 
reducing the conditions necessary to extract bribes” (Elliot, 1997, p. 208). 
One strong assumption underlying this economic analysis of corruption 
was that this problem is inextricably correlated to poverty, underdevelopment, 
authoritarian governments, and political unrest. In other words, corruption was a 
problem of Third World nations. Likewise, corruption was defined almost 
unanimously in terms of bribery: “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
(Haller and Shore, 2005). This definition excluded other forms of potential 
corruption, such as cronyism, traffic of influence, and exchange of favors, which 
can also be understood as bribery, according to a broader definition. This meant 
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that corruption was already defined within a preconceived notion that framed it as 
an economic problem, and that the policies designed to tackle it would proceed 
according to this paradigm (Williams and Beare, 1999). 
Overall, conceptualizing corruption in terms of a unique economic model 
ignored social and cultural practices common in underdeveloped societies that are 
deeply intertwined with this phenomenon beyond the realm of economics.   
Corruption [was] viewed by the international community in 
explicitly economic terms with little concern for its broader social 
and political implications. Furthermore, this economic framework 
[was] articulated in direct reference to the self-interested Western 
objective of democratization and liberalization of world trade and 
investment. (Williams and Beare, 1999, p. 124) 
 
As a result, the remedy for addressing corruption was to privatize public 
enterprises and take as many responsibilities as possible out of the state’s control. 
This also included establishing democracy and free market policies towards 
liberalization as a basic government principle. 
I contend that corruption is more than an isolated act wherein individuals 
behave and act in ways dissociated from social and cultural processes; although a 
few corrupt acts may occur in isolation, individuals also respond to social stimuli 
whether they are encouraged by greed, need, or financial power. Corrupt acts “are 
not merely selfish and private but profoundly social, shaped by larger 
sociocultural notions of power, privilege, and responsibility” (Hasty, 2005, p. 
271). This interconnectedness between corruption and other social and cultural 
phenomena suggests why context and setting are crucial when studying this 
problem.  
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Corruption as a Theoretical Problem 
One of the reasons corruption has been so difficult for scholars to cope 
with is the common misunderstanding about what corruption actually means. As 
Kurer points out, “Any research effort dealing with corruption is heavily 
influenced by how it defines its subject. The conception of the nature of 
corruption circumscribes the analyses and defines the field of action, so to speak” 
(Kurer, 2005, p. 222). Some theoretical approaches imply that the idea of 
corruption can be grasped within a universal conceptualization that is usually 
associated with bribery. Others adopt the principle that corruption does not mean 
the same thing everywhere and that some social practices, such as gift-giving, 
have no negative connotation in some societies yet could be defined as corruption 
by Western standards (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  
Regardless of the approach, it is important to recognize that an intrinsic 
quality of any definition is that it ought to be a generalized description of a 
particular phenomenon that captures most of the attributes that characterize the 
essence of that phenomenon (Kurer, 2005). This means that a good definition has 
to be ambiguous enough to embrace most of the hypothetical situations that the 
definition is trying to incorporate, while still establishing some limitations to 
provide meaning and certainty to what is being defined.  
Although not always acknowledged by some academics, corruption is an 
extremely contested concept. This means that it has a diversity of meanings 
depending on variables such as the setting in which corruption happens, the epoch 
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of occurrence, the case under consideration, the type of corruption, the people 
involved, the value at stake, mores, local culture, and so on (Pritzl, 2000). 
Therefore, a hallmark of corruption is that there is no consensus on what it means, 
or to put it in other words, corruption can mean many things in many different 
places.  
Throughout history, the term “corruption” has had different meanings and 
connotations (Friedrich, 1999). What is considered to be corruption today, such as 
the practice of U.S. corporations giving bribes to officials in Third World 
countries to secure contracts from bids (e.g. Wal-Mart’s recent kickbacks in 
Mexico), was not defined as such in the past. Likewise, some practices (e.g. 
exchange of favors among public servants, cronyism, influence peddling, and 
nepotism) that are explicitly defined as corrupt acts in industrialized societies 
might not be understood as wrongdoing in Mexico, Argentina, or Nigeria. It is 
crucial then to take into account the context (e.g. local culture, particular 
historical processes, etc.) and the setting (e.g. political and social environment, 
government system, and singular circumstances) when defining corruption 
because these two elements can influence, and even determine, the meaning and 
definition of this phenomenon. 
Some countries share similarities in corrupt practices so that it could be 
possible to propose a general definition of corruption applicable to them. For 
instance, analogous historical processes in Latin America, such as colonialism, 
dictatorships, and underdevelopment, have influenced how corruption is 
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experienced and defined in countries such as Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico. 
Nevertheless, despite any similarities among these countries, each possesses a set 
of political, social, and cultural circumstances that makes it different from the 
others, and understanding these conditions is crucial to grasping the complexity of 
corruption at the local level.  
This does not mean that comparative analyses of corruption cannot be 
done using quantitative approaches. Indeed, general definitions of corruption 
serve as launching pads to theorize and argue about it, and any scientific method 
capable of providing insights on these types of social issues should be used to 
shed light on these problems. However, from a qualitative approach, such as the 
one taken in this research, local context and setting must be taken into account in 
order to understand the complicated nature of corruption. Corruption is a political 
and economic problem, but it also a sociological, cultural, legal, and 
anthropological issue. This multifaceted feature of corruption is the theoretical 
point of departure of this qualitative approach. Qualitative approaches such as this 
one can render unexpected findings that contribute to the literature of corruption 
(Blundo, 2007; Haller and Shore, 2005; Kurer, 2005; Pritzl, 2000; Williams and 
Beare, 1999).  
Universal vs. Non-Universal Definitions of Corruption 
In a general sense, corruption indicates bribery, extortion, graft, 
embezzlement, and kickbacks. However, under certain scenarios, this concept 
also may or may not include acts such as favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, the use 
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of connections, patronage, political clientelism, the use of favors, gift-giving, 
influence peddling, and the like (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010; Gupta, 1995; Lomnitz, 
2000; Morris, 1991). Scholarly work about corruption has usually been defined 
according to particular social disciplines. Although these approaches have been 
useful in helping to theorize corruption, they have ignored the testimony of the 
people who engaged in this phenomenon as well as the context and setting in 
which it takes place.  
Given the multiplicity of ideas about corruption, there is a need for an 
alternative option besides a one-size-fits-all concept. For instance, the classic 
definition provided by the World Bank “corruption is the abuse of public office 
for private gains” (Haller and Shore, 2005) could be applied in some cases of 
corruption, but it would be insufficient to understand the diversity of meanings 
and their implications in every single society. By not having a more 
comprehensive approach of this phenomenon, any policy or action for addressing 
it would be misguided because it would depart from a limited view of the 
problem. Thus, extrapolating scholarly formulas and typologies from one country 
to another could be useful but would fail to address the particular cultural and 
social circumstances of every society.  
Universal approaches are incomplete at some point because most of them 
ignore the social conditions and circumstances where corruption occurs and how 
it is understood locally. Context and setting are important when defining 
corruption because they allow an understanding of the subtleties and sociocultural 
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elements behind the multiplicity of meanings of corruption. This variety of 
meanings appears to occur in different realms, such as politics, government 
agencies, state judicial systems, and society in general.  
There is an overwhelming amount of international literature on corruption 
that has led to a proliferation of conceptualizations that suggest scholars cannot 
agree on what corruption means. “There is little accord about what constitutes a 
reasonably comprehensive and widely shared definition of corruption” (Chinhamo 
and Shumba, 2007, p.2). Corruption is not just a complicated issue to grasp, but it 
is also dependent on the kind of disciplines or perspectives with which scholars 
approach this issue. This does not mean that it is impossible to reach some 
agreement about it, but it is essential to find the best way to approach corruption 
in order to be more precise about what is being discussed. More accurate language 
for the notion of corruption will help devise better methods and ideas to address 
this problem. To create a more systematic theoretical discussion, I will next 
provide a general literature review on the concept of corruption, beginning with 
the author, Michael Johnston, who openly acknowledges that the causes and 
consequences of corruption can vary depending on the context. 
Literature Review on Corruption 
Syndromes of Corruption 
Michael Johnston (2005) argues in his book Syndromes of Corruption that 
defining corruption as a “one size fits all” category is not addressing the problem 
properly. Johnston contends that different societies have different corruption 
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problems and that all nations, regardless of their level of development, have issues 
with this phenomenon at different degrees. He connects corruption with 
development and focuses on different settings and the way power and wealth are 
interrelated. Johnston suggests four syndromes for corruption, which can be used 
to describe and characterize countries that possess a combination of certain 
political and economic conditions with specific government and social 
institutions. The four syndromes are Influence Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs 
and Clans, and Official Moguls. The idea of his proposal is to categorize the signs 
and symptoms—hence the named syndromes—that indicate a particular level of 
corruption. What Johnston ultimately proposes is an understanding and 
explanation of how the complexity of context and settings influences the diverse 
ways in which corruption operates. According to him, understanding this diversity 
is important in order to propose real reforms that can lead to combating corruption 
in accordance with each particular socio-political context and reality.  
Despite the fact that Johnston criticizes one-size-fits-all definitions of 
corruption, he does suggest one, carefully warning about the controversy and 
disagreement attached to it. He defines corruption as “the abuse of public roles or 
resources for private benefit [italics in original], but emphasize[s] that ‘abuse,’ 
‘public,’ and even ‘benefit,’ are matters of contention in many societies and there 
are varying degrees of ambiguity in most” (Johnston, 2005, p. 12). Johnston does 
not focus on corruption as a specific behavior or act, but as a systemic problem; 
he contends that corruption is inextricably related to economics, politics, and state 
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building. Countries with stronger institutions, healthy political systems, and 
thriving economies are less likely to suffer from systemic corruption than those 
lacking these features. 
For Johnston, the dynamics between wealth, power, and institutions are 
essential in understanding the pervasiveness of corruption. Johnston’s approach 
looks at the systemic problem of corruption as a whole, but does not pay attention 
to the numerous details of cultural traditions and social conditions of every 
society. In other words, it does not look at sociocultural context and setting. These 
traditions and social conditions are relevant in a society in which corruption is a 
social instrument, a sort of tool used to navigate everyday affairs, and where this 
concept has multiple definitions and understandings, as it does in Mexico 
(Lomnitz, 2000).  
Changing the rules and setting up new institutions would not solve 
corruption by itself, because these actions would not affect the old social habits 
and long-term malfeasant attitudes that exist among individuals in societies in 
which corruption has been so widespread. 
If a state already has a corrupt political economy, then it is not 
likely to enforce new rules aggressively. Simultaneously, and to 
the frustration of those wanting simple explanations, new rules and 
contexts can create new patterns of corrupt behavior at the same 
time that old patterns are at work. (Warner, 2007, p. 9) 
 
Clearly, corruption cannot be properly addressed by merely implementing 
economic and political reforms without paying attention to the local culture and 
mores. Most conceptualizations of corruption have not taken into account the 
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local surrounding conditions because arguments from every culture are 
asymmetrical, making it difficult to make non-contradictory generalizations that 
can embrace all those differences. For instance, when citizens have more loyalty 
to relatives, friends, and community members than they have to government 
institutions, neither institutional reform nor the use of wealth and power can have 
much impact. 
Johnston uses Mexico as one of his cases to explain one of his syndromes 
of corruption. In his discussion of the syndrome Oligarch and Clans, Johnston 
cites three cases: Russia, the Philippines, and Mexico. Regarding Mexico, he 
accurately describes the political conditions of the authoritarian regime that made 
corruption its favorite tool in maintaining strict control and stability. Johnston 
acknowledges that in this syndrome the concept of corruption is significantly 
broadened:  
Where boundaries and distinctions between the public and the 
private, the state and society, and politics and the markets are 
indistinct and fluid, and where legal and social norms are contested 
or in flux, a wider range of activities become part of the problem. 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 153) 
 
However, he does not address the meaning of corruption in itself because his 
focus is on the larger systemic problem that is interconnected to development and 
state building.  
Political Scholarship on Corruption 
The bulk of the literature regarding corruption is derived from political 
corruption studies and the assumption that the main—if not the only—form of 
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corruption is bribery. From a political perspective, the literature tends to focus on 
corruption as a pathology of the government. Whether there is a democracy or an 
authoritarian regime, political corruption has usually been defined as any behavior 
that deviates from the norm. This deviation is usually associated with a personal 
benefit at the expense of the public. Friedrich (1999) asserts that this is the core 
meaning of the concept of corruption and that this idea has been continuously 
used in most societies to explain corruption. Most of these conceptualizations can 
be summed up in the following statement: corruption refers to any abuse of a 
public office for private benefit. It is possible to deconstruct this definition in 
order to list its core elements and have a better understanding of it.  
First, this perspective emphasizes the behavior of public officials rather 
than institutional or systematic patterns of corruption. From this point of view, 
corruption is first and foremost a “bad apple” problem, meaning it is an issue of 
individual behavior, not a flaw in the system. Second, the notion of public office 
focuses on the bureaucratic setting only and disregards the private sector where 
corruption can also occur. Third, this definition is normative, meaning that only 
those acts that the norms define as corrupt will be considered as such, while those 
acts that are not defined as illegal by the law (e.g. influence peddling and 
favoritism) even if they are corrupt, will be legal and permitted (Kurer, 2005). 
Finally, the definition is state-centric, implying that the term “public office” is 
conflated with the notion of state, which is problematic (Warren, 2004). However, 
the typical state has decentralized many of its functions, such as private hospitals 
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and schools. This implies that nowadays some corporations and non-
governmental organizations exert roles and provide services to the public reserved 
in the past only for the government. As a result, this definition of corruption 
would not be applied to anyone who works for these institutions because they do 
not fit the criterion of public office.  
One notion of political corruption suggested by Nye (1967) that became 
popular among scholars a few decades ago—and was even used as a theoretical 
model—summarizes the principle elements of political corruption. Nye said, 
“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, p. 419). This conceptualization was intended to 
be broad enough to embrace most instances of corruption. However, it only 
includes corrupt acts that deal with public servants, such as bribery, 
embezzlement, and extortion, but fails to address other types of corruption, such 
as favoritism, influence peddling, and cronyism. It also excludes corruption that 
takes place in nongovernmental settings, which is becoming a more common 
phenomenon among corporations and private institutions such as the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals on wrongdoing. Another criticism is that this definition is 
culturally biased (Johnston, 1986) because it neglects local context. Other 
scholars (Friedrich, 1999; Malem Seña, 2002; Morris,1991; Noonan, 1984) who 
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have addressed corruption from a political and legal perspective adopted  
definitions of this phenomenon that are similar to Nye’s definition. 
Economic Scholarship on Corruption 
The idea of corruption from an economic perspective is based on an 
approach that explains that the core of this phenomenon is a financial problem: 
corruption is motivated by selfishness. According to this view, regardless of the 
culture, values, and social norms, most human beings who engage in corrupt acts 
do so for pecuniary reasons. “There is one human motivator that is both universal 
and central when explaining the divergent experiences of different countries 
[dealing with corruption]. That motivator is self-interest” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 
p. 2). The corollary is that if the economic benefit was gone, corruption would be 
too. At the very least, it would be dramatically reduced.   
Within this approach, corruption is seen as doing business in which the 
main actors pocket money to take advantage of bureaucracy or deficient 
management of the state’s affairs. In this case, bribes are said to regulate a supply-
and-demand mechanism between the state (as a provider of goods and services) 
and the public (as is entitled to them). Because many individuals are not willing to 
queue or may not have the right to receive those services and goods, they may be 
ready to pay “incentives” to obtain them (Lui, 1985). From this angle, a 
government office is seen as a commercial organization within which public 
servants do their best to extract the maximum self-benefit from their positions, 
which is always in detriment to the public good.  
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Klitgaard (1988) provides a point of view on this kind of corruption, and 
his definition summarizes similar stands from authors such as Lui (1985), Rose-
Ackerman (1999), and Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Klitgaard argues that “illicit 
behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents 
have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak” 
(Klitgaard, 1988, p. 75). According to his perspective, the fact that a public 
servant maintains the control of a government service without enough supervision 
leads to corruption. This notion is consistent with the idea that supply and demand 
in a bureaucratic setting can be mediated by corruption. Klitgaard suggests a 
formula to represent the basic ingredients of this phenomenon: Corruption = 
Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. This equation implies that corruption 
can be prevented by taking away the decision-making processes of public officials 
(shutting down the business) while exerting more control over their behavior 
(more supervision).  
Overall, conceptualizing corruption, either from a political or economic 
approach, can be useful when viewing specific public offices or bureaucratic 
government settings in order to understand these kinds of corruption: bribery, 
extortion, kickbacks, and embezzlement. However, to explain the frequency of 
corruption, its hidden mechanisms, why it occurs, and whether or not 
sociocultural norms influence this phenomenon, a holistic approach is more 
desirable.  
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Broadening the Definition of Corruption  
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, besides the traditional 
assessments from economists and political scientists, new research from other 
social scientists belonging to disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, law, 
psychology, and multidisciplinary programs has begun to study corruption 
(Blundo, 2007; Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010; Haller and Shore, 2005; Hasty, 2005; 
Lomnitz, 2000; Nuijten and Anders, 2007; Smith, 2007). These innovative views 
have addressed the idea of corruption from perspectives different from politics 
and economics, challenging the conventional assumption of conceptualizing 
corruption as a universal phenomenon. 
 Most of these scholars agree that the idea of corruption is malleable, given 
that it can be studied and defined from multiple perspectives and disciplines 
depending on which elements are highlighted and the kind of corruption under 
study. Although corruption may be similar in many forms, the mechanisms and 
cultural meanings of corruption that may apply and occur among law enforcement 
officers are never the same as the mechanisms and cultural meanings among 
judges or court staff. For instance, in Mexico bribing a patrol officer is socially 
accepted (Morris, 1991), but the same action is condemned if it occurs among 
court staff officials (Begné Guerra, 2007). In a similar situation, providing gifts to 
public officials is seen as a way to create social networks in China, with no social 
stigma attached to this behavior (Smart, 1993), but the same action would 
probably be condemned and criminalized in developed countries. Thus, 
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corruption varies according to setting, social status of the corruptor and corrupted, 
the matters involved, the societal and cultural mores, the value of the transaction, 
and so on.  
The political and economic conceptualizations of corruption have usually 
described this problem as either a violation of the law (normative approach), the 
use of public positions as business (economic approach) or the abuse of public 
office for personal gains (political approach). However, the idea of corruption 
does not belong per se to any discipline in particular, whether it is politics, 
economics, law, or sociology. Every notion of corruption derived from any of 
these academic fields has always been an unfinished endeavor because each 
attempt usually explores only one side of the problem and leaves others 
untouched. These traditional approaches also fail to address the complexity of 
social relations and how individuals interact with institutions when the rule of law 
is less important than kinship affiliation, social networks, and local traditions—as 
is the case in many African and Latin American countries.  
A holistic or more inclusive definition of corruption would not be intended 
to exhaust the nature of the phenomenon, but to serve as analytical tool to explore 
and expand theories and methods aimed to address corruption. By definition, most 
academic or theoretical proposals approaching corruption—or any other social 
problem for that matter—have methodological and empirical limitations because 
they are constrained by their own research principles. Additionally, it is 
understood by scholars that context, institutions, and culture matter when 
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describing and analyzing a particular social issue. I do not want to demonstrate 
these principles in this thesis; rather, my contribution is towards making the case 
that corruption cannot be fully understood without interrogating the parties 
involved and affected by this problem and making sense of their discourses. 
Obtaining meanings and different narratives from their voices can help to grasp 
corruption more accurately.  
In this research, those voices belong to employees working at the Mexican 
federal judiciary, and listening to them facilitates the comprehension of corruption 
in this government branch by taking into account local context, institutional 
meanings, parties involved, and interests at stake. As Punch points out, 
“corruption is seen not as one thing but as a complex and shifting phenomenon 
taking many forms, proving remarkably resilient, altering over time and adapting 
to control regimes” (Punch, 2009, p. 225). 
I do believe that one cannot fight something that it is unknown, and 
corruption seems elusive if researchers overlook ways to include the opinions of 
those affected by this problem. Thus, only when a particular phenomenon such 
corruption is known can one understand it to the point at which it becomes 
possible to change it (Coronel, 1999). Conceptualizing and understanding the 
scope of the meanings of corruption serves as a basis for a stronger foundation 
from which to address this problem effectively. Because corruption usually occurs 
in correlation to a larger set of systems of government, organizations, and 
practices, this research dovetails with a more holistic approach to the study of 
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judicial corruption by taking into account the aforementioned context and setting. 
The setting is the Mexican federal judiciary—district courts, in particular, where 
trial proceedings are carried out—and the context is Mexican society and its legal 
system, comprising institutions and practices inherited from the old authoritarian 
government of the twentieth century. The essential part of this dissertation is an 
ethnographic approach that collected data from employees and judges working in 
the federal courts. The following chapter explains at length how fieldwork was 
conducted and how access to interviewees and the federal judiciary was possible.   
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGICAL PRACTICES, INTERVIEWS, FIELDWORK 
The Challenges of Studying Corruption 
 
As explained in chapter one, corruption is a complicated phenomenon to 
study. Most social scientists who have focused on this problem (Gupta, 1995; 
Haller and Shore, 2005; Klitgaard, 1988; Morris, 1991; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Smith, 2007) agree that it is difficult to witness and research corruption first hand. 
This is not surprising given that one of the main characteristics of corruption is 
the secrecy in which it usually occurs. As Haller and Shore point out, “[i]t is often 
assumed that corruption takes place only in hidden, occult and unofficial settings, 
clandestinely, and with the knowledge of the immediate exchange-partners only” 
(2005, p. 11). Thus, if a researcher cannot directly collect data about the nature 
and modus operandi of a particular event, how do we learn about corruption? This 
is one of the major challenges when researching corruption using social sciences’ 
conventional research methods. 
 Challenges with researching corruption are similar to challenges 
researching topics such as drug abuse and prostitution. Just as individuals who 
engage in drugs or prostitution are unlikely to talk about their behavior because of 
the stigma and legal implications attached to such acts, so are those involved in 
acts that are deemed corrupt. As a result, scholars who conduct research on any of 
the aforementioned phenomena usually have to rely on secondary-order data to 
collect information. This information is a sort of second-hand knowledge: 
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participants do not have direct understanding of the problem, but rather talk about 
how they see and interpret it (Haller and Shore, 2005).  
 As explained earlier, corruption is a contested concept: it does not have 
the same meaning everywhere. Consequently, the study of corruption requires the 
understanding of social and cultural contexts in order to grasp the complexities of 
this problem (Blundo, 2007; Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010; Nuijten and Anders, 2007). 
The most suitable social science approach that would allow us to better grasp this 
socio-cultural context is to use the qualitative methods approach. 
In social research, there are a wide variety of qualitative methods to 
collect data, from direct and participant observation to interviews, focus groups, 
and case studies. Among these methods, ethnography stands out as one of the best 
approaches to study and understand people’s behavior and cultural phenomena 
because it looks in depth at everyday life and practice. For researching corruption, 
qualitative methods offer a practical tool to learn and grasp the social and cultural 
complexities of this phenomenon.   
Traditional approaches to corruption have rarely asked those directly 
involved or affected by corruption about their perspective on the problem. Thus, 
the research project behind this dissertation is aimed at studying corruption 
through interviews with those who have witnessed or experienced corruption and 
have been affected by it within the Mexican Federal Judiciary (MFJ).  
Many sensitive issues had to be considered to choose the most appropriate 
methods for this research. I had to take into consideration the nature of the setting 
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under study (government offices), the availability of interviewees (mostly busy 
public officials), and the main research topic (corruption). In short, the research 
methods used in this academic investigation are returning membership, 
interviews, and a case study.  
Conducting Research as a Returning Member 
 Those who engage in ethnographic work look for information that 
members of the setting under study have, this is known as member knowledge. In 
this research project, I already have this member knowledge based on my 
background as a Mexican attorney and prior practice and training. Because of this 
membership knowledge, I conducted the fieldwork as a Returning Member, “a 
person who at one time had contextual member knowledge and now seek to return 
to study things in this setting” (John Johnson, personal communication). As an 
attorney who litigated in Mexican courts for several years, I experienced 
corruption first hand in the state judicial system as well as in the federal courts. 
Corruption in the state courts was mostly petty corruption, such as the well-
known practice of La mordida and grease payments to circumvent the red tape or 
expedite legal proceedings (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010). Sometimes I witnessed 
blatant bribery at the highest echelons, but only exceptionally.  
In the federal judiciary, I knew of corruption through friends and 
colleagues working in district courts, who would confide in me when a trial was 
affected by corruption. This corruption was rare, though. Most of the time, I was 
able to confirm this information by reading the summary of the case sentence 
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(which is a public record) and by looking at the context of the trial. By context, I 
mean who the judge was, what interests were at stake, who the main stakeholders 
of the trial were, and who the attorney or law firm in charge of the case was. 
Context was important because by identifying it, one could figure out hidden 
connections or relations between stakeholders that could potentially lead to 
influence peddling, cronyism, and corruption. For instance, if a defendant’s 
attorney in a criminal trial turned out to be a former classmate, acquaintance, or 
friend of the judge, this relation could facilitate corruption at some point. 
Likewise, if the interests at stake were high, more often than not both parties 
would use political and economic incentives to achieve a favorable judgment. 
Interviews  
 Given the complexity of studying corruption among Mexican public 
officials, I decided that the best methodological approach was conducting semi-
structured interviews. This type of interview allows the use of questionnaires to 
include specific topics essential for the researcher, using a loose format that 
allows the interviewee the freedom to expand on themes he or she personally feels 
are important. As explained by Bernard, “a semistructured interview is open 
ended, but follows a general script and covers a list of topics…in situations where 
you won’t get more than one chance to interview someone, semistructured 
interviewing is best” (Bernard, 2002, p. 203-205).  
I realized from my former experiences that Mexican officials would be 
reluctant to talk about their jobs if the conversation were being recorded. Any 
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possibility that their opinions could be exposed to public scrutiny would have 
undermined my efforts to recruit officials for interviews. Most of them fear that if 
they say what they really think—usually a criticism of their institution—and it is 
disclosed, they could lose their jobs. Consequently, I did not tape-record any of 
the interviews. To record the information I wrote their responses on paper using 
notes, sometimes using keywords to emphasize themes or ideas that the 
interviewee considered important. After every interview, I transcribed the notes 
onto a Word document using a netbook that I carried with me all the time. 
Because the transcription took place right after the interview, I was able to include 
most of the information provided by the interviewees based on the notes and fresh 
memories.  
I interviewed 45 people in total: 40 public officials working in the MFJ, 
three Mexican scholars whose expertise related to the same institution, and two 
attorneys whose work focused on federal courts. Out of the 45 people 
interviewed, 16 interviewees were females and 29 were males. Two-thirds of the 
interviews (32) took place in the interviewees’ offices and one-third (12 
interviews) in different settings, such as coffee shops, restaurants, and the 
interviewees’ homes. Interviews were conducted in six different cities in Mexico: 
Nogales, Tijuana, Mexico City, Puebla, Acapulco, and Morelia. Below, there is a 
table about interviewees’ demographics, which highlights the most important 
information about them.   
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Table 1.1 Sample’s Demographics 
# City Name  Gender Rank Seniority 
1 Nogales Antonio Male Secretary of the Court 10 yrs. 
2 Nogales Bruno Male Judge 19 yrs. 
3 Nogales Carlos Male Process Server 20 yrs. 
4 Nogales Daniel Male Federal Public Defender 5 yrs. 
5 Tijuana Elizabeth Female Typist 22 yrs. 
6 Tijuana Felipe Male Secretary of the Court 8 yrs. 
7 Tijuana Gerardo Male Federal Public Defender 8 yrs. 
8 Tijuana Héctor Male Secretary of the Court 17.5 yrs. 
9 Tijuana Isabel Female Judge 22 yrs. 
10 Tijuana Jazmín Female Federal Public Defender 10 yrs. 
11 Tijuana Kevin Male Secretary of the court 11 years 
12 Tijuana Luis Male Judge 12.5 yrs. 
13 Tijuana Mónica Female Secretary of the court 19 yrs. 
14 Tijuana Magdalena Female Judge 32 yrs. 
15 Mexico City Natalia Female Secretary of the court 11.5 yrs. 
16 Mexico City Orlando Male Scholar  
17 Mexico City Pedro Male Secretary of the court 11 yrs. 
18 Mexico City Quirina Female Scholar  
19 Mexico City Ramón Male Scholar  
20 Mexico City Santiago Male Secretary of the court 18 yrs. 
21 Mexico City Teresa Female Secretary of the court 9 yrs. 
22 Mexico City Victor Male Secretary of the court 9 yrs. 
23 Mexico City Wilfrido Male Secretary of the court 10 yrs. 
24 Mexico City Xavier Male Secretary of the Council 20 yrs. 
25 Mexico City Yanny Male Secretary of appellate court 15 yrs. 
26 Mexico City Zacarías Male Magistrate 40 yrs. 
27 Puebla Andrés Male Judge 11 yrs. 
28 Acapulco Baltasar Male Typist 1.5 yrs. 
29 Acapulco Carmen Female Typist 25 yrs. 
  
45 
30 Acapulco Diego Male Judge 14 yrs. 
31 Acapulco Ernesto Male Secretary of the court 15 yrs. 
32 Morelia Fernando Male Secretary of the court 26 yrs. 
33 Morelia Gustavo Male Federal Public Defender 30 yrs. 
34 Morelia Hugo Male Magistrate 21 yrs. 
35 Morelia Ignacio Male Litigant in federal courts 36 yrs. 
36 Morelia Josefina Female Typist 5 yrs. 
37 Morelia  Karla Female Process Server 9 yrs. 
38 Morelia Lourdes Female Secretary of appellate court 16 yrs. 
39 Morelia Miguel Male Secretary of the court 11 yrs. 
40 Morelia Nancy Female Secretary of appellate court 16 yrs. 
41 Morelia Oscar Male Secretary of appellate court 13 yrs. 
42 Morelia  Patricia Female Litigant in federal courts 30 yrs. 
43 Morelia Quintiliano Male Magistrate 20 yrs. 
44 Morelia Raquel Female Typist 13 yrs. 
45 Morelia Sara Female Judge 17 yrs. 
 
Besides interviews, I also conducted an archival research on a recent high-
profile trial dubbed the Michoacanazo. Several interviewees in Morelia 
mentioned the Michoacanazo case as a paradigmatic example of corruption, 
politics, and drug-related issues in federal courts. For some interviewees, this case 
embraced the complexities and contradictions that the federal judicial system has 
to face regarding corruption and drug trafficking. I decided to use this trial as a 
case study for this dissertation to present an analysis of the connections between 
corruption, politics, and drug trafficking. Chapter six addresses this case study in 
detail, but I will briefly explain the main context of the case and how I obtained 
copies of the trial. 
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Case Study: The Michoacanazo 
During the fieldwork, I asked some interviewees who had direct 
knowledge of this case about the context and legal foundations of the indictment. 
Through a chain of fortunate events, I was able to get direct access to copies of 
parts of the file and sentencing data, which enabled me to grasp a more accurate 
picture of the whole case. I also collected enough first-hand data and archival 
documents to conduct a thorough analysis of it. By knowing what happened, why 
it happened, and what it meant in the broader context of this institution, this case 
offered the opportunity to approach my research topic from a practical perspective 
while allowing a critical analysis of the MFJ.  
The events that led to this trial took place on May 26, 2009, when the 
Mexican federal government arrested several dozens of public servants in the 
state of Michoacán. The federal attorney’s office (Procuraduria General de la 
Republica, PGR) argued that these officials had ties to, or gave protection to, the 
powerful regional cartel known as La Familia Michoacana (Elorriaga and 
Castillo, 2009). Among the detainees were a state judge, a former state attorney 
general, a close adviser to the governor, state police officers, and several mayors. 
Federal forces, without prior notice to state law enforcement agencies and the 
local government, made the arrests.  
The news of this event made headlines nationally and internationally and 
created a deep political conflict between the state and the federal governments 
(Elorriaga and Castillo, 2009).  State elections were approaching in the following 
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months, and because the state government was under control by the opposition 
party (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, PRD), some pundits viewed these 
arrests as politically motivated to influence voters (Alemán, 2010). All detainees 
were indicted, but all of them were eventually released one to two years later 
when federal judges threw out the case for lack of conclusive evidence.  
 To provide a more accurate explanation of the case, I analyze in chapter 
six the social and legal context of drug trafficking in Mexico as well as the long-
term relationship between politics and drug cartels. There is also a thorough 
discussion and close examination of the evidence from the trial to shed light on 
the hidden mechanisms that surround the connection between corruption and 
political power. Overall, the Michoacanazo case offers a unique opportunity to 
take a closer look at the federal judiciary and complement the data from 
fieldwork.  
Questionnaires 
I arrived at the questions asked during the fieldwork using two methods: 
one was an analysis of the setting under study and consideration of the kind of 
questions most appropriate and effective to elicit responses from MFJ employees. 
After I came up with a list of topics and questions, I set up the second method: I 
did a pretest of these topics and questions with intimates who worked at the 
federal judiciary. Their feedback helped me to eliminate inappropriate questions 
and be more subtle when addressing controversial themes. This feedback also 
suggested including an analysis of the institution as a whole, instead of focusing 
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on corruption only. According to my intimates, this new approach would 
encounter less resistance to talk from respondents and create friendlier interviews, 
which it turned out to be true.   
I introduced questions regarding the everyday activities of these public 
servants working in the MFJ as a form of icebreaker. As I began my fieldwork, I 
noticed that, translated into Spanish, the original questions still sounded abrupt 
from a Mexican cultural perspective. It is considered impolite to ask a public 
official about corruption or wrongdoing because there is the assumption that the 
interviewer is suggesting this official is corrupt (Riding, 1985). Thus, I reworded 
the questions to introduce a more indirect approach and to avoid repetitions while 
leaving the topic of corruption for the final part of the interview.  
This modified questionnaire made more sense because it began the 
interview with general questions about the institution, such as what was the most 
difficult task of working at the MFJ, what was the best part of the MFJ, and what 
needed to be improved in the MFJ. This approach showed interviewees that the 
interview was about knowing and understanding the federal judiciary as a whole, 
and not only the problem of corruption.  
Theory 
 The theoretical approach that sustains this research project is based on the 
interpretive constructionist theory (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). This theory looks at 
describing and understanding social situations, using interpretation and 
meaningful context. Traditional approaches seeking answers to general questions 
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on corruption usually follow the methods used in the natural sciences. To 
understand how corruption is produced, however, demands a different approach. 
Interpretive constructionist theory (ICT) pays attention to people’s view of their 
world, their jobs, and how they experience reality (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
Through ICT, it will be possible to document the shared meanings and 
expectations these people have in common and how they interpret their 
experiences within a specific cultural circle. The purpose of using this theoretical 
approach is to look at corruption and the Mexican federal judiciary through the 
lenses of the people who work in or have some knowledge of this government 
setting. 
People who work and spend large amounts of time together share similar 
meanings of themselves, the job setting, and their everyday activities (Gubrium 
and Holstein, 1997). ICT is a more appropriate theoretical approach than those 
coming from a hypothesis-testing paradigm because it allows an analysis of the 
phenomenon of corruption in the MFJ as well as the institution itself. ICT takes 
into account individuals’ opinions and views of those who have a direct 
knowledge of the problem and looks for a holistic comprehension of what is 
under study. This theory is inclusive because it embraces the voices of those who 
have been ignored in the academic debate of corruption: the people who deal and 
face with complex social issues in their everyday activities (Gubrium and 
Holstein, 1997).  
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 Interpretative constructionist theory is not free from criticism, though. 
Critics of the theory argue that this approach can lead to absolute relativism 
because it tends to focus on describing a multiplicity of viewpoints; consequently, 
none of these perspectives will be truer than any other (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2010). However, researchers who use ICT analyze the experience of different 
people and then evaluate contrasting versions of these perspectives to present the 
best explanation. In addition, the analysis of the collected data is tested to show 
accuracy, thoroughness, and believability, which leads to scientific and credible 
conclusions (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
 Finally, interpretive constructionist theory dovetails with qualitative 
research, in particular with an interviewing model, such as the one used in this 
dissertation. Both ICT and semi-structured interviews look for a deep 
understanding of the topic of research by focusing on meaning, context, setting, 
and situations. To reach these goals, both the research project and the theory 
supporting it must be flexible enough to integrate new findings into the project 
and redesign the interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). This flexibility was a great 
asset during the fieldwork because it allowed me to include other themes related 
to corruption, such as abuse of power, nepotism, and gender discrimination that I 
did not anticipate when designing the interview questionnaires.  
Methodological Practices 
 Given the complexities of studying corruption within a government branch 
that is reluctant to disclose its everyday practices to the public, I seek the 
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combination of different methodological practices to provide a substantive 
triangulation of information (John Johnson, personal communication). It is 
important to emphasize that this dissertation is written by a returning member 
with relevant sociocultural knowledge of the topic, the setting, and the people 
under study.  
 The first methodological practice used here is contextual triangulation, 
which means that the narratives and stories collected from the interviews are 
discussed and analyzed vis-à-vis the knowledge and cultural understandings from 
my prior experiences. At a different level, the accounts from some respondents 
are compared and contrasted with other respondents from the same jurisdiction or 
similar rank, to find patterns of behavior and confirm the veracity of the facts; this 
second methodological practice is named informant triangulation. A third 
methodological practice is documentary triangulation by which books, articles, 
and public documents of the MFJ are used to verify the collected information. 
Interestingly, the Michoacanazo case study mentioned earlier, embraces these 
three triangulations altogether for the following reasons: a) It was suggested as a 
paradigmatic trial by respondents, 2) this information was confirmed by other 
interviewees, and 3) it was possible to obtain public records to have a closer look 
at it.   
 The combination of these methods is the best approach to address the issue 
of corruption in the federal courts because the goal is to achieve embedded, 
contextual understandings of the problem, given the known complexities of 
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studying judicial corruption. By triangulating three different sources of 
information, it is possible to guarantee the reliability and validity of the 
methodological process.   
Heuristic Questions 
 Rather than proposing hypotheses, as is usually the case in traditional 
research projects, I decided to come up with heuristic questions, based on a 
suggestion by one of my committee members (John Johnson, personal 
communication). Hypothesis is a term that belongs mostly to methods of the 
natural sciences, which is a different paradigm from what is intended here. 
Heuristic questions refer to matters that are more experience-based and present a 
more flexible problem-solving methodology. There are four heuristic questions 
for this research, and they arose from different sources: I. The literature discussed 
in chapter one, II. The methods used to conduct the research, III. Personal 
experience in dealing with the MFJ, and IV. Feedback prior to the research from 
people working at this institution:   
1. Judges and judicial staff working in the MFJ define corruption in 
different ways depending on context and setting. Bribery and extortion will be 
clearly defined as corrupt acts. However, influence peddling, cronyism, and 
favoritism are less likely to be defined in the stark moral language of corruption 
because of institutional rationality and cultural norms.  
2. The impact of judicial corruption occurs mostly through subtle 
mechanisms by which some politicians and high-ranking officials influence 
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judges or judicial staff to provide benefits in the trials for some cartel members. 
These benefits include mitigated sentences, parole benefits, privileges in prison, 
and sentencing cartel members to state prisons rather than to high-security federal 
prisons. Rampant judicial corruption, such as an acquittal despite strong evidence, 
does not occur.    
3. The use of death threats by drug cartels against judges and judicial staff 
is becoming more frequent in drug-related cases. The MFJ has effectively 
responded to these threats, principally through the protection of personnel (e.g. 
armored vehicles, bodyguards, and keeping employees’ personal information 
confidential).  
4. Judicial corruption in the MFJ involves cliques and social networks. 
Elite attorneys working for drug cartel members influence judicial staff, judges, or 
justices through gift-giving and political support. Benefits to these officials 
include political connections and promises to move up the hierarchy, expensive 
gifts (e.g. golden watches, expensive bottles of alcohol, luxurious cars), money 
channeled to third parties (e.g. judges’ friends, relatives, girlfriends), and paid 
services (e.g. expensive travel, luxurious restaurants and clubs). 
In the conclusion of this dissertation (chapter seven), I address each of 
these heuristic questions to show whether the collected data and its analysis 
confirms their validity regarding corruption in the MFJ. In addition, a detailed 
assessment is provided to explain why these questions may have failed to account 
for the existence of corruption.  
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Intricacies of the Fieldwork Setting: The Federal Courtrooms  
Most federal courts are overwhelmed with excessive workloads. The 
demand for justice from citizens often exceeds the capacity of the federal 
judiciary to cope with legal petitions, proceedings, and trials in a timely manner. 
This is not by any means an exclusive problem of these courts. As a rule, the 
judicial system in Mexico, at both the state and federal levels, has traditionally 
been clogged with backlogs due to scarcity of personnel, resources, and lack of 
attention. In the federal courts, however, the backlog never was as bad as in state 
judiciaries. Because the federal courts have more resources and are better 
organized, they accomplish their legal duties more efficiently.  
The MFJ is a hierarchical and bureaucratic institution in the traditional 
sense of these words. As a bureaucracy, it divides the work into specific 
categories. The work is carried out by specialized individuals according to pre-
established rules set up by the federal constitution and bylaws. As a hierarchy, it 
is an organization that has strict, arranged ranks among individuals and between 
lower and higher courts that reflect a compartmentalized mentality. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to these arrangements. In the past, bureaucracy and 
hierarchy allowed the existence of a highly centralized judicial branch that 
maintained strict control of the institution in a top-down structure. This form of 
control reproduced features of the authoritarian regime, such as coopting 
dissidents, suppressing self-criticism, and keeping sentencing guidelines that 
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favored the undemocratic system. By doing this, the MFJ contributed to the most 
crucial element of the authoritarian regime: political stability (Domingo, 2000).  
In a more democratic era, this arrangement was problematic. The 
hierarchy and bureaucracy thwarted freedom of speech and the independence of 
judges and magistrates because they were subordinated to high-ranking officials. 
It also created an institutional atmosphere in which obedience, subordination, and 
loyalty to the boss were more important than either the institution itself or the 
public interest. Cronyism, influence peddling, and patronage had become deeply 
embedded within the federal judiciary because these acquired practices became 
normalized (Schatz, Concha, and Magaloni Kerpel, 2007).    
The authoritarian regime waned at the end of the twentieth century and the 
Mexican Federal Judiciary transformed dramatically in the past 15 years. Now, a 
more democratic and egalitarian judicial branch is emerging, but not without 
difficulties and arduous resistance from within (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni, 
2010). Bureaucracy and hierarchy are still a supporting and centralizing part of 
the federal judicial system, although in a different way than in the past. The 
categorization of people at the different echelons is not as prominent as it used to 
be during the undemocratic government though. Employees, judges, and high-
ranking members are still arranged in ranks of seniority, power, and social status 
according to the jobs they perform in the institution. These clear-cut divisions 
between lower, middle, and high-ranking members of the judicial branch manifest 
themselves in a myriad of ways. The organization of the courtroom, job duties, 
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distribution of space, social interaction, salaries, gender roles, and language usage 
are all intertwined and conditioned by the hierarchical and bureaucratic order that 
prevails (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni, 2010).  
Sometimes these features are immediately visible to an outsider by just 
looking at how the setting has been arranged and where every person sits and 
works. Other times, hierarchies and bureaucracy are more subtle or hidden and 
only detectable by paying close attention to events and activities that are usually 
taken for granted, such as employees’ demeanors, boss and worker interactions, 
and official rituals.  
A Hermetic Federal Judiciary 
The MFJ is an elite institution that avoids any outside scrutiny as a result 
of these hierarchies. As part of a centralized culture, the federal judiciary prefers 
to deal internally with issues affecting its members, image, policies, and any other 
problem that could imply some criticism. These policies have led the institution to 
turn inward and be relatively closed to outsiders (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni, 
2010).  
By adopting a reserved attitude towards those who do not have the 
credentials or the knowledge to interact or be part of the organization, the MFJ 
has remained inaccessible to a certain extent. In this context, being inaccessible 
means that the institution has kept strict control of its internal culture, policies, 
social relations, and everyday affairs. Only those who are familiar with the MFJ 
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know how and why the institution does what it does and the rationale behind it. 
Consequently, Mexican society knows little about the federal judiciary.  
What most people know about the MFJ does not reflect the nature and 
organization of the judicial branch. The technical language used in trials and 
proceedings has kept the MFJ out of reach because most people do not understand 
this technical terminology. Due to its aversion to external scrutiny, it is necessary 
to explain how I got access to people working at the MFJ to conduct the fieldwork 
and interviews during the summer of 2011. 
How I Got Member Knowledge  
 I studied law in Morelia Mexico and became an attorney during the mid-
1990s. As a law student, I did several internships at the state judicial system that 
gave me first-hand experience and an inside perspective about this branch of 
government. First, I joined the third civil courtroom in Morelia (Juzgado Tercero 
de lo Civil de Primera Instancia). My commercial law professor was the judge in 
this court, and she invited me to join it. Later, I did another internship at the 
prosecutor’s office assigned to the fourth criminal appellate court (Cuarta Sala 
Penal del Supremo Tribunal de Justicia del Estado). Finally, a year before 
graduation I joined as an intern the office of the public defender assigned to the 
fourth criminal courtroom of Morelia (Juzgado Cuarto de lo Penal de Primera 
Instancia), located adjacent to the state prison.  
I spent almost three years working as a trainee at the State Supreme 
Tribunal of Michoacán (Supremo Tribunal de Justicia de Michoacán), gaining 
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practical experience about law and litigation to better understand the judicial 
system. In particular, I engaged in socialization processes, such as spending time 
outside the office with other peers, attending celebrations relevant to people in the 
judicial system, and creating closer bonds with coworkers. These activities 
allowed me to figure out how important connections and friendships are in such a 
bureaucratic setting. This helped me later on during my litigation years as well as 
with future academic projects such as this one. The state judicial system is not the 
same as the federal judiciary, but there are some similarities between the two of 
them, such as the existence of hierarchies, bureaucracy, and lower and appellate 
courts (Vargas, 2008). The experience I gained at the state judicial system was 
fundamental in having easier and smoother access to the federal judicial system as 
an attorney as well as for the fieldwork of this research. 
 After my graduation, I worked for two law firms and practiced property, 
criminal, and civil law in the state of Michoacán, mostly in its capital Morelia. A 
few years later, having saved enough money to move on, I created my own law 
firm and personally litigated for more than six years in state and federal 
courtrooms. Litigation before federal courts was mostly Amparo cases in both 
district (lower) and collegiate (appellate) courts. During these years, as part of my 
duties as an attorney, I gained access to court staff, judges, and magistrates. 
Because this setting is immersed in a strong hierarchical structure, it was 
important to maintain respect and deference towards these public officials while 
dealing with them. Familiarity with technical language, appropriate demeanor, 
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and formal clothing were three basic elements that were and still are valued in the 
federal judiciary. Knowing how to use them appropriately takes time, but there is 
the reward of becoming an insider once they are learned. 
Over the years, some of my former classmates, acquaintances, and friends 
from law school began working at the federal judicial system and filled positions 
there. As is true of most people who get jobs at the MFJ, they initially began 
working at the lower echelons of the institution, and they made their way up the 
hierarchy until they began holding middle and high ranking positions. This meant 
moving out to different cities and working in various courtrooms in order to gain 
experience and senior positions. During this time, I always kept in touch with my 
social network of school friends, by either visiting them at their employment 
setting or getting together with them during the holiday season. Around 
Christmas, most of them would be back in Morelia to spend time with family, and 
we would reunite for dinner or just coffee to catch up and nurture our friendships.  
Approaching People in the Federal Courtrooms 
Snowball Approach 
I used my extended network of friends who work at the federal judiciary 
to contact and interview a little more than half of my sample. Some of those 
interviewees were my own friends who volunteered to be interviewed. Others 
were friends or acquaintances of my friends who accepted the interviews because 
I had been recommended (Adler and Clark, 2011). In the second round of 
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interviewees, I used a snowball approach to contact interviewees recommended 
by friends and acquiantances.   
Having my friends mediating to contact potential interviewees was an 
extremely useful formula for interviewing more people. As a result, and despite 
their busy schedules, the interviewees were willing to sit and talk with me for an 
hour or more. For some of the interviews, I had to wait for hours before we could 
start the interview because of the interviewee being called away on short notice. 
Eventually, however, the interview would be conducted.  
The fact that I was recommended by a mutual friend created a sort of 
commitment to do the interview, and this saved me time and energy, which 
helped me reach more individuals according to my research timetable. 
Conversely, when I lacked the recommendation of a friend, I was not able to 
secure as many interviews when I approached potential interviewees by myself. 
The Problem of Accessing Interviewees 
As with most bureaucratic organizations in Mexico, the MFJ is a 
complicated institution to get access to. In general, public employees tend to 
mistrust those who do not share the same affiliation because they are seen as 
outsiders. Federal court employees are even more suspicious of outsiders due to 
the nature of their work. Having a friend or acquaintance mediating between an 
employee and an outsider is extremely helpful in creating trust and rapport, but 
without a mediator, other measures are needed. I conducted fieldwork in some 
federal courtrooms where I did not know anyone personally, mostly in cities, such 
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as Nogales and Tijuana, which are located on the Mexico-U.S. border. To have a 
higher successful rate of interviews where a referral from a friend was not 
possible, I designed a personal strategy to create rapport (Adler and Clark, 2011) 
and convince these public officials to be interviewed. This strategy was divided 
into four rubrics: appearance, language (verbal and body), credentials, and 
research project.  
Appearance: My background as an attorney reminded me how important 
clothing and personal appearance are for good first impressions. When I first met 
with my potential interviewees to request an interview, I wore semi-casual clothes 
and I showed up early, around 9:00 in the morning, when these public servants 
open the courts to the public and they are usually not so busy. 
Body and Verbal Language: The use of body and verbal language were 
two important elements that communicated self-assurance and formality at the 
beginning of conversations. For body language, I was aware that a handshake is 
almost a mandatory ritual in Mexican culture when two people meet or greet each 
other, and meeting a public official for the first time could not have been the 
exception. For verbal language, I used formal words in Spanish and the traditional 
way of addressing people who are older or unknown to you. When talking to 
these officials, I always included their job title added to their last names to signify 
respect and acknowledge their official positions (Riding, 1985).  
Credentials: I presented myself as a graduate student and former attorney 
from Michoacán state conducting research on the federal judiciary. Initially, I did 
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not say I was an ASU student in order to avoid suspicion for being a potential 
outsider. I just said that I was a PhD student (estudiante de posgrado) doing 
fieldwork, without being specific about my affiliation. Sometimes “gatekeepers” 
(e.g. judge’s secretaries) would ask me to provide my affiliation in order to 
inform the potential interviewee where I was coming from, and I would provide 
my former law school affiliation: Universidad Michoacana (Michoacán 
University).  
Once I was in the presence of a future interviewee, and after the usual 
protocol of salutations, I explained to him/her that I had litigated for several years 
in Michoacán state, and that I wanted to explore other realms of law. I also 
mentioned that I was currently finishing a PhD in Sociology. It would have been 
complicated to explain my major as Justice Studies because there is no equivalent 
in Mexican academia for this discipline. I figured Sociology would be the closest 
subject most interviewees would recognize as the field of study supporting my 
research on the federal judicial system.  
Research Project: In order to convince potential interviewees to agree to 
the interviews, I realized that I had to make my research project attractive to them. 
To do this, I had to tackle two major obstacles: public officials’ busy schedules 
and the topic of corruption. When I began to entertain the idea of studying 
corruption at the MFJ, I knew that these public servants—who are extremely 
busy—would not easily give up their time for interviews. I also knew that I could 
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not tell them openly that I was conducting a research on corruption because most 
of them would have turned down the interviews (Haller and Shore, 2005). 
As I mentioned earlier, my strategy to make the research appealing was to 
incorporate other topics and issues related to the MFJ that could be interesting to 
my potential interviewees. Thus, when I first talked to future interviewees, I 
explained to them that I was conducting research on the federal judicial system to 
better understand the institution. I said that a fundamental part of the interview 
was to hear what they personally had to say about their workplace, whether good 
or bad. I emphasized that confidentiality would be guaranteed, that no questions 
would be asked about any trial or case under their consideration, and that names 
of people and personal information would not be recorded. I also said that I was 
planning to publish the findings of the research in the future in order to let the 
public know about it.  
Fieldwork: Criteria for Selecting Settings 
I conducted fieldwork in six different Mexican cities: Nogales, Tijuana, 
Mexico City, Acapulco, and Morelia. The rationale behind choosing these six 
cities to conduct interviews had two main goals: 1. to have a representative 
sample of the institution and people under study; and 2. to compare and contrast 
dissimilar jurisdictions of the MFJ and be able to achieve a holistic understanding 
of the institution and the problem of corruption.  
Federal courts are not the same in Mexico City as in any other jurisdiction 
far away from the capital. The MFJ is a centralized institution, and economic and 
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human resources favor the capital of the country where the head of the MFJ is 
located. This means that people who work in the federal courts of Mexico City 
enjoy better work settings and more opportunities to move up the echelons. 
Therefore, their perspectives on corruption and the institution could be different 
from someone who works in the district court of a small town located in the 
Mexico-U.S. border.  
Since jurisdictions in border towns would be included in the fieldwork, I 
picked up Nogales and Tijuana as places to conduct interviews. These two towns 
would be better fieldwork settings than other border cities, such as Ciudad Juarez 
and Nuevo Laredo. First, they were located nearer Phoenix, where I live, and 
would be within closer reach. Second, given the high levels of violence in some 
states of Mexico, such as Chihuahua and Tamaulipas where Ciudad Juarez and 
Nuevo Laredo are located, I did not want to risk personal safety by spending time 
in these cities. Finally, Tijuana is the largest city located at the Mexico-U.S. 
border and has the largest number of district courts of any border city. 
Geography influences the type of work that federal courts do. For 
instance, district courts located in border towns south of the U.S. have many trials 
related to drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling, and contraband. In 
addition, federal courts located in cities such as Acapulco and Morelia, where 
drug trafficking has been part of the local economy, have high crime rates related 
to drug cartel violence. Based on this criterion, I picked up Acapulco and Morelia 
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as settings for conducting interviews because the experience and stories that MFJ 
employees could tell about the research project would be significantly different.  
Mexico City concentrates the largest number of federal courts and archival 
resources; in addition, I have several intimates working on these courts. Then, 
picking this city as another place for conducting fieldwork was necessary. Puebla 
City, which is located close to Mexico City, also had plenty of resources and 
potential for finding respondents. I selected it for the same reasons that I included 
Mexico City. Finally, my hometown Morelia offered me the chance to interview 
many individuals because I had the largest social network there.   
The city of Morelia is known for its colonial heritage, and the local 
university—Universidad Michoacana—and its School of Law in particular, have 
a positive reputation within the federal judiciary because many of its graduates 
end up working in this institution. Morelia feels like a college town, but as the 
capital of the state of Michoacán, it suffers from the same urban problems (e.g. 
intense traffic, crime, unemployment) as any other large city. Morelia is located 
approximately 150 miles west of Mexico City, and it is well connected to the rest 
of the country with highways, an international airport, and public buses. 
Itinerary and Timetable 
I started fieldwork on April 15, 2011, in Nogales, where I interviewed four 
individuals. On April 25, I traveled to Tijuana. Tijuana is the largest Mexican city 
located on the Mexico-U.S border. Due to its proximity to the U.S., federal 
crimes, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms trafficking, occur at 
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high rates. There are eight district courts in Tijuana in total, and no other border 
town has as many courts as Tijuana does. I interviewed ten people there, and then 
I went to Mexico City. 
Fieldwork in Mexico City was one of the most exciting experiences during 
my summer of research. I was able to interview high-ranking officials and obtain 
great information for my research project, both during interviews and in my 
archival searches. Here, I interviewed nine people at different levels of the 
hierarchy from both lower and higher courts. I also interviewed three individuals 
from academia whose area of expertise was the federal judicial system and the 
Supreme Court. Mexico City concentrates the highest number of federal courts in 
Mexico, which should not come as a surprise since is the capital of the country 
where the seat of the federal powers lies. There are 79 district courts, 60 collegiate 
courts, and 9 unitary courts in Mexico City alone (Consejo de la Judicatura, 
2011). All of these courts are specialized by subject such as criminal, 
administrative, civil, and labor. Courts are located throughout the city, but 
following a particular pattern. The Supreme Court is located downtown, most 
criminal district courts are adjacent to the prisons (known as Reclusorios), and 
most civil and labor district courts are concentrated in a sort of judicial city called 
San Lázaro, north of downtown Mexico City. There are nearly ten Reclusorios in 
the capital and most of them have district courts. I conducted almost half of my 
interviews in this city in one of these Reclusorios, a few others in San Lázaro, and 
the rest in academic settings and restaurants when the interviewees requested a 
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setting other than their offices for meeting with me. From this city, I went to 
Puebla where I could interview one senior official only. 
 After Puebla, I went to Acapulco and interviewed four individuals. It was 
difficult to schedule interviews in this city because most potential respondents 
were discouraged from talking. Reluctance to be interviewed stemmed from a 
combination of several factors. First, most courts—at the lower and higher 
ranks—were overwhelmed with work, which made it difficult for these public 
servants to give away time for an interview. Second, for several years Acapulco 
has been the scene of a violent and bloody drug war between rival cartels that has 
left hundreds of people dead. Dismembered and decapitated bodies appear every 
day on the streets of this Pacific port, and regular shootings occur in major 
touristic centers and intersections. On December 2008, one process server 
working in the federal courts of Acapulco was found dead, with a shot in his head 
and evidence of torture (García Parra, 2008). Nobody knows why this happened 
to him. Nevertheless, people working in the federal courts in Acapulco are 
constantly worried and live in fear as a result of this bloody war between cartels. I 
assumed that these elements intertwined to inhibit potential interviewees from 
talking with me.  
 Finally, I moved to Morelia as the last place of fieldwork. Having this city 
as the final stage of the research was rewarding because my social network here 
was more extensive and I was able to interview more people in a shorter time. I 
knew I could contact potential interviewees outside the courts as well as during 
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the vacationing period during the last two weeks of July. I interviewed 14 people 
in Morelia. Among them were two individuals who were attorneys in major law 
firms that handled cases in federal courts. Their expertise provided a different 
perspective on the MFJ. 
Sample and Representativeness 
  By collecting data in these six contrasting cities, I wanted to guarantee a 
distribution of demographic variables that included different perspectives based 
on the location of courts (Bernard, 2002). These six urban locations do represent 
the range of cities where federal courts are located, which are large, medium, and 
small jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions include huge urban settings such as 
Mexico City and Monterrey while medium size jurisdictions include places such 
as Acapulco and Morelia. Small jurisdictions refer to local towns, such as border 
cities like Nogales or Nuevo Laredo, which have no large population but 
concentrate high rates of federal crimes. Mexico City represents large 
jurisdictions, Acapulco and Morelia medium-sized jurisdictions, and Nogales a 
small town jurisdiction. Tijuana has a mixed categorization, representing small 
and medium-sized jurisdictions because many of its employees have moved 
around in Northern Mexico between different jurisdictions, having experience in 
both medium-sized and small jurisdiction. Morelia also has employees who have 
worked in the city of Uruapan, a small town located 60 miles to the south with 
high rates of drug-related crimes, which makes this jurisdiction between medium 
and small as well.    
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 A crucial factor to take into account is that most interviewees had spent 
time in different jurisdictions because mobility is part of the process of 
advancement. They had worked in several jurisdictions and federal courts, 
performing different duties under a variety of judging styles, depending on the 
location of the courts and the people in charge of them. This variety of duties has 
given interviewees broad experience on the topics approached during the 
interview, especially the topic of corruption, because they knew where and how 
this phenomenon could occur and go undetected.   
 Having 45 interviews was a sufficient sample to present a credible and 
reliable representative selection of the population under examination because I 
reached what social researchers called theoretical saturation (Adler and Clark, 
2011), the point at which I was hearing little new information. Fieldwork was 
based on qualitative interviewing, which goes beyond simply learning about a 
single topic and including information that is important for those being studied 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Unlike quantitative approaches that highlight statistical 
precision and the quantification of data, qualitative research pays attention to 
shared meanings and the different interpretations of social reality held by 
respondents. In this research, 45 interviews provide more than enough 
information to understand the cultural arena (Rubin and Rubin, 2005), the setting 
in which MFJ employees work and interact routinely by mutually sharing their 
Weltanschauung (worldview). By combining different individuals’ interpretations 
of particular issues, such as nepotism, inequalities, and corruption within the MFJ, 
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and how they are perceived, it is possible to put together a single narrative that 
makes sense of all them. Chapters five, six, and seven describe this narrative 
derived from the personal accounts of these 45 interviewees combined with 
archival information and my experience as a returning member of the federal 
judiciary.    
 To maintain the diversity of experiences from interviewees, I explored 
different levels of the MFJ hierarchy in the fieldwork. I interviewed individuals 
from the bottom of the echelons (typists) to the top (a magistrate who was a 
former head of the highest electoral tribunal). This wide range of respondents 
provided a rich narrative in which different and contrasting narratives were 
recorded. Because of job rotation, most of the respondents had been in different 
jurisdictions prior to the interview, and this brought even more information and 
expertise to the conversation. 
 In addition, the number of interviews per city was different because in 
each jurisdiction the number of federal courts varies. Most of the interviews took 
place in Tijuana (10), Mexico City (9), and Morelia (14), which happens to be 
cities with large numbers of courts. Nogales and Acapulco are relatively small 
jurisdictions and I interviewed four people in each of them. Puebla is a special 
case because it has an important judicature but time constraints prohibited me 
from staying longer there. Thus, I was able to interview one senior official only.  
Having only four interviews in Nogales and four in Acapulco was the 
result of fieldwork complications that are part of the dynamics of this research 
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method. Many times the encounter between the researcher and the respondent is 
mediated by setting, culture, and particular circumstances that make it difficult to 
arrange an interview. In the case of Nogales, it was the first city where interviews 
took place, and it was extremely challenging to convince people to talk. First, I 
did not know anyone there. Second, employees were reluctant to commit to 
interviews. However, weeks later I was able to interview ten people in Tijuana, 
which made up for the few interviews in Nogales. Combining the interviews from 
both Tijuana and Nogales provides adequate representation of the context and 
issues most federal courts face in the jurisdiction of the Mexico-U.S border.  
In the case of Acapulco, as I said earlier, people were reluctant to talk. 
However, the high number of interviews in Morelia made up for Acapulco 
because the places have many similarities. Both locations have high levels of 
drug-related crime, local cartels in control of the territory, and both are medium-
sized jurisdictions. As I said, the fact that most respondents have worked in 
different federal courts because of a job rotation policy gives interviewees a broad 
perspective on their understanding and experiences of the MFJ. 
 Regarding gender ratio in the data, I wanted to have a gendered balance in 
my sample to look for potential trends or patterns between genders, considering 
that more than 50% of the employees in the federal judiciary are women. 
Unfortunately, many female employees that I asked for interviews declined my 
requests. After several women in a row refused my requests for interviews, I 
realized that many of them did not feel comfortable talking about the work setting 
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or any other matter with a stranger. Other women just did not want to “waste” 
their time in interviews. Despite this resistance, 16 out of the 45 interviews I 
ended up conducting were with females. 
Caveats of Fieldwork 
Regarding the analysis of the collected data, it should be noted that 
sometimes information or ideas attributed to respondents were not explicitly 
stated by them, but gathered through my interpretation of the content (facts and 
data) of the interview. Because the research method used to collect data consisted 
of semi-structured interviews, sometimes an interview did not follow the 
guidelines of the questionnaire but took its own path based on the respondent’s 
background, seniority, availability of time, and so on. As a result, not all 
interviewees responded to the same questions or provided the same information. 
For instance, in chapter five I discuss the definition of corruption used by MFJ 
employees. Most often, they describe corruption as bribery, but sometimes they 
also defined it as tips, nepotism, or influence peddling. Not all interviewees 
explicitly responded with a definition of corruption, and when they did, not all 
categorically referred to corruption as a specific behavior. In these cases, I 
interpreted the content, context, and narrative of the interview and deduced what 
the respondent meant corruption to be based on that. 
To guarantee confidentiality, I did not use any respondents’ real names. 
Instead, I assigned a letter of the alphabet to every interviewee, using a 
chronological pattern, and then came up with a Hispanic name. Thus, the first 
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respondent I interviewed received the letter “A” and his name in the analysis of 
the data is Antonio. I repeated the same procedure using the 26 letters of the 
alphabet, and started all over again with the interviewee listed as number 27 on 
my fieldwork list. To avoid confusion, I keep gender consistency, meaning that 
female respondents received female pseudonyms and male interviewees male 
pseudonyms. 
  Regarding the names of federal judges and parties involved in the 
Michoacanazo case, I maintain confidentiality as well, except for a few 
individuals, such as the judge in Nayarit state who suffered a machine gun attack 
and the Michoacán governor’s half-brother who was accused of wrongdoing. 
Those particular names and events related to our case study are publically known 
and used in the mass media, so there was no need to hide the identity of such 
individuals.    
I do use verbatim quotes from interviewees throughout the dissertation to 
emphasize some points and voice the perspectives of those who were interviewed. 
To clarify, those quotes are not always the interviewees’ exact words. During the 
interviews, in order for me to capture the core of what respondents were saying, I 
had to ignore some words, such as articles, pronouns, stylistic expressions, and 
idioms in order to record the most important information. Once each interview 
was over, I reconstructed some of the respondent’s words while transcribing my 
fieldwork notes into a Word document in order to create a logical narrative. 
Nonetheless, the interviewees’ words quoted throughout this dissertation certainly 
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reflect the meaning of what they said. The next chapter presents an overview of 
the Mexican Federal Judiciary, in which fieldwork took place, to provide a 
contextualization of the institution as a whole. 
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Chapter 4 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEXICAN FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
Similar to the U.S. federal system, Mexico’s political authority is 
composed of a central government located in the Federal District (Mexico City) 
and 31 self-governing political divisions called states. Each state has its own 
constitution, governor, legislature, and judicial system. The state judicial systems 
are organized in a two-tier hierarchical structure of lower courts (juzgados) and 
appellate courts (salas). The former are headed by state judges (jueces del fuero 
común) and the latter by state magistrates (magistrados del fuero común). There is 
also a State Supreme Court that is the highest authority of each state judiciary, 
and most states now have a State Judiciary Council (Consejo de la Judicatura 
Estatal) in charge of managing the budget, career civil service, and administrative 
affairs. The jurisdiction of state judiciaries is based on a sort of default principle: 
everything that does not fall under the umbrella of federal courts belongs to state 
courts (Mexican Federal Constitution, articles 40-44, 2012). Hence, federal 
legislation, such as the civil and the criminal codes, explicitly defines which legal 
matters will be handled by the federal judiciary. Everything else belongs to the 
jurisdiction of state judiciaries. 
 On the other hand, the federal judiciary is one of the branches of the 
central government, the judicial branch, which is part of the governing model 
based on the separation of powers. The Supreme Court of Justice is the highest 
authority of this institution. Lower and appellate courts distributed throughout the 
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country are in charge of federal matters, such as drug related crimes, human 
smuggling, and arms trafficking. Compared to state judiciaries, the federal 
judicial system enjoys a better social status and recognition by the community of 
law firms, attorneys at law, and citizens who have litigated and know both the 
federal and state judiciaries.  
 The prestige of the federal judiciary comes from two sources. First, as a 
federal authority, its budget is considerably larger than any of the state 
judiciaries', which allows it to have more available human and material resources 
and to provide better service to the community. Second, the federal judiciary has 
jurisdiction over the constitutional guarantee for civil rights protection called 
Amparo. Amparo is “a constitutional provision peculiar to Mexico which 
resembles United States writs of prohibition, certiorari, injunction, and habeas 
corpus” (Robb, 1979, p. 74). Amparo means “protection, aid, or shelter” in 
Spanish. Although the Amparo was an original Mexican creation, it combines 
national and international influences from legal principles, such as the habeas 
corpus, injunction, certiorari, and error of mandamus (Schatz, Concha, and  
 Kerpel, 2007).  
Society in general trusts the Amparo as a reliable legal action to combat 
government abuses and violations of due process. It is a sort of judicial review 
against any authority that infringes the Bill of Rights (garantías individuales). 
Although not all Mexicans have access to this suit due to lack of resources to hire 
an attorney, the Amparo is considered a social institution because it is seen as a 
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reliable recourse against civil rights violations (Schatz, Concha, and Magaloni 
Kerpel, 2007). To better understand the MFJ, it is important to explain the 
political environment of the past that influenced this institution. 
The Federal Judiciary under the Undemocratic Government    
Social and political unrest in Mexico led to a revolution in 1910. As a 
result of radical political change, a new constitution was endorsed in 1917. The 
new document reflected the concerns of the revolutionary period. Besides the 
incorporation of workers’ rights, agrarian reform, and term limitations, the federal 
judicial system was consolidated to assure a positive equilibrium between the 
three branches of government. The 1917 constitution embraced judicial 
independence, transparency, separation of powers, and a more efficient Supreme 
Court (Cabrera, 1968).  
Throughout the post-revolutionary period, the role of the federal judiciary 
was usually eclipsed by the presidential system and the authoritarian regime that 
controlled Mexico during most of the twentieth century. As Schatz, Concha, and 
Magaloni Kerpel accurately remark, “The judicial power remained subordinate to 
the executive branch as the post-revolutionary regime was transformed into a 
unique Mexican-style authoritarianism, in which particular practices and forms of 
organization—as opposed to written laws contained in the Constitution—
endowed the executive branch of government with almost unlimited political 
power” (2007, p.199). This unlimited power included the phenomenon of loyalty 
  
78 
and subordination from the entire bureaucracy to the President, a feature that 
would eventually lessen the credibility of the federal judicial system.  
 Mexico experienced 71 years of an authoritarian regime that remained in 
place for most of the twentieth century. The federal judiciary was part of this 
political establishment, allowing the system to remain in power by legitimizing 
and sanctioning the status quo. Strictly speaking, the political regime at this time 
was not a dictatorship. The separation of powers remained an official policy, and 
the three branches of government performed their roles according to the federal 
constitution. However, the executive branch exercised absolute dominance over 
the other two branches. This supremacy of the President nullified the system of 
checks and balances that usually brings balance to power in democratic societies.  
The federal judiciary was left with limited independence. Justices, 
magistrates, and judges were appointed on a political basis rather than on merit 
and professionalism. The unwritten rule among the autocratic establishment was 
that as long as the judges did not affect or contradict the political and economic 
interests of the incumbent President and his clique, there would be some judicial 
independence. As Domingo has stated, “The Mexican Supreme Court has been 
traditionally characterized by its passive political role, and its subservience to the 
will of the executive, in a system which has concentrated most political power, 
both formal and de facto, in the hands of the presidency” (2000, p.706). The 
nature of the authoritarian regime and the limited political autonomy of the 
judicial branch thwarted any possibility of a counterbalancing function. Justices 
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and federal judges knew this pragmatic principle and followed it in their judicial 
decisions. 
  There are different explanations for why the federal judiciary was so long 
subordinated to the executive branch. One is that the Mexican legal system is 
based on the Roman law tradition or on civil law inherited by the Spaniards. This 
tradition requires that the law to be susceptible to frequent change to keep up with 
social developments. The response in civil-law systems to this view of law has 
been legislative drafting of lengthy written codes. Legislation, not judicial 
interpretation, becomes the basis for law reform. Mexico, in deference to this 
tradition, has often rewritten its codes, laws, and the federal constitution. 
As a result, it has been relatively easy to modify the Mexican constitution. 
This has been facilitated by the political establishment’s absolute control. Many 
of the legal reforms encouraged by different presidents and the official party 
targeted the judicial branch to restrict and control its independence and scope of 
influence. The official justification for these reforms was the need to improve the 
role of the federal judiciary. Although sometimes these reforms did ameliorate the 
administration of justice in favor of the citizenry, the real goal was to benefit the 
President. As Taylor explains, 
We can learn much about the origins of Mexico’s judicial 
weakness through a historical review of reforms to Mexico’s 
Constitution of 1917. Four discouraging patterns emerge 
from Mexico’s Constitutional reforms. From 1917 to the 
present, reforms show: (1) an attempt to undercut judicial 
prestige; (2) an effort to curtail the autonomy of the Supreme 
Court; (3) an adherence to overly rigid theories of law; and 
(4) a mistrust of the judiciary. (1997, p. 144) 
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 The most important constitutional reforms took place in 1928, 1934, and 
as recently as 1994-1995. Most of these changes were the products of specific 
political, economic, and social needs that depended on the President in power. 
Despite the authoritarian nature of the political system, it always looked for 
legitimacy to justify its dominant power. More often than not, the Mexican 
political system ignored the rule of law as a basic republican concept, but 
defended the principle of legality as a justification of its own political chicanery 
(Domingo, 2000). This meant that, in order for the government to defend arbitrary 
decisions, it usually changed the law to fit its political needs. If changing the law 
were not possible, the government would promote the appearance of legality by 
forcing the Supreme Court to interpret the law favorably to the regime. This 
resource of disguised legitimation was a powerful incentive to keep the federal 
judiciary under control.  
 The relationship between the judicial and the executive branches during 
the rule of the official party, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) can be 
divided into five different phases (Domingo, 2000):  
 Relative independence when the constitution was adopted. From 1917 
until 1928; 
 Subordination to the executive power, when military men became 
presidents. From 1928 until 1944;  
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 Institutional and administrative consolidation of the federal judiciary with 
less influence from the other two branches. From 1944 to 1986;  
 Democratic changes that led to judicial reforms to enhance the separations 
of powers. From 1986 to 1994-1995;  
  A new Mexican federal judiciary with almost complete judicial 
independence and political autonomy, but still struggling to leave behind 
the influence of the executive and legislative powers. From 1994 to date. 
Judicial Independence as the Yardstick  
 In any democratic country, a well-functioning judicial branch guarantees 
respect for legality and constitutionality while maintaining the checks and 
balances between the different branches of government. In addition, the judiciary 
provides justice to citizens by protecting their rights and resolving legal 
controversies according to the law. Independence of the judiciary is a necessary 
feature because it protects it against pernicious influence from other political 
powers or private interests. Impartiality, due process, and judicial review are the 
most important manifestations of judicial independence. However, it is not easy to 
measure or quantify how much independence a particular judiciary has. Absolute 
judicial independence is problematical because the nature of checks and balances 
requires that judges too be accountable for their decisions (Domingo, 2000).   
Political theorists describe several elements basic to an independent 
judiciary. Among them, the most frequently noted are objective and fair 
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appointment procedures, competitive salaries, long tenures (inamobilidad), 
financial self-determination, and political insulation. Despite political interference 
from the powerful presidency during the authoritarian regime, the Mexican 
federal judiciary managed to enjoy some relative judicial independence. This 
independence was most visible in administrating justice for the average Mexican 
citizen. When two equal parties came and submitted a petition to the federal 
judiciary to solve a legal issue between them, the federal courts—and the 
Supreme Court as the highest authority of this branch—usually decided a verdict 
based on the available evidence. In such cases, judges tended to honor the 
principles of judicial independence and due process. As Domingo notes, a 
functional system existed: “Despite the prevailing image of lack of impartiality 
and corruption as characteristics identified with the administration of justice in 
Mexico, a functional and unified court system operate[d] and there [was] in place 
a well-established and sophisticated legal tradition” (Domingo, 2000, p. 726).  
 The situation was very different when the political establishment (the 
President, his clique, or a powerful politician) had particular interests in the case. 
In these situations, the judicial branch would favor the most powerful party. This 
favoritism or arbitrariness would always be justified as adherence to law, however 
far-fetched the interpretation (López-Ayllón, 1995; Schatz, Concha, and Magaloni 
Kerpel, 2007; Taylor, 1997). In sensitive affairs for the regime, such as political 
and economic matters, the federal judiciary—in particular the Supreme Court—
would not dare to rule against the government. One subtle but effective form of 
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submission to the executive branch was the reluctance of the Supreme Court to 
admit or rule on petitions that could undermine the credibility and stability of the 
undemocratic regime.  
 The political environment in which a legal system operates inevitably 
affects its performance. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the 
undemocratic order in Mexico conditioned the scope of judicial independence 
available to the federal judiciary. What is less obvious is how the federal judiciary 
legitimized the authoritarian government through its subtle prevention of the law: 
“[D]ominant party rule secured the complicity of the judicial branch in the 
hegemonic rule of the PRI. The judiciary played a crucial role in the 
legitimization of the Mexican political system” (Domingo, 2000, p. 726).  
In short, judicial independence was a complicated and thorny issue in the 
federal judiciary for most of the 71 years of one-party incumbency. Sometimes 
this independence was severely restricted by the President and sometimes it was 
looser, but in general, the judicial branch censored its own performance to avoid 
disputes with the executive. Political stability was the most serious concern for 
the regime, and the Supreme Court guaranteed this stability through judicial 
review. When this stability began to disappear during the 1990s, the President had 
to adopt some political changes in order for the regime to survive, which led to a 
democratic transition that demanded an overhaul of the judicial system. Among 
those changes was the 1994-1995 judicial reform that overhauled the entire 
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judicial branch. From then on, the influence of the executive over the federal 
judiciary began to wane, slowly but steadily.  
The 1994-1995 Judicial Reform: A Watershed 
 In the mid-1990s, Mexico was experiencing a severe political and 
economic disaster because of long-term social inequalities, lack of democracy, 
and mishandling of government affairs. Between 1993 and 1994, several high-
profile assassinations occurred—among them the presidential candidate of the 
party in power, a Cardinal, and the coordinator of the House of Representatives. 
This created unprecedented political instability. In addition, an indigenous armed 
rebellion began on January 1, 1994, in Chiapas, one of the poorest states in 
Southern Mexico, shocking the political establishment and Mexican society. A 
sudden devaluation of the Mexican currency in December of 1994 produced a 
deep economic crisis that forced the U.S. government to intervene—literally 
bailing out Mexico—in order to avoid a regional financial calamity. The 
combination of these three factors plus a long period of social and political 
discontent generated a climate conducive to change and legal reforms (Castañeda, 
1995).          
   On December 1, 1994, Ernesto Zedillo was sworn in as the new President 
of Mexico. Because he was the replacement of the murdered presidential 
candidate, Zedillo did not have the traditional political obligations to the ancien 
régime. He was a sort of “last-minute president,” and this gave him advantage to 
carry out audacious reforms in an atmosphere of crisis. Within weeks of taking 
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office, President Zedillo submitted a constitutional reform to overhaul the entire 
federal judiciary. This reform attempted to tackle the problems that had 
traditionally undermined the judicial branch, such as corruption, impunity, 
cronyism, and the devious application of the rule of law. It aimed to consolidate 
the federal judiciary and make it a real political power equal to the executive and 
legislative powers and capable of performing the checks and balances demanded 
by a more democratic social order. As Staton points out, “[T]he 1994 reform was 
a means of convincing an increasingly relevant electorate that the government 
was becoming more willing to respect the rule of law and thus worthy of electoral 
reform” (2007, p. 276) 
 Zedillo’s proposal modified 27 articles of Mexico’s 1917 constitution. 
These reforms were adopted and became effective on January 1, 1995 (Diario 
Oficial de la Federación, 1994). Among the most significant changes was the 
transformation of Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice. The reform reduced the 
number of Justices from 26 to 11 and demanded higher standards of competency. 
Tenure on the court was reduced to 15 years and the process of appointment was 
modified to take away decision-making powers formerly held by the President. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was reshaped to include greater judicial 
review powers, and a new institution was created, the Council of the Federal 
Judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal). This new council would be in 
charge of administrating the entire judicial branch, except the Supreme Court 
(Vargas, 2008).  
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 These changes at the top of the judiciary were eventually transplanted to 
the rest of the institution by establishing new rules for civil service careers in the 
MFJ, a better internal organization, more available resources, and the 
professionalization of judges and court staff. The reform granted the federal 
judiciary, the Supreme Court in particular, new constitutional jurisdiction and 
powers that established the court as an equal branch of government. Staton 
explains that, 
 
[T]he action of unconstitutionality grants the Supreme Court 
the power to set general effects in a certain class of cases, as 
long as eight of the eleven ministers [Supreme Court 
justices] adopt the majority proposal. The reform also 
enhanced the Court’s power in constitutional controversies, 
an action under which the Supreme Court rules on conflicts 
arising between two branches of the same level of 
government and disputes between governments of distinct 
levels in Mexico’s federal system. The Zedillo reform 
drastically changed the institutional structure of the federal 
judiciary. Perhaps most important, by requiring the 
resignation of all then-current members, the reform paved 
the way for a new set of judges to revitalize the third branch 
of government. (2007, p. 280)  
    
 In a country where the rule of law and legitimacy had long been ignored in 
the name of personal or political interests, not surprisingly, these reforms took 
some time to take root. It took several years for the judicial branch to acquire a 
more prominent and independent role in the Mexican political system and be 
regarded as an authentic institution in charge of administrating justice. The 
problem of legitimacy has been even more pronounced at lower levels in the 
system, but at this point, the judicial branch has achieved some political activism 
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and public presence by ruling in high-profile cases, such as mass killings against 
peasants and indigenous people. In the Aguas Blancas and the Acteal massacres, 
for example, the Supreme Court took on an unusual role, conducting an 
investigation to find out who the murderers were and if any government authority 
had been directly involved with the killers (Domingo, 2000). In the last 15 years, 
significant court decisions have included trials challenging the federal constitution 
in tax and labor laws as well as personal rights in criminal cases. Many of these 
rulings have been decided against the interest of the state, showing to society that 
judicial independence is real. “The Court has adopted controversial positions and 
made rulings which have captured the public attention in an unprecedented 
manner, not only with regard of its new review powers, but also in amparo suits” 
(Domingo, 2000, p. 732).  
In the last few years, the federal judiciary has engaged in public 
controversies with current President Felipe Calderon regarding the performance 
of district judges in drug-related trials. The controversy stems from the fact that 
some drug traffickers have been released from jail based on technicalities and the 
strict application of the law, even when there is evidence that they are probably 
responsible for criminal acts. The President has publicly accused federal judges of 
corruption and wrongdoing without presenting any proof to support his claim. He 
argues simply that the prosecutor’s office, law enforcement agencies, and the 
army work hard to capture criminals and drug-traffickers, but once these 
offenders are sent to the federal courts they are freed (Carrazco Araizaga, 2011).  
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Despite all the good intentions in the 1994-1995 reform, however, politics 
still affects the appointment of justices and how the court deals with some 
politically sensitive topics. Constitutional scholars (Domingo, 2000; Fix-Fierro, 
1998; Mayer-Serra and Magaloni Kerpel, 2010; Staton, 2007; Taylor, 1997; 
Vargas, 2008) debate how independent the court system is, but most of them 
agree that the 1994-1995 reform has helped the Supreme Court become more 
independent from external political influences. Nevertheless, there is also 
consensus among these scholars that political intervention from the executive and 
legislative branches still exists. This intervention stems from the federal 
constitution itself and how the executive branch introduced the judicial reform, 
which is the subject of the next section. 
The Politics of Appointing Justices and Council Members 
 The tenure and the appointment system for members of the Supreme Court 
was a contested issue throughout the undemocratic regime of the previous 
century. The original procedure to appoint justices established in the 1917 
constitution did not allow any intervention from the executive branch. Subsequent 
constitutional reforms in 1928, 1934, and 1944, however, introduced a 
presidential appointment system that gave the executive power almost absolute 
control over the federal judiciary. The federal constitution required the approval 
of the Senate to appoint justices, but in fact, the process was under the President’s 
control. “[T]he consolidation of the dominant party rule effectively signified that 
Supreme Court appointments were virtually in the hands of the executive. Here 
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began the process of subordination of the Court to the executive” (Domingo, 
2000, p.712). The tenure of judges was also reduced, from life tenure in the 1917 
constitution, to a six-year term in 1934. Life tenure was reinstated in 1944 and 
remained until the latest reform in 1994-1995, which established a 15-year term.    
 While the 1994 reforms limited the influence of the President in judicial 
appointments, it kept a subtle but effective mechanism of political intervention in 
which the Senate elects each justice of the Supreme Court from a list of three 
candidates submitted by the President. A two-thirds majority is required to 
appoint a candidate. If the Senate rejects the President’s candidates, he or she 
must offer another trio of candidates. If this second list is turned down, the 
President can appoint one justice from this last list of candidates. This has not 
been an effective mechanism to strengthen the Supreme Court because party 
ideologies in the Senate now determine what candidate is appointed.  
 Politics also influence the selection of Council members. The Council of 
the Judiciary is composed of seven Counselors, three of whom are appointed by 
the executive and legislative branches, with two selected by the Senate and one by 
the President (Mexican Federal Constitution, 2012). The fact that the President 
still has some power to determine who should be part of the Supreme Court and 
the Council of the Judiciary weakens the principle of separation of powers and 
subordinates the judicial branch. 
The influence of the undemocratic past was evident in the 1994-1995 
judicial reforms in subtle ways. Allowing the executive branch to name a trio of 
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candidates for the Supreme Court gave the President a way to exert indirect 
control of the appointment system. Making the Senate part of the process was a 
democratic gesture, but an ineffective one. There are too many political parties for 
anyone to have a two-thirds majority vote, which has led to sterile inter-party 
disputes, governmental stalemate, and a politicized Supreme Court.   
Inter-party disagreement in the Senate has also affected the composition of 
the Supreme Court in other ways. On September 2010, one justice died of a heart 
attack. The President sent a list of three female candidates to the Senate a few 
months later (El Universal, 2010). Having another woman justice would have 
increased the number of women to three of the eleven sitting justices, creating a 
more gender-balanced Supreme Court. However, the three main political parties 
in the Senate collided over which candidate to support and so no one obtained the 
required two-thirds majority vote, despite consensus that any of the three had the 
qualifications to become a member of the Supreme Court. Weeks later, the 
president sent another list, this time of male candidates, and the Senate appointed 
a new justice from that list. This gender gap on the Supreme Court is reflected in 
the judiciary at large: only 20% of either judges or magistrates are women despite 
the fact that they compose more than 50% of the total employees. 
 Mayer-Serra and Magaloni (2010), two Mexican scholars who have 
studied the Mexican Supreme Court extensively, contend that legal formalities, 
such as the appointment process and judicial tenure, negatively impact who is 
appointed and what kind of political ideology the appointee will employ in future 
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court decisions. The authors consider that the 1994-1995 judicial reform, although 
innovative, did not really break with the practice of executive interference in the 
judicial branch. For instance, the eleven new justices elected after the reform, 
Mayer-Serra and Magaloni assert, were selected from among then-current federal 
judges who had been already indoctrinated to think within the authoritarian legal 
mindset (2010, p. 37). The newly constituted Supreme Court thus has maintained 
the old mindset in its jurisprudence. 
 Mayer-Serra and Magaloni also criticize the appointment procedure, 
arguing that a trio of candidates presented by the President forces the candidates 
to compete among themselves, encouraging them to lobby for political support. 
This competition could affect judicial independence through demands for 
paybacks. In fact, the political parties have already had confrontations in the 
Senate based on the appointment procedure, such as the one mentioned above. 
Each party wants to appoint the candidate that best fits its political ideology.  
 Political disputes between parties and the President to appoint members of 
the Supreme Court and the Council have reinforced traditional practices, such as 
cronyism, the use of connections and cliques, which negatively affect the federal 
judiciary (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni, 2010). These disputes create groups within 
the MFJ in search for support to be nominated as justice or council member, 
which strengthen social networking and camaraderie in each of these groups. 
Eventually these relations translate into potential cronyism, influence peddling, 
and even political corruption because favors are expected to be paid.  
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Political support to become a justice can also be paid by turning a blind 
eye to peers’ misconduct among high-ranking officials. An example of this 
phenomenon can be pointed out with the case of Justice Balderrama (which will 
be explained in next chapter). Despite the fact that Justice Balderrama has 
probably engaged in misconduct and abuse of power, he remains unmolested 
because there is little or no political willingness from the Supreme Court to 
investigate him. Other favors, such as hiring friends, relatives, and acquaintances, 
have become a regular practice among judges and magistrates, as will be 
explained in chapters five and seven. These favors and connections are usually 
encouraged because of the existence of different groups that battle for power and 
control within the MFJ, reproducing cronyism, nepotism, and wrongdoing. To 
better understand how these groups are formed and divided, it is crucial to look at 
the organization and structure of this institution. 
Structure and Organization of the Federal Judiciary      
The organization and makeup of the Mexican federal judiciary is defined 
by the Mexican federal constitution (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos). The constitution is composed of 136 articles, and it follows the 
European model (Vargas, 2008). Although there have been many reforms and 
amendments (more than 500) since its adoption in 1917, the initial provisions and 
structure still remain.  
Title Three, Chapter IV, of the federal constitution sets forth the powers of 
the judiciary and its organization. Article 94 prescribes that the “Judicial Power of 
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the Federation [Poder Judicial Federal] is vested in a Supreme Court of Justice, 
in an Electoral Tribunal, Circuit Collegiate and Unitary Courts and in District 
Courts” (Mexican Federal Constitution, 2011, p.58). This article provides that the 
discipline, monitoring, and organization of the judicial branch (except the 
Supreme Court) will be in the hands of the Council of the Federal Judicial 
(Consejo de la Judicatura Federal), which will operate according to the 
guidelines established by the constitution and the applicable laws. The Consejo de 
la Judicatura plays a significant role in the chapter to follow.  
The Organic Act of the Federal Judicial Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder 
Judicial de la Federación) governs the internal affairs of the federal judicial 
power. This law regulates the work and the responsibilities of those who work in 
the judicial branch, and outlines the jurisdiction of the federal courts. There are 
other secondary laws, such as the Amparo Act (Ley de Amparo), the Federal Code 
of Civil Procedure (Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles), and the Federal 
Criminal Code (Código Penal Federal) that regulate specific legal procedures and 
activities during legal proceedings.  
The federal judiciary in Mexico has a three-tier structure comprised of the 
Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the district courts. “District courts serve as 
the lowest level of original jurisdiction (primera instancia) for federal cases. 
Circuit courts serve as appellate courts” (Schatz, Concha, and Magaloni Kerpel, 
2007, p. 204). All these judges are appointed.    
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The Supreme Court (La Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación) 
Mexico’s Supreme Court is composed of eleven justices (called Ministros 
in Mexican law) who function either as a full court (Pleno) or in two chambers. 
The first chamber (Primera Sala) handles civil and criminal matters. The second 
chamber (Segunda Sala) handles administrative and labor cases. This is the 
highest court of the country. According to Article 105 of the federal constitution, 
the court has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional controversies between a 
state and the federal government, the federal government and municipalities, and 
two states, among other legal duties.  
Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial Federal) 
The Federal Electoral Tribunal is a specialized organ of the federal 
judiciary and the highest court on electoral disputes. It is composed of a full court 
(Sala Superior) and five regional chambers (Salas Regionales). The full court is 
made up of 7 magistrates (Magistrados) and they have jurisdiction to resolve 
challenges to elections of the president of Mexico, federal elections of 
congressman (Diputados) and senators (Senadores), controversies in local and 
state elections, and so on (Mexican Federal Constitution, article 99, 2011). This 
tribunal has the final word in all electoral matters, and it has become an essential 
as well as controversial institution in the democratic transition that is taking place 
in Mexico.  
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Federal Appellate Courts (Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito) 
Circuit Collegiate Tribunals are courts composed by three magistrates and 
located throughout the country in 32 jurisdictions known as Circuitos Judiciales 
Federales, one for each state (mostly in the capital of the state) and one for the 
federal district. As of May 2011, there were 222 of these tribunals distributed 
according to workload, society’s needs, and backlog (Consejo de la Judicatura, 
2011). They exercise jurisdiction over direct Amparo suits against definitive 
judgments, appeals (Recursos de Revision) against sentences (related to any legal 
matter except criminal trails) rendered by district judges, administrative 
complaints (Quejas), and the like. As of April 2011, there were 645 magistrates 
working in these courts (Consejo de la Judicatura, 2011).  
Criminal Appellate Courts (Tribunales Unitarios de Circuito) 
Unitary circuit tribunals are composed by a single magistrate. They are 
located in each state and the federal district (32 jurisdictions). As of April 2011, 
there were 88 of these tribunals and an equal number of magistrates. Similar to 
circuit collegiate courts, unitary tribunals are distributed according to demand and 
need. They exercise jurisdiction over appeals in matters decided in the first 
instance by district courts and Amparo lawsuits against the acts of other unitary 
circuit tribunals, among other things dictated by the law (Organic Act of the 
Judicial Power of the Federation, Article 29, 2011).  
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Federal District (Trial) Courts (Juzgados de Distrito) 
District courts are the lower courtrooms that handle most of the 
proceedings and trial related hearings. Most of these courts have mixed 
jurisdiction, meaning that they handle a variety of matters, including criminal, 
civil, commercial, and Amparo petitions. For agrarian, labor, and administrative 
matters there are special courts under the control of the executive branch. In the 
last decade, the Council of the Judiciary began to have specialized courts—in 
major cities—in order to improve the administration of justice to make it more 
efficient.  
Throughout the country, there are 370 district courts. Each court is 
composed of a single judge (Juez de Distrito) and the court staff (e.g. clerk of the 
court, process server, and court typists) to carry out proceedings. Unlike appellate 
courts, district courts are scattered in the 31 states and the federal district of the 
country, their location determined by the incidence of crime, size of population, 
and geography. For instance, small towns south of the Mexico-U.S. border, such 
as Nogales, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros, have several district courts 
due to high crime rates produced by human and drug smuggling, both of which 
are federal crimes. As Vargas points out, “All federal proceedings before a federal 
court are regulated by the Federal Code of Civil Procedure jointly with, in 
Amparo cases, by the federal Amparo Act” (2008, p. 38). District courts are 
extraordinarily busy compared to appellate courts or to any other courts in the 
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Mexican Federal Judiciary, because they are trial courts and handle the daily 
proceedings of all federal trials.  
The Council of the Judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal) 
 The Council of the Federal Judiciary is a recent institution in the Mexican 
Federal Judiciary. It was the result of a major overhaul of the Judicial Branch in 
1994-1995, days after Ernesto Zedillo, the last president of the authoritarian 
regime, took office. The Council is made up of seven members known as council 
members (Consejeros). The entire Supreme Court elects three of them from 
magistrates of circuit and district courts. The President of the Republic elects one, 
the Senate elects two others, and one is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
(Mexican Federal Constitution, article 100, 2011).  
The power of the executive and legislative branches to shape the Council 
by designating three of its members tends to undermine judicial independence 
according to many of the legal officials whom I interviewed. Even when the 
federal constitution explicitly commands that the counselors do not represent 
those who designated them, in practice there are political struggles among parties 
to elect them. In light of the strategic and delicate function of the Council in 
organizing the internal affairs of the whole institution—except the Supreme 
Court—it is surprising that the MFJ has not gained full autonomy from the other 
two branches of government.  
The Council’s duties are ample and diverse. According to Article 81 of the 
Organic Act of the Judicial Power of the Federation, the Council appoints circuit 
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magistrates and district judges and determines the number of courtroom and 
judicial circuits; it organizes the judicial civil service; it investigates and sanctions 
responsibilities of magistrates, judges, and court staff in the entire institution, 
except the Supreme Court, among other duties. There is no need to list the 
approximately 40 provisions that the law explicitly establishes as the jurisdiction 
of the Council. Suffice it to say that its role has become crucial and powerful in 
the administration of justice. 
Other Institutional Components  
 There are other important institutions within the MFJ that are subordinated 
to the Council of the Judiciary but enjoy some autonomy. One is the Institute of 
the Judiciary (Instituto de la Judicatura), an organization specialized in training 
and providing legal education to members of the federal judiciary through classes, 
courses, and workshops. The other is the Public Defender Federal Agency 
(Instituto Federal de Defensoria Pública), an organization with a reputation for 
high quality and good service among the judicial community. This agency 
provides legal consulting for people dealing with the federal judiciary who cannot 
afford to pay a private attorney.        
 The aforementioned courts and institutions are the most important parts of 
the Mexican Federal Judiciary. The Supreme Court stands out as the most 
powerful and visible organ of the judicial branch in Mexico. Indeed, many people 
and some journalists appear to believe the Supreme Court is the entire federal 
judiciary 
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Hierarchical Structure 
One of the most visible features of the federal judiciary is its 
organizational structure. Similar to other government organizations in Mexico, the 
judiciary has built strong hierarchies with categorical levels of administration and 
power. Subordination to a higher authority—such as a judge, an appellate court, 
or the Supreme Court—is the principle that glues together the different units of 
this institution. Hierarchies are deeply embedded in the ethos of the judicial 
branch and they are most noticeable in two particular realms: organization and 
ranks in district courts.     
The federal constitution and other secondary laws that regulate how the 
judicial branch should be organized have created a downward pyramid in which 
the Supreme Court rests at the top of a strictly ordered pyramid. These hierarchies 
stratify salaries, work settings, workload, duties, and create a bureaucratic culture. 
Therefore, subordination, authority, and social status between junior and senior 
officials homogenize judicial criteria to decide cases because a complacent 
attitude grows out of obedience.       
Under the authoritarian regime, the hierarchical structure of the federal 
judiciary flourished because it reflected the centralization of power that the 
political system encouraged. When democracy began to develop and the 1994-
1995 judicial reform restructured the judicial branch, hierarchies and inertia from 
the past remained. Judges and magistrates enjoy absolute decision-making 
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authority to organize their courtrooms and their employees’ schedules and 
workloads, including the power to require unpaid overtime and weekend work. 
There are no guidelines regarding the boundaries of the judge’s 
discretionary power to rule over employees. The only yardstick is how much 
work the courtroom has, and the vast majority of lower courts (district courts) 
have excessive workloads. In consequence, all employees work overtime and 
weekends. The courtrooms’ official hours are 9:00 in the morning to 2:30 in the 
afternoon. However, what varies greatly is how employees perform their duties. 
Some judges demand that employees work until midnight, with little or no time 
for lunch or dinner. Others allow employees to go home in the early evening and 
bring work with them. Some judges do not care about employees’ work schedules 
after official hours, as long as they finish their work. It is up to the judge or 
magistrate to organize the work setting, leaving employees powerless in deciding 
how to do their jobs. Many interviewees complained that this arbitrariness was a 
major issue in the everyday activities of the district courts because it affected both 
the employees and the administration of justice 
This quasi-authoritarian managerial style is a remnant from of the old 
system. Political clientelism, populism, and loyalty to cliques were the tools the 
regime used to dominate society and bureaucratic settings. The person in charge 
of any public office was the boss and subordinates had to obey without 
complaints if they wanted to keep their jobs. The federal judiciary was not 
excluded from this influence. Cronyism still plagues this institution, and so do 
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subordination and strict hierarchies (Magaloni, 2003; Mayer-Serra and Magaloni 
Kerpel, 2010; Schatz, Concha, and Magaloni Kerpel, 2007).       
 Demographics 
According to Council of the Judiciary, there are almost 30,000 employees 
working in the federal judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura, 2011). More than half 
of these workers are women, but they are greatly underrepresented in high-
ranking positions. Only 20% of judges and magistrates are women. There are 733 
magistrates of circuit—600 men and 133 women—and 356 federal judges—269 
men and 87 women—(Atlas Jurisdiccional, 2011). This gender inequality does 
not appear to be a concern for the judicial branch, despite the existence of an 
office that is charged with addressing gender issues within the institution 
(Consejo de la Judicatura, 2011). The Council of the Judiciary has normalized 
this gender gap by ignoring the topic and addressing only women’s issues related 
to judicial matters. In other words, the Council and the entire federal judiciary 
acknowledge that Mexican women suffer from discrimination in society, but are 
incapable of admitting that women working in the judicial branch suffer 
institutional discrimination.    
This official attitude towards women has been justified on the basis of 
institutional rationality. Many interviewees reproduce this attitude arguing that 
there are far fewer women judges and female magistrates because they prefer low-
ranking positions to take better care of their children and marriage. Most of those 
who adopted this argument highlighted that becoming a judge is extremely hard 
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because it demands time, discipline, and hard work. These demands take away 
quality time that could be used to care for children and loved ones. Nevertheless, 
these interviewees failed to notice that the federal judiciary has incorporated and 
reproduced socio-cultural values from Mexican society that determine gender 
roles for each person. Nor has the judiciary set up the adequate working 
conditions for women. The work setting is still highly masculinized, allowing 
women only subservient roles, such as secretaries, typists, and janitors. 
The institution is also insensitive to sexuality. Interviewees explained that 
the institution demands a specific heteronormative code of behavior. There was 
no official policy towards sexual diversity, but the unwritten rules are clear 
enough. There is a sort of "don’t ask, don’t tell" policy driven by homophobic 
fears that derive from larger cultural patterns of the Catholic Mexican society.  
These are the major parts and characteristics of the federal judiciary. The 
goal of this chapter has been to give details and contextualize the setting, 
environment, and people where the fieldwork took place. The next chapter will 
analyze and explain the most significant topics discussed during the interviews, as 
well as the findings from the fieldwork. 
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Chapter 5 
DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, DISCUSSION 
Part One 
 This chapter is divided in two parts. Part one focuses on internal issues of 
the MFJ, such as hierarchical divisions of labor, abuse of power by judges, 
excessive workload, and employees’ salaries—all topics mentioned by 
interviewees during the fieldwork. These topics have a direct correlation with 
other phenomena taking place in the institution, such as corruption, influence 
peddling, and nepotism. In order for the reader to understand the larger picture of 
the collected data, it is important to present this first part as an explanatory 
section. Part two focuses on wrongful practices in general, and corruption is 
addressed in the final pages.  
There is a correlation between the information presented in both parts. For 
instance, the description of a district court in part one provides an important 
background to recognize how nepotism and abuse of power operates within the 
MFJ, described in part two. In addition, explaining aspects of the daily jobs that 
employees within a federal courtroom perform—usually unknown to outsiders—
contextualizes the setting to better understand the dynamics of wrongdoing. That 
being said, part one begins with the initial questions asked during the interview. 
Breaking the Ice 
One goal of this research was to have a more accurate idea about the work 
done by court employees and judges—in order to understand how corruption 
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operates. The first four questions of the interview questionnaire were geared to 
address this topic as well as to break the ice.
2
 Inquiring about a public servant’s 
job is always an invitation to talk and create rapport because it opens the door to 
ventilate issues, perspectives, and topics that are difficult for them to express in 
their daily work. No major topic in the MFJ—such as justice issues, influence 
peddling, and indeed corruption—can be described and understood without 
appreciating the nature of the work that people in the federal judiciary perform 
every day. This appreciation implies acknowledging what employees think about 
their work and how they see themselves doing that work; this is the aim of these 
four questions. 
Citizens who are unfamiliar with the federal judicial system are inclined to 
speak in vague terms about its performance. They usually base their opinion on 
media reports of injustices coming from single cases that gather widespread 
media attention, such as violations of due process by state judiciaries, not the 
MFJ.  
Every phenomenon of wrongdoing in federal courts is embedded in larger 
webs of cultural meanings that require an explanation of the social contexts that 
hold those meanings. This understanding is better served by providing a thick 
description (Geertz, 1973) of the setting under study. A thick description allows a 
closer look at the social phenomena the researcher wants to interrogate. To start 
                                                 
2
 These four questions were: 1. How difficult and demanding is the work done at the MFJ? 2. What is the most difficult job 
in the MFJ? 3. What works fine and what needs to be improved in the MFJ? 4. How do people working in the MFJ see 
themselves? 
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the data analysis and present the first part of the research findings, I will carry out 
a description of a composite district court according to accounts from 
interviewees. This thick description will provide the context and foundation of the 
initial discussion and analysis of this dissertation and will include the information 
gathered during the fieldwork from the first questions in the questionnaire.   
What is a District Court Like? 
 A district court (DC) is an exciting place to be if one is interested in the 
Mexican legal system and the administration of justice. Unlike state judicial 
systems and other branches of the criminal justice system (e.g. law enforcement 
agencies and the prosecutor’s office), a district court enjoys prestige and 
possesses more resources to provide better service to the community (Ferreyra-
Orozco, 2012). This prestige arises mainly from the fact that district courts are in 
charge of the Amparo suit (Amparo indirecto). As explained in chapter one, the 
Amparo suit is a unique Mexican provision for protection against arbitrary acts by 
authorities. This type of suit is the most frequent proceeding in district courts and 
it comprises up to 90% of the courts´ work, according to fieldwork data. As 
interviewee Andrés put it, “El amparo es el rey de los tribunales porque es lo más 
importante y es lo que más se ve” (The amparo is the king of the courts because it 
is the most important and prevalent matter in our daily work).   
 Besides prestige, district courts also enjoy more resources than any other 
lower level courts in the state judiciaries. These resources are visible in different 
ways, such as better office equipment, more court staff, efficient organization and 
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professionalization, and above all, good salaries. Salaries in particular play a 
fundamental role in the performance of the MFJ because, as its own employees 
acknowledged, wages are high compared to the wages of court employees in the 
state judiciaries. Salaries were a frequent topic of discussion by most interviewees 
because they saw them as a phenomena linked to issues such as the absence of 
petty corruption in the work setting, institutional loyalty, and willingness to work 
exhausting schedules. 
 According to Article 42 of the Organic Law of the MFJ, district courts are 
made up of a judge and the number of secretaries of the court and employees 
allowed by the budget. This suggests that there is no specific number of people 
that should work in a DC. On average, however, there are around 40 people 
working in each district court, depending on its location, the workload, and the 
kind of cases handled by the court. The organizational structure of all district 
courts is hierarchical, as it is in the rest of the MFJ. On top, there is the judge. 
Below, there are five to six secretaries of court (secretarios de juzgado), each of 
whom has one to two typists (oficiales administrativos). There are also three to 
four process servers (actuarios), and then several other low ranking positions, 
such as janitors and administrators.  
   Courts that are not specialized in one single matter, such as criminal or 
civil law, handle all kinds of federal trials. Specialized district courts are a recent 
policy in the MFJ, which has made the administration of justice more efficient 
and effective; however, only jurisdictions in major cities, such as Mexico City and 
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Monterrey, have them. District courts located in other jurisdictions, such as border 
towns have legal authority over all matters, and they are called mixed district 
courts (juzgados de Distrito mixtos). The internal organization of a district court 
varies greatly depending on the judge. Nearly 90% of respondents (40) argued 
that the judge has absolute discretionary power to organize the district court 
according to his or her personal experience, gender, and background. Interviewee 
Bruno, a judge, said something that summarizes the general view of interviewees: 
“Cada juzgador tiene su propia forma de trabajar y en ese sentido posee absoluta 
discrecionalidad para organizar el trabajo en el juzgado. Cada juzgador tiene 
una cultura propia que se refleja en la forma de llevar a cabo el trabajo” (Each 
judge has his own way to do the job, and he enjoys absolute discretion to organize 
the court. Each judge has a personal background that is reflected in how the work 
is done).     
 The MFJ and its Organic Law do not require a particular system to operate 
and administer district courts. According to several high-ranking interviewees, the 
main concern from the Council of the MFJ (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal) 
towards district courts is their productivity and efficiency in the administration of 
justice. According to interviewee Andrés, the number of sentences released 
monthly by each district court measures productivity. Efficiency is evaluated by 
how many sentences are upheld by appellate courts: the more upheld sentences a 
district court has, the more productive it is. This approach has left both judges and 
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magistrates with absolute power to decide and control the courts over which they 
preside as long as they are efficient and productive.  
Tyrannical Judges  
There was a recurrent idea repeated by many interviewees throughout the 
fieldwork that described those judges who tended to abuse their power, as “jueces 
tiranos” (tyrannical judges). This phrase meant that many judges handled the 
district courts as if they were oppressive and cruel rulers, at least from the 
perspective of these interviewees, some of whom were judges.  
Interviewees emphasized that this extensive power wielded by some judges had 
negative consequences, such as abuse of power on labor conditions, nepotism, 
sexual harassment, and potential corruption. Out of these consequences, the most 
frequently mentioned by interviewees was the abuse of power by judges, such as 
demanding extensive overtime work or firing an employee to give the job to 
someone else. Interviewee Ernesto said this: “Si hay jueces tiranos, incluso había 
uno que era de Michoacán que le llamaban el ‘Hitlersillo’ por ser implacable” 
(There are judges who are tyrannical. There was one from Michoacán state that 
employees nicknamed “Little Hitler” because he was implacable).  
There were several reasons behind this perception. For instance, the so-
called tyrannical judges usually made their employees to work and stay in the 
court all day long until late night, sometimes without having a break for lunch or 
dinner. According to interviewees, these judges created a stressful environment by 
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demanding an endless amount of work that required most employees to spend 12 
to 15 hours per day in the court, sometimes even more.  
Conversely, there were judges who also demanded long work schedules 
but who were not labeled tyrannical. The difference between these two types of 
judges was simple: non-tyrannical judges were sensitive about employees’ 
personal needs and had a more flexible attitude towards everyday work while 
tyrannical judges did not. Tyrannical judges were stricter and focused mostly on 
employees’ productivity. Some interviewees even said that some judges suffer 
from psychiatric disorders because of their obsession with work. Andrés stated 
this: “Hay titulares que están locos, que tienen problemas de personalidad y que 
son adictos al trabajo” (There are judges who are mad, who have a personality 
disorder and are addicted to work).     
More than 10% of interviewees (5) did not define the power judges had as 
abusive or prone to tyranny. Instead, they argued that as heads of district courts 
judges are responsible for the entire court and noted that if something goes wrong 
judges would be solely accountable for the outcome. Judges demanded long work 
schedules from their employees because the amount of work that most district 
courts handled is overwhelmingly high every year. That was why so-called 
tyrannical judges behaved like that, according to these interviewees. Not all 
district courts have the same amount of work, though. Usually those that handle 
criminal cases are the busiest. Another subject that interviewees addressed at the 
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beginning of the interview was the topic of workload, which, due to its 
importance, will be discussed next.  
Too Much Work! (Carga Excesiva de Trabajo) 
One of the main features that distinguishes and shapes district courts is the 
excessive amounts of work. This is by no means an exclusive characteristic of the 
Mexican Federal Judiciary. In general, the entire Mexican administration of 
justice suffers from disproportionate demands of work. Unlike other justice-
related institutions in Mexico, the MFJ and the district courts in particular, 
comply with the deadlines fixed by the law to carry out everyday proceedings and 
trials, despite their workload. The administrative branch of the MFJ, the Council, 
has created several mechanisms to expedite trial proceedings. Among those 
mechanisms, there was a program called Sistema Integral de Seguimiento de 
Expedientes or SISE (Integral System to Follow up Processes) to electronically 
monitor and follow up every single step of a trial. There are also statistical 
summaries and reports that every district court has to submit monthly to the 
Council to show that there is no backlog in the court. In addition, there is a close 
watch by the Council on judges and employees to make sure the district courts are 
run efficiently, productively, and according to the law.      
MJF employees, both junior and senior officials, were well aware of these 
working conditions and they have come to accept them as part of the work setting 
and the nature of the job they perform. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they 
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uncritically embrace them because employees know that there is a high price to 
pay for these demanding circumstances.  
Nearly 96% of interviewees (43) pointed out that there is too much work 
all the time in the MFJ, mostly in the district courts. Interviewee Felipe said, “Las 
jornadas de trabajo son muy largas” (The work schedules are very long). 
Another interviewee, Lourdes, put it this way: “Es demasiado el trabajo que hay 
que hacer en el colegiado, hay que analizar asuntos voluminosos y hacer trabajo 
de fondo, estudiar bien para poder hacer un buen proyecto” (There is too much 
work in the appellate courts. One has to do deep analyses of thick cases, which 
implies a lot of reading and intellectual effort to come up with a professional 
sentence).  
In district courts that have jurisdiction on criminal cases, the burden of 
work is heavier because the criminal code has strict deadlines (términos legales) 
for carrying out proceedings. For instance, once the prosecutor sends an 
indictment to the federal judge, the district court has 24 hours to respond with a 
warrant of arrest (orden de apprehension) or a denial of it. If the indictment 
involves organized crime (delincuencia organizada), then the deadline is 12 
hours. Whether the indictment involves a file of 100 or 10,000 pages, these 
deadlines are firm, and court employees have to do a lot of work in order to meet 
them.  
Proceeding deadlines pose great challenges for district courts when they 
have to issue an arrest warrant on organized crime cases because the indictment 
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usually involves multiple defendants and the file comes with thousands of pages. 
Interviewees said that in those types of cases, almost everyone in the court has to 
stay overnight to work on the file and have the warrant ready for the due date. 
Interviewee Natalia said that, in 2006, her court handled the indictment of a 
former Mexican president who was indicted on charges of genocide for the 
killings of unarmed students in 1968. The indictment had 80 files of documents 
with hundreds of pages each, and the warrant of arrest was issued in a timely 
manner. Natalia stated, “Estos trámites de muchos tomos y voluminosos no son 
tan raros y nos llegan con cierta frecuencia” (Indictments containing thick files 
of documents are not rare and we get them more often than not).         
There are two other court duties that exacerbate the workload in district 
courts: 1. Court shifts (Turnos) and 2. On duty responsibilities (Guardias). The 
former refers to the period that each district court accepts and processes 
indictments from the prosecutor´s office. This period varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction depending on the number of district courts each jurisdiction has. 
There is a justification for this according to interviewee Felipe: “El mecanismo de 
turno es mantener un equilibrio para que todos los juzgados tenga el mismo 
número de expedientes en promedio” (The court shift mechanism has been 
designed to provide all district courts with the same amount of work and keep 
equilibrium between courts). 
On-duty responsibilities refer to employees’ availability at all times if 
there is a legal emergency that requires the intervention of the court. For instance, 
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an outstanding arrest warrant from this district court has been served late at night, 
and the defendant wants to be bailed out as soon as possible; court employees 
must be available to process the petition. Both on-duty responsibilities and court 
shifts require that most employees stay longer periods of time in the facilities of 
the district court. This not only imposes a heavier burden of work on them, but it 
also disrupts any personal schedule.  
Work Schedule (Horarios de Trabajo)  
A complaint that many interviewees had about their work duties was a 
hectic and unpredictable work schedule (el horario). Too much work and too 
many hours of office work are related, but they are not the same. Sometimes 
excessive work can be handled without working overtime. On the other hand, if 
the work setting requires longer periods of time in the office, whether because 
there is excessive work or because work can “pop up” unpredictably, then the 
work schedule becomes a burden.  
El horario, as most employees referred to their work schedule, included 
working 12 to 15 hours every day on average, but this could vary significantly 
depending on several variables: the employee’s position, jurisdiction of the court, 
who the judge was, the court´s managerial style, and whether or not the court 
handled criminal cases. The work schedule includes working on weekends, 
(Saturday for sure and sometimes even Sundays), depending also on how much 
urgent work needs to be done.   
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Most public institutions in Mexico have fixed and predictable work 
schedules, usually weekdays from 9:00 in the morning to 3:00 in the afternoon, 
when they are open to the public. Office hours in district courts are from 9:00 in 
the morning to 2:30 in the afternoon, from Monday to Friday, for regular 
business. However, most employees stay on the court beyond this time. Because 
the judge decides what schedule employees should follow after office hours, there 
is a great degree of variation on this. Most so-called tyrannical judges would not 
allow people to go home and eat dinner (Mexican time for dinner is between 2:00 
in the afternoon and 6:00 in the evening). Other judges would allow most 
employees to go home and return to the court around 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening 
and work four to six more hours.  
Despite the complicated work schedules and the significant amount of 
work that district courts demand, most interviewees presented a positive outlook 
on their work setting. There were two major reasons behind this optimistic 
attitude: good salaries and having a vocation for doing the job.  
High Salaries and Vocation 
According to more than 90% of interviewees (41), wages are among the 
best aspects of this institution. Except for the lowest level of the hierarchy, typists, 
all interviewees agreed that their salaries were remunerative, although not 
everyone conceded that those salaries offset the entire job done in the courts and 
the working conditions. For instance, interviewee Jazmín said, “El salario sí 
compensa el trabajo y las responsabilidades de laborar en el tribunal porque es 
  
115 
un buen sueldo comparado con otras instituciones o con el poder judicial del 
fuero común” (The salary offsets the work done at the court and its 
responsibilities because it is profitable compared to other government agencies or 
the state judicial systems). Interviewee Héctor put it this way: “Los salaries son 
buenos y existen buenas prestaciones, sin embargo no compensan todo el trabajo 
que se hace” (Salaries and social benefits are good enough, but they do not offset 
the work done in the court).  
It is worth mentioning that, except for typists, nobody else receives 
payment for overtime work. In fact, the concept of overtime work is alien to MFJ 
employees because they are not hired to work by the hour but to accomplish 
specific tasks. These tasks include judgments, conducting court proceedings, 
process serving, and everything else needed to run the court, regardless of the 
amount of work and how long it takes to accomplish. Court workers are paid for 
this entire bundle, so to speak, and working overtime is usually not an issue. 
Anyhow, interviewee Natalia suggested that paying overtime would improve the 
administration of justice. 
Interviewees used a particular phrase, salarios buenos (good salaries), to 
emphasize that the payment for their work was monetarily rewarding. They 
acknowledged that salaries were a powerful incentive that attracted many lawyers 
to work at the MFJ, but that wages were not enough incentive to make a career 
there. Given the disruptive job schedule and the endless amount of work, 
something else was needed to truly accept these circumstances and work at the 
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MFJ. Several interviewees defined this attraction as having a vocation while 
others suggested having passion. Others used the words addiction to the 
proceedings (adicción a los asuntos), and some more highlighted the intellectual 
challenges of solving complicated legal matters as a thrill of working there.  
In his own words, interviewee Andrés described his passion for work with 
a metaphor that reflected the general feeling on this: 
Cuando se tiene vocación el trabajo es adictivo porque quieres 
más, como si fueras alguien que amas los dulces y de pronto te 
meten a trabajar a una fabrica de dulces, entonces lo vas a amar 
sin que te interese el horario o la carga de trabajo. (When 
someone has a calling, work becomes addictive because you want 
more. Similar to someone who loves candies and suddenly finds a 
job at a candy factory; then you are going to love it regardless of 
heavy workloads and chaotic work schedules.)   
 
Not all people working at the MFJ were inclined to enjoy their jobs, 
according to interviewees. They commented that most employees in the court 
were proud and happy to work there, but a few coworkers lacked the motivation 
to perform their duties responsibly. According to these interviewees, unmotivated 
employees struggled to deal with the stress and busy schedules of the court 
because they did not like the work setting. Employees without intellectual 
motivation worked at the MFJ on the grounds of a profitable salary only and hated 
the demands of the everyday proceedings. A few interviewees defined these 
people as “chambistas” (jobbers), a concept derived from the Mexican word 
“chamba,” which means that they did not value the privilege of being part of the 
MFJ and the ethical and social responsibilities that came with it.  
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Additionally, several interviewees brought up a powerful argument to 
justify the high salaries MFJ employees received. They argued that a good salary 
discouraged corruption in the judicial system because court employees do not 
have the need to make ends meet through wrongdoing as is usually the case in 
other government institutions. The rationale behind this assumption was that 
employees who had jobs with excellent social benefits and privileged salaries 
would take better care of their work responsibilities to avoid losing these 
advantages.  
When asked about whether the salaries of high-ranking officials of the 
MFJ were justified, there was a mixed response from most interviewees. Some 
interviewees thought that those salaries were excessively high, while others 
argued that senior officials deserved them because of their job responsibilities. 
For a better understanding of this information, it is crucial to provide some 
context that may have influenced this diversity of the responses.  
Justices, Magistrates, and Council Member Salaries 
There has been a heated debate in the past years in Mexico about the 
fairness of the salaries earned by high-ranking members of the MFJ. During the 
mid-2000s, it became public news that many Mexican public officials, such as 
mayors and Supreme Court Justices, had a salary higher than the President of the 
country did. This news caused an outcry and strong criticism from society and 
political pundits to the point that in 2009 the Constitution was amended to set up 
limits on salaries for government employees (Jiménez, 2009).  
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The Supreme Court has also come under strong criticism because the cost 
of running it is extremely expensive and higher than for Supreme Courts in other 
countries (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni Kerpel, 2010). Two Mexican scholars who 
focus on the Mexican administration of justice, Magaloni Kerpel and Mayer-
Sierra, did a comparative analysis of Supreme Courts from different countries. 
Based on an analysis of information from 2009, they found out that Mexican 
Supreme Court Justices are among the best paid in the world compared to similar 
positions. In Mexico, a Supreme Court Justice (Ministro de la Corte) had an 
average annual salary of $320,765 dollars in 2009 (4,169,957 pesos at an 
exchange rate of 13 pesos per dollar). In Canada, a Justice made an average of 
$296,940. In the United States, the salary was $222,301. In Germany, it was 
$197,937, and in Colombia $136,763 (Mayer-Serra and Magaloni Kerpel, 2010).   
Based on this institutional context, it should not be a surprise that there 
was a great dissimilarity of opinions on whether or not the current salaries of 
high-ranking officials at the MFJ were fair and justified. Among those who 
disagree with the salaries was interviewee Pedro, who said, “El sueldo de los 
ministros no creo que este justificado porque ganan un cantidad estratosférica y 
comparado con lo que ganamos el resto del personal es injusto por decir lo 
menos” (The Justices’ salary are not justified because they make a stratospheric 
amount of money and, compared to what the rest of court employees make, it is 
unfair to say the least).  
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Interviewee Diego argued in favor of high salaries for Justices, Council 
members, and Magistrates: 
Si están justificados porque así se evita la corrupción, además de 
que concede autonomía a los titulares para decidir los asuntos de 
manera imparcial. Comparado con los sueldos de los secretarios 
de Estado y los diputados, no es tan alto ([Salaries] are justified 
because they help to avoid corruption and give judges judicial 
independence to decide trials impartially. Besides, compared to the 
wages received by secretaries of the state and congressmen, 
salaries are not very high.) 
 
Another interviewee, Hugo, said,  
A mi me parece que si están justificados por el trabajo que tienen, 
incluso parece poco. Comparado con lo sueldos de los ejecutivos 
en la iniciativa privada, es poco dinero. Y comparado con los 
senadores o secretarios de Estado que ganan más, están 
justificados. (To my knowledge, I consider their salaries justified 
due to the amount of work they have. I even think that it is not 
enough. Compared to the wages that executives make in 
companies, it is little money, and compared to the salaries of 
senators and secretaries of state who make much more money, the 
salaries are also justified.)  
   
Most, but not all, low-ranking officials tended to disapprove of the high 
salaries of those at the top of the MFJ because they view them as unfair and 
disproportionate. According to the Supreme Court (Diario Oficial de la 
Federación), in 2011, a secretary of the court—a middle-ranking official—made 
approximately $47,256 per year ($614,340 pesos) while a typist at the bottom of 
the hierarchy made approximately $14,671 per year ($190,728 pesos). The 
average salary for a low-ranking official would be between $16,000 and $18,000 
per year, generally speaking. To have a better reference for these wages, as of 
January of 2012 in Mexico the daily minimum salary is $62.33 pesos for an 8 
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hours shift, which accounts for $0.60 cents per hour of work. This means that 
even the lowest salaries in the MFJ are considerably higher than the minimum 
wages. 
For low-ranking interviewees, the salary gap between the top and the 
bottom of the MFJ was too wide for a government institution that officially boasts 
of being a cornerstone of the administration of justice in Mexico. In addition, this 
salary gap did not represent the real distribution of work in the federal judiciary 
because low-ranking employees do most of the physical and intellectual work 
while the high-ranking members mostly oversee that work. Yet, the former make 
far less money than the latter. In a government office in which the vast majority of 
employees are lawyers, there was an acute sensitivity towards issues of fairness 
and righteousness, and many interviewees perceived as greed the salaries and 
social benefits at the top.  
The topic of salaries—either one’s own or somebody else’s—was deeply 
engrained in the ethos of the MFJ because it was associated with different 
phenomena in the everyday affairs of the institution. For instance, good salaries 
were seen as the main motive behind the lack of petty corruption, such as 
mordidas and tips. Employees who wanted to change jobs due to the high levels 
of stress in district courts were normally discouraged from proceeding because no 
other government institution would match their salaries. Most employees at the 
MFJ work hard because they acknowledge that their salaries are among the best in 
the field, and given the strong competition for positions, they accomplish their 
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work duties responsibly to keep their jobs. In addition, good salaries attract many 
young lawyers wanting to work at the federal court, which helps the institution to 
recruit the best applicants. This last part is not always the case, however, because 
there is abundant nepotism and favoritism.     
Part Two 
Traffic of Influence and the Use of Connections (Amiguismo y Contactos) 
 The phenomena of traffic of influence (which can be translated as a 
combination of influence peddling and nepotism), connections, and favoritism 
among public servants have been deeply embedded in Mexican society for many 
decades (Smith, 1979). As explained in chapter four, the authoritarian regime of 
the past century based its political recruitment on a system of rewards, loyalty, 
and obedience to the boss. This system permeated the entire administration of the 
government and became part of the ethos of the Mexican bureaucracy. The ancien 
régime lost its power in 2000, and now a democratic transition is under way.  
 However, the inertia of the past still sustains many of the old 
undemocratic practices that provided political stability during the past century. 
Among those practices are the traffic of influence and the use of connections. 
Even for those government institutions that have become more independent and 
democratic, such as the federal electoral institute and the federal judiciary, it has 
been a challenge to eradicate these phenomena.  
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 There were three questions
3
 from the questionnaire related to the use of 
connections and/or traffic of influence in the MFJ. These questions were 
formulated as euphemistically as possible to avoid any offense by interviewees. 
This context of using connections and traffic of influences was constrained to 
internal affairs of the MFJ and mostly discussed in relation to administrative 
matters, such as climbing up the ranks of the institution. In other words, these 
phenomena did not refer to connections or influence in relation to trials and cases. 
Making Sense of Connections and Traffic of Influence 
 Eighty percent of interviewees (36) responded emphatically to these 
questions, saying that favoritism and connections indeed exist, while 20% of 
respondents (9) said they do not exist (see Table 1.2). Among those who denied 
the existence of these phenomena was interviewee Diego, who said, 
“Anteriormente quizá si eran valiosas las palancas y los amigos, pero se ha 
transparentado la institución y ya no es necesario” (Maybe in the past the use of 
connections and friends was necessary, but the institution now has become more 
transparent). Interviewee Wilfrido was among those who categorically admitted 
the existence of these phenomena as part of the everyday affairs of the MFJ. He 
said, “Si ayudaría [tener amigos o contactos] porque esa es la actitud, es sólo un 
reflejo de la sociedad mexicana, como en todo. Siempre que hay exámenes pasan 
los que tienen palancas, claro también los otros, pero los recomendados 
                                                 
3
 Question 9: Does having friends or connections in the Council of the Judiciary help to advance more easily in the 
hierarchical ladder of the MFJ? Question 10: Is the designation of judges and magistrates and sending them to specific 
jurisdictions absolutely free from external influence or can the use of connections sometimes influence these decisions? 
Question 11: Have the MFJ, and the Supreme Court in particular, left behind the shadow of influence from the executive 
power given the history of authoritarianism in the Mexican political system? 
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siempre” (It would be helpful [to have friends and connections at the top] because 
that is the only game in town. It is just a reflection of the Mexican society, like 
everything else. When there is a selection process for appointments, only those 
who have connections make it. Indeed, there are other applicants who make it too, 
but those with connections always do).    
 Among those who responded yes, most of them did so with a cautious 
caveat. They said that the use of connections and traffic of influence was not a 
systemic or consistent practice. It varied extensively depending on the person who 
did it and his or her hierarchy in the institution, interests at stake, and the 
implications of engaging in these practices. Sometimes some people would use 
these practices under specific circumstances, and other times the same people 
would not use them even if they had the power to do so. There was not a specific 
pattern of how and when the connections would be used. For instance, some 
interviewees knew cases in which junior employees have made it to the top of the 
hierarchy based on personal credentials. However, they also knew that a few 
individuals did not have enough credentials, usually the relatives of high-ranking 
members, and still they have made it to the top. However, these cases were more 
the exception than the rule. Interviewee Andrés described this problem in a clever 
manner: “Las relaciones son importantes para avanzar pero no son 
determinantes porque la carrera judicial sí funciona. Tan en así que funciona que 
no todos los hijos de magistrados llegan a jueces porque se requiere más que una 
recomendación, también cuentan los conocimientos” (Connections are important 
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to get ahead, but they are not indispensable because meritocracy really works. 
Evidence that it works is provided by the fact that not all the children of senior 
officials become judges, the reason being is that besides connections you also 
need to be smart to fill a senior position).  
Caveats on the Use of Connections 
Andrés highlighted something important, which is that favoring someone 
is more a combination of different circumstances than merely the use of 
connections and traffic of influence per se. He explained that the head of the MFJ 
has a double standard to appoint senior officials. On the one hand, it has set up a 
strict selection system to recruit the best people based on meritocratic 
requirements, such as written and oral exams, experience, education, and 
seniority. This process allows that only the best of the best lawyers advance to be 
heads of federal courts. On the other hand, it has created exceptions to that system 
through which people with not enough qualifications have also gotten ahead 
through a subtle mechanism related to connections.  
A common example of this aforementioned mechanism—described by 
several interviewees—has been when the Council of the Judiciary makes 
“special” vacancy announcements to find new judges and magistrates 
(convocatorias para ser juez o magistrado). These vacancies are designed 
specifically for employees working in any of the high-ranking offices, such as the 
Supreme Court, the Council of the Judiciary, and the Federal Electoral Tribunal. 
These vacancies excluded anyone else in the MFJ from applying for these vacant 
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positions, and the requirements are usually less demanding than the general 
vacancy announcements. This policy has conveniently left the door open to allow 
relatives, friends, and members of one’s clique to fill senior positions. Several 
interviewees from senior and junior positions confirmed this procedure of 
appointing judges and magistrates using two different criteria. These interviewees 
used a particular concept-verb to describe this phenomenon: campechanear. 
Campechanear in Mexican Spanish means to mix up different things, mostly in 
cooking affairs. It comes from the word campechana, which means a seafood 
cocktail. In the context of the MFJ, interviewees defined campechanear as an 
attitude of the Council to select judges and magistrates from two different 
methods: 1. credentials and 2. connections, traffic of influence, and/or nepotism.     
Even though the use of connections and traffic of influence is prohibited 
by law, officials carry out such practices discreetly and without leaving traces. As 
professionals of the law, they know how to circumvent restrictions by finding 
loopholes. Since justices and council members are all at the top, they know that 
their actions cannot be scrutinized by a higher authority, even if it were not for the 
secrecy that permeates some parts of the MFJ.  
Besides the power these senior officials exercise in appointing judges, 
they also have broad decision-making power within their own courts. It was 
explained earlier that tyrannical judges provide examples of this power. This 
power becomes almost unlimited when selecting their court staff because only the 
judge or the magistrate in charge of the court decides who works there. Given that 
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one individual decides these appointments, that individual can be influenced 
through connections and traffic of influence to favor some people. This most 
commonly takes the form of nepotism, a subject that will be addressed below. 
However, before that, it is important to incorporate three crucial ideas to have a 
more balanced understanding of these phenomena.    
 The first idea has to do with the fact that the use of connections and traffic 
of influence within the federal judicial system has gradually declined in the past 
decade compared to how widespread it was during the authoritarian regime. 
Several interviewees coincided in their responses saying that the MFJ changed 
after the 1994-1995 reform to become a more professionalized and respectable 
institution. Among those changes was the founding of a real meritocratic system 
where employees with no connections can make it to the top. These responses 
coincide with analyses from scholars who have studied the federal judiciary and 
the 1994-1995 judicial reform (Domingo, 2000; Fix-Fierro, 1998; Schatz, 
Concha, and Magaloni Kerpel, 2007; Staton, 2007) 
 The second idea is that the use of connections and traffic of influence has 
been limited in general to administrative affairs, such as appointments of typists 
or private secretaries. Although there is no evidence that these phenomena are a 
serious problem affecting trials or the administration of justice as a whole, there 
are some exceptions to this generalization. There were at least two critical cases 
where connections and influence peddling were used to affect the outcome of 
trials. The first case is the Michoacanazo, which will be discussed in the next 
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chapter, and the second is discussed below under the heading Combining 
Judgeship with Lobbying and Litigation. These two cases fall within the amount 
of corruption that is thought to exist in the MFJ by most interviewees, between 
1% to 10% percent. 
 Finally, the third idea refers to the fact that not all senior officials use 
connections or traffic of influence to favor employees, friends, or relatives. At 
least 50% of high-ranking officials (5) of this sample argued during the interview 
that these phenomena were ethically wrong and damaging to the institution. 
Therefore, they refused to engage in these practices and have tried to eliminate 
them. Notwithstanding, these phenomena are still part of the federal judiciary as 
most interviewees acknowledged them. Interestingly, there is a similar problem 
that is particular rampant in the MFJ: nepotism. The vast majority of interviewees 
said that it has been difficult to cope with nepotism because almost everyone 
benefits from it as will be discussed next. 
The Normalization of Nepotism (Nepotismo al Natural) 
 In the MFJ, connections and traffic of influence are used to favor friends 
and members of one’s clique to obtain positions and climb the echelons of the 
institution. Nepotism, on the other hand, is used firstly to favor one’s relatives in 
obtaining jobs, and then to get ahead. The difference between nepotism and traffic 
of influence is that the latter refers to favoritism and/or preferential treatment in 
government affairs to benefit friends or one’s clique, while the former is 
favoritism shown by someone in power to relatives, usually by appointing them to 
  
128 
jobs. These jobs do not have to be good positions as long as they are steady 
employment.  
Nearly 80% of the respondents (35) admitted that nepotism exists as part 
of the everyday life of the MFJ. It has become a naturalized practice because 
everyone—among senior officials—does it and benefits from it. Even junior 
employees if they can, would use their connections to find a job for a relative 
because they know that salaries in the MFJ are better than in other institutions. To 
get a job in this institution a person does not have to be a lawyer because there are 
dozens of administrative positions that do not require a law degree. 
In Mexico, and certainly inside the federal judiciary, nepotism does not 
have the negative connotation that it might have elsewhere. This has to do with 
the sociocultural understanding of the Mexican family. Riding (1985) argues that 
the family has been a powerful and conservative institution that has given political 
stability to Mexico. He asserts: “Those with jobs look to place unemployed 
relatives: in homes with extensive domestic service, the maid, chauffer and 
gardener may belong to the same family…Within the government, nepotism at the 
highest levels may be frowned upon, yet entire families will be brought into the 
bureaucracy by some relative with influence” (Riding, 1985, p. 239). Based on 
this thinking, helping a relative to obtain a job is not just socially acceptable but 
doing otherwise would be reprehensible to everyone’s eyes.  
Family is considered more important and respectable than one’s job or any 
government office because it offers a structure of support that no one else can 
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provide. Family is also a reliable and a trusted domain, one probably more 
important than respecting the law or any personal interest. Although the concept 
of family has changed and become less traditional in the new millennium, some of 
those old features still prevail in Mexican society. Authors such as Lomnitz 
(2000), Morris (1991), and Smith (1979), support the argument that family ties 
and socialization play a crucial role in reproducing phenomena such as nepotism 
and corruption.     
 Based on this contextualization of the Mexican family, it is not difficult to 
understand why nepotism is perceived as acceptable in the MFJ. As with other 
practices in Mexican society involving wrongdoing, people use euphemisms to 
refer to nepotism (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010). Senior and junior officials would 
never refer to nepotism using this word but in other terms such as favores 
(favors), dar chamba (give a job), and favores de chamba (employment favors). 
By using euphemisms, MFJ employees take away the disapproving association of 
the word nepotism, and it is not seen as harmful and objectionable any longer.  
 Nepotism was not a topic initially included in the interview, but I decided 
to include it when it became clear from interviewees that it was a common 
practice among senior officials. Table 1.2 shows that in interviews conducted in 
Nogales and Tijuana, most respondents did not talk about nepotism because it was 
not listed in the questionnaire. Once it was included in subsequent interviews, 
respondents acknowledged its existence.  
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 Most of the 80% of interviewees who talked about nepotism used the 
phrase favores de chamba to describe this phenomenon, but others used different 
words, such as mafias, malas prácticas (bad habits), and recomendados 
(recommended people). Interviewee Elizabeth said, “Muchos jueces de distrito 
que acaban de ser nombrados son hijos o sobrinos de magistrados o ministros. 
Aparentemente los exámenes de selección son la regla pero todo es una mafia 
desde arriba” (Many district court judges who have been recently appointed are 
children or nephews of senior officials. To outward appearances, the appointment 
process is fair and impartial, but it is all a façade because the whole process is 
mafia-like, from top to down).       
 Santiago, another interviewee, highlighted that nepotism is the worst face 
of the federal judiciary: “Lo peor del PJF son los compadrazgos, los 
recomendados, esto es el único punto donde no estoy de acuerdo. Para quienes 
tienen un papa o familiar de alto rango encontrar trabajo es seguro.” (The worst 
side of the MFJ is the compadrazgo [relationship between compadres—
godfathers], the use of connections; here it is the only issue I don’t agree with. For 
those who have a dad or relative among senior officials it is easy to find a job).    
 There was a compelling argument from a high-ranking official, Zacarias, 
explaining why the children of senior officials work in the MFJ. Zacarias held one 
of the most powerful positions at the MFJ in the recent past. When the interview 
took place, he was the head of the institute in charge of jurisprudence and 
judgeship of the federal judiciary. He said this on the topic of nepotism: 
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En lo personal creo que hay que contextualizar por qué los hijos 
de magistrados, ministros, o jueces están en el PJF. Pienso que es 
el mismo razonamiento de porque los hijos de industriales son 
industriales como sus padres, o de porque los hijos de 
comerciantes terminan siendo también comerciantes. Entonces, 
porque no debería ser así también en el PJF. Desde que era niña 
mi hija me acompañaba al juzgado de distrito cuando era juez y le 
encantaba ‘jugar al expediente’. No se me hizo raro que después 
quisiera entrar a trabajar al PJF y hasta la fecha sigue trabajando 
aquí. El ser hijo de un magistrado o juez no debe ser un 
impedimento para ser miembro del PJF. Nadie debe llegar por 
favoritismo pero tampoco excluir a nadie por tener un pariente en 
el PJF. Este asunto no debe verse como absoluto sino caso por 
caso y así analizarlo. (Personally, I think that it is important to 
contextualize why the children of magistrates, justices, and judges 
work in the MFJ. I believe it is the same reasoning as why the 
children of industrialists want to be industrialists like their parents, 
and why the children of businessmen end up being businessmen 
too. Then, it should be no different in the MFJ. I have a daughter 
and, since she was a little girl, she would come with me to the 
district court when I was a judge, and she loved to play at "the 
judicial process." It was not a surprise for me later on when she 
wanted to work in the MFJ and she still does. To be the child of a 
senior official should not be a liability to work at the federal 
judiciary. Nobody should get a job here based on favoritism, nor 
should anyone be excluded for having a family member working 
within the institution. This phenomenon should not be seen as an 
absolute truth, but it must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.)  
 
Zacarias’s argument is valid and logical because having a relative in the MFJ 
should not be an impediment to getting a job there. Nevertheless, interviewees 
who complained about nepotism did not challenge the right of senior officials’ 
relatives to work in the institution. Rather, interviewees emphasized the 
advantages and favoritism that these relatives have compared to those who do not 
have high-ranking members as relatives. This unfairness creates a situation in 
which the relatives of senior officials will have the guarantee of having a job and 
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getting ahead at any time (regardless of their credentials), while others will not 
even if they are overqualified.  
 Nearly 20% of interviewees (10) said that the Council of the Judiciary is 
well aware of the epidemic proportions of nepotism and it has tried to stop, or at 
least reduce it. The usual approach has been to change a bylaw to penalize its 
practice, but none of those measures has succeeded for two major reasons: One is 
that most of the attempts to eliminate nepotism have not truly intended to fix the 
problem given that the Council and its members benefits from nepotism. 
Secondly, modifying the law to impose harder sanctions against those who engage 
in nepotism is condemned to fail because senior officials are lawyers who know 
the law better than anyone else and thus they can always find loopholes to 
circumvent it.  
 Nepotism has been easy to reproduce in the federal judiciary because most 
senior officials agree with it, off the record of course. According to interviewees, 
there is a traditional scheme by which nepotism takes place easily in the 
institution. This scheme is supported by a set of non-written rules than everyone 
follows to assure reciprocity. One interviewee depicted the scheme in the 
following way: Judge A asks judge B for an employment favor (favor de chamba) 
to have his or her relative hired in Judge B’s district court. Judge B accepts and 
now he or she has the “right” to ask Judge A for a reciprocal favor de chamba, 
which he or she follows through on. This scheme does not violate any law and 
leaves no evidence that it took place. It is worth remembering that senior officials 
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have great decision-making power in their courts and they can appoint several 
court employees, such as a private secretary, a chauffeur, typists, and secretaries 
of the court. Based on this discretionary power, judges can almost always fulfill 
requests for jobs by peers or other senior officials. These requests are not made 
randomly but within the proximity of one’s clique.  
Meritocracy in the MFJ is more than just a system of rewards based on 
personal credentials. It also involves developing social networks to find 
opportunities. It is within this network of friends, acquaintances, former bosses, 
peers, and coworkers that favores de chamba are requested and given. Those who 
benefit from favoritism, either through connections, traffic of influence, or 
nepotism, are nicknamed recomendados, a derivative term from the verb 
recomendar, which means to recommend.  
At least 10% of the interviewees (5) mentioned that having recomendados 
in one’s district court is a doubled-edged sword because they can be responsible 
workers and fulfill the demands of the job or exactly the opposite. In either case, 
the head of the court has to tolerate the person because there is an unwritten rule 
among senior officials that, regardless of the performance of recomendados, 
employment is always guaranteed. This may sound silly if the recomendado turns 
out to be a failure, but it is a procedure to assure permanent employment status. 
According to interviewees, some but not all recomendados enjoy quite a few 
benefits than other employees do not, such as shorter work schedules, more time 
off, and less demanding work. In any case, the assessment and working conditions 
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of the recomendado would depend on who the recomendado is, who 
recommended him or her, the position the recomendado holds, and whether or not 
he or she is pursuing a career within the MFJ.   
From the analysis of the interviewees’ narrative, it can be inferred that 
nepotism is not a black-and-white phenomenon and not necessarily always a 
negative one. For instance, job rotation is a common practice among brand new 
judges and magistrates because they are frequently assigned to different 
jurisdictions earlier in their careers before they settle into one. Favores de chamba 
is a pragmatic practice to provide employment for spouses if needed. Family 
members of judges and magistrates sometimes reach high-ranking positions not 
because of nepotism, but because they are smart and have to prove it by excelling 
in their jobs. Among the negative implications of nepotism and recomendados are 
an unfair system of appointments, abuse of power by senior officials, and an 
inconsistent meritocratic process.   
Nepotism is not an isolated phenomenon, but one intertwined with other 
institutional practices, such as strong hierarchies, heavy centralism, and a male-
centered culture, that have characterized the federal judiciary. Indeed, nepotism is 
a self-defeating practice in the administration of justice because it creates a 
second-class category for those employees who do not have relatives in powerful 
positions. It also contradicts the principles of fairness and equality that must be at 
the core of the federal judicial system. Nonetheless, it is fundamental to take into 
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account the social context in which the phenomenon takes place in order to 
understand it more accurately and address it accordingly.   
Combining Judgeship with Lobbying and Litigation 
 One unexpected finding from the fieldwork was the fact that some justices 
and magistrates provide (off the record) legal counseling services to powerful 
clients, such as corporations, rich businesspersons, and politicians, who have legal 
problems in federal courts. This demand for legal counseling varies from client to 
client, but it can go from a simple consultation for a case that is about to go to 
trial to asking for lobbying or advice for a particular case that will be decided by 
the Supreme Court soon.  
 The mechanism by which this legal counseling takes place is through third 
parties, according to interviewees. As mentioned earlier, the family is the most 
trusted institution in Mexico, and senior officials who engage in these practices 
rely mostly on relatives to make the connection between them and clients. Many 
adult children of justices and magistrates who do not work in the MFJ own law 
firms. As heads of their firms, more often than not, they use the social and cultural 
capital gathered by their parents to litigate difficult cases. It is obvious that the 
names of their parents never appear in any documents related to cases, nor do they 
deal directly with the clients asking the counseling.  
 Quirina, an interviewee who had direct knowledge of this phenomenon 
and connections among high-ranking officials in the Supreme Court, explained 
that influential clients who ask for legal counseling usually hire the law firm of 
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one specific senior official’s son or daughter. Actually, however, the client is not 
hiring the law firm per se, but paying for the connections and inside knowledge 
that comes with this association. This interviewee even mentioned the name of a 
Supreme Court justice, Balderrama, who is well known in the community of 
lawyers for engaging in this practice. Quirina’s account was this: 
El ministro Balderrama tiene fama de utilizar sus influencias con 
los magistrados o en asuntos con jueces. La forma como se hace es 
que quienes estén interesados en sus servicios van con su hijo que 
tiene un despacho jurídico y quienes lo contratan no están 
contratando al hijo sino al papá y eso lo saben quienes van. Esta 
información es bien sabida por gente que trabaja en la corte y se 
puede decir que está casi confirmado que así sucede. ([Supreme 
Court] Justice Balderrama has a reputation for using his power to 
put pressure on lower court officials, such as magistrates and 
judges, to influence some cases. Those who are interested in his 
legal counseling go to his son, who has a law firm, and hire him. 
They know they are not hiring the son but the father. This is how it 
is done, and those who look for that type of legal counseling know 
it. This information is well known by those who work in the 
Supreme Court, and it is almost certain that it is a fact, not gossip.) 
 
This information was confirmed by nearly 10% of interviewees (4) throughout the 
fieldwork. Two interviewees said that they were aware of this influence peddling 
from this particular Justice Balderrama. They corroborated his reputation with 
accounts similar to that of interviewee Quirina. Additionally, during the summer 
of 2011, it became public news that an attorney at law, who was litigating a civil 
case involving millions of dollars against a well-known bishop in Central Mexico, 
publically denounced Justice Balderrama for interfering in the case (Vera, 2011).  
 Other interviewees generalized their response regarding Justice 
Balderrama’s case, not confirming the information but saying that it has been 
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known that some justices lobby and litigate cases through third parties. A few 
interviewees argued that they did not have direct knowledge of Justice 
Balderrama’s actions, but they would not dismiss the information. In other words, 
the lack of information was not evidence of the lack of influence peddling. 
Interviewee Xavier, who had 20 years of experience in the MFJ and was working 
at the Council of the Judiciary at the time of the interview, said this regarding the 
issue: 
En relación al asunto del ministro Balderrama, no te puedo decir que si, 
pero tampoco que no. Se sabe que un ministro [sin mencionar el nombre 
se refiere al ministro Balderrama usando lenguaje corporal] litiga 
mediante el despacho de su hijo, se sabe que es cierto. Además no es algo 
nuevo sino que desde siempre los ministros, magistrados y jueces han 
venido haciendo esto porque es muy difícil detectarlo” (In relation to 
Justice Balderrama’s case, I cannot say whether is true or false. It is 
known that a Justice [without mentioning a name the interviewee implies 
with body language that he is talking about Justice Balderrama] litigates 
via his son’s law firm. This is true. Besides, this is not news, more often 
than not, Justices, Magistrates, and Judges have been engaging in 
misconduct because they can get away with it).  
 
Not all shared the same view of the case of Justice Balderrama, either because 
they ignored any information about his actions or they believed it was simply 
untrue gossip. Those who believed it was just gossip added that if someone had 
evidence of this kind of wrongdoing, this person should come forward and present 
it to the public. This argument, however, is rhetorical because it is extremely 
difficult to gather evidence of wrongdoing, either because it is done clandestinely 
or because those who do it are clever enough not to leave traces.   
Confronting all the collected information and his public record, what it is 
suspected about Justice Balderrama is probably true. Before being a justice, he 
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was a politician and congressman (diputado federal) from the state of Chiapas, 
representing the party that ruled Mexico for 71 years (Suprema Corte de Justicia 
de la Nación, 2012). He holds the record in the Supreme Court of siding all the 
time with powerful Mexican corporations in court decisions. All the available 
information suggests that for Justice Balderrama business and pragmatism are 
more important than justice and the rule of law.  
Engaging in legal counseling was not restricted to some senior officials. 
Interviewees mentioned that sometimes secretaries of the court (secretarios 
proyectistas) also litigate cases or provide legal counseling to third parties as a 
source of revenue. Similar to senior officials, these junior officials are extremely 
careful of not leaving evidence of their behavior. The mechanism, frequency, and 
modus operandi of it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and it would depend 
on several factors, such as the type of court the employees works in, who the head 
of the court is, who the employee is, who benefits, and the interests at stake. Some 
interviewees said that it was more prevalent in criminal cases than in other cases. 
  It is fair to conclude that lobbying, litigating, and influence peddling by 
employees are not a frequent problem in the federal judiciary. Interviewees who 
acknowledged their existence said that they were isolated phenomena. Similar to 
the problem of corruption, nearly 100% of respondents said that the 
aforementioned practices were a rare practice, and not a single interviewee argued 
that it was systematic (see Table 1.2 below).  
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Most employees would not dare to engage in these practices for several 
reasons: it is unethical, it is illegal, it is too risky, and employees do not have time 
for it. How widespread are these phenomena? It remains to be seen because it is 
complicated to prove when the practices have been committed. The official policy 
towards these phenomena is that they do not exist in the institution. If a case 
arises, it is always defined as a single event of personal dishonesty, a “bad apple” 
issue, and it is never discussed as an institutional or systematic problem. The 
same policy is adopted towards the most common problem, corruption, which is 
discussed below. 
Corruption in the Federal Courts 
 Researching corruption in the MFJ was one of the main targets of this 
research. The topic of corruption came in the second part of the interview in 
question 13.
4
 Based on responses, a little more than 80% of the interviewees (37) 
said that there was corruption in the institution but only as a rare occurrence rather 
than a systematic practice. Further, while it can occur in all places in the MFJ, its 
occurrence appears to be random, not related to any structural problems or 
incentives facing employees of a particular sector/status within this institution. 
(See Table 1.2). According to interviewees, the range of this exceptional 
corruption could go from a minimum of 1% to a maximum of 10%.  
 Comparing and contrasting the data from the six different cities where 
fieldwork took place, there is no significant variation in perceptions of corruption 
                                                 
4
 Question 13: Do you think there is some type of dishonest behavior or corruption in the MFJ? If so, what kind? 
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among MFJ employees. The distribution of what corruption means and whether it 
exists in the institution was generally equal among these six jurisdictions. The 
major difference would be that in Tijuana 40% of the respondents (4) argued that 
corruption does not exists, which is a higher number than for other cities. These 
data could be explained by the fact that among those interviewees were two 
judges who tend to present a more optimistic view of the MFJ. The lack of 
variation in perceiving corruption is consistent with the monolithic organization 
of the institution and job rotation. These two factors are part of the culture and 
they tend to homogenize some behaviors and practices, such as the perception of 
corruption.  
There were at least three consistent reasons given by interviewees that 
supported the existence of corruption, even in low numbers. The first justification 
was that corruption is a common practice in Mexico and it would be impossible or 
naïve to think that the MFJ is free from that problem. Therefore, corruption surely 
existed but to a lesser degree compared to other government offices. A second 
explanation was that dishonest public servants are always part of any bureaucratic 
setting in Mexico, and there may be some “obejas negras” (black sheep), as one 
interviewee put it, in the MFJ who at some point in their careers will get involved 
in corrupt practices. The third argument was that the judicial process, criminal law 
in particular, could be vulnerable to corrupt acts because some people would use 
any means to obtain a favorable verdict and avoid prison.  
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 Regardless of the reason for corruption, the interviewees made it clear that 
this phenomenon was not seen as a serious problem within the federal judiciary. 
Unlike state judiciaries in which petty corruption is more prevalent and visible, 
the MFJ does not suffer from structural problems of grease payments or 
mordidas, the classic example of minor corruption used to expedite or circumvent 
red tape. Despite the bad reputation of the judicial system in Mexico as a whole, 
the MFJ has faced few or no scandals of senior officials involved in corruption. 
This does not mean they do not exist—as the case of Justice Balderrama 
mentioned earlier shows—but compared to the rest of the government branches, 
the MFJ seemed above all the bad reputation the judicial system has, according to 
interviewees (see Table 1.2).  
Interviewee Andrés, who was a judge during the interview and months 
later became a magistrate, explained: “En el 95% de los casos en el PJF no existe 
corrupción. Como en todas partes siempre hay ovejas negras, pero en su mayoría 
la gente es honesta” (95% of the cases in the MFJ are free from corruption. Like 
everywhere, there are always black sheep, but the majority of people in the MFJ 
are honest). Ernesto, another interviewee said: “La corrupción que pudiera haber 
es mínima y en comparación con otras instituciones es la excepción; con 
cualquier otra no es nada” (Any corruption that could exist would be little 
compared to other institutions; it is a rare occurrence and nothing if compared 
against any other institution). One more interviewee, Gustavo, asserted, “Casi no 
hay corrupción pero si hay coladitos. Si acaso existe es de manera muy 
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excepcional porque hay buenos salarios y eso evita la corrupción, ya que no hay 
necesidad de robar” (Corruption is almost not existent, but there are a few cases. 
If corruption exists at all, it would be just as an exceptional issue because there 
are good salaries and this prevents corruption: There is no need to be dishonest).       
Interestingly, the criterion to measure corruption in the MFJ was the 
existence of corruption in the larger context of Mexican society. Given that 
corruption is so widespread, a little corruption meant nothing or was insignificant 
considering the entire social landscape. This did not mean that employees belittled 
corruption; rather they tried to give a fair portrayal of the problem, 
acknowledging its existence while highlighting that it was not as serious as many 
people would think.       
Examining in detail the collected data, Table 1.2 shows that more than 
20% of the respondents (11) implied that corruption takes place only among high-
ranking officials, such as judges and magistrates. A little less than 15% of the 
respondents (7) suggested that corruption occurs only among low-ranking 
employees such as typists and court staff. Nearly 12% of interviewees (6) said 
that corruption happens just among middle-ranking officials, such as secretaries 
of the court. Less than 40% of the respondents (16) considered that corruption 
takes place at all hierarchical levels of the institution, low, middle, and high ranks. 
These data show that corruption is not a uniform phenomenon within the MFJ and 
it can or cannot occur anywhere, which supports the fact that it is not a common 
practice because there are not habitual patterns of this practice.  
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Table 1.2 Coded Data on Corruption, Nepotism, and Favoritism/Wrongdoing 
Coded Data  
 
 Interviewee Is there 
Corrupti
on? 
Category  Frequency Where?   Nepotism? Favoritism 
cronyism? 
1 Antonio Yes, 2% Bribery 2% Middle ranks Don’t know No 
2 Bruno Yes Petty: tips, 
mordidas 
Exceptional Low ranks Yes Yes 
3 Carlos Yes Petty: tips, 
mordidas 
Exceptional Low ranks Don’t know No 
4 Daniel Yes Bribery Exceptional Middle/Low  
ranks 
Yes Yes 
5 Elizabeth Yes Bribery Exceptional Middle/Low 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
6 Felipe No    Don’t know Yes in the 
past 
7 Gerardo Yes Petty: tips, 
mordidas 
Rare Middle ranks Don’t know Yes 
8 Hector Yes Bribery Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
9 Isabel Yes Bribery Rare Middle ranks Don’t know No 
10 Jazmín No    Don’t know No 
11 Kevin Yes Influence 
peddling 
Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
12 Luis No    No No 
13 Mónica No    Yes Yes 
14 Magdalena Yes Tips Rare Low ranks No No 
15 Natalia Yes Bribery Exceptional High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
16 Orlando Yes Bribery Exceptional High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes No 
17 Pedro Yes Bribery Exceptional High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
18 Quirina Yes Influence 
peddling 
Rare High ranks Yes Yes 
19 Ramón Yes,  Bribery 10% High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
20 Santiago Yes Bribery Exceptional High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
21 Teresa Yes Bribery, tips Exceptional High/Low 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
22 Victor Yes Bribery Rare Low ranks Yes Yes 
23 Wilfrido Yes Bribery, tips Exceptional Middle/Low 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
24 Xavier Yes Bribery Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
25 Yanny No    Yes Yes 
26 Zacarías No    No No 
27 Andrés Yes Bribery 5% High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
28 Baltasar Yes Bribery Rare High/Middle 
ranks 
Don’t know Yes 
29 Carmen Yes Bribery Exceptional Middle ranks Yes Yes 
30 Diego No    Yes No 
31 Ernesto Yes Bribery Rare High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
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32 Fernando Yes Bribery Exceptional Middle ranks Yes Yes 
33 Gustavo Yes Bribery Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
34 Hugo Yes Bribery Exceptional  High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
35 Ignacio Yes Bribery 1%  High ranks Yes Yes 
36 Josefina Yes Influence 
peddling 
Rare High ranks Yes Yes 
37 Karla No    Yes Yes 
38 Lourdes Yes Bribery, tips Exceptional High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
39 Miguel Yes Bribery Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
40 Nancy Yes Bribery Rare Middle ranks Yes Yes 
41 Oscar Yes Influence  
peddling 
Rare High ranks Yes Yes 
42 Patricia Yes Influence 
peddling 
Rare High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
43 Quintiliano Yes Bribery 5% High/Middle 
ranks 
Yes Yes 
44 Raquel Yes Bribery/Thre
ats 
Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
45 Sara Yes Bribery Exceptional High ranks Yes Yes 
 
Defining Corruption in the MFJ 
 More than 50% of the interviewees (24) defined corruption as acts of 
bribery only, meaning the acceptance of money or other incentives to influence 
the judicial process or using one’s public position to gain economic benefits. 
Nearly 10% of the respondents (5) defined corruption as influence peddling by 
which third parties would influence a trial by using their connections with judges 
or magistrates. A little less than 10% of the sample (4 interviewees) suggested 
that corruption meant taking any money from the public, such as tips or mordidas, 
regardless of the ultimate intention behind given the money. Less than 15% of the 
respondents (7) defined corruption as a practice that fitted several categories, such 
as bribery, tips, and mordidas to influence the judicial process.   
Those who defined corruption as mere acts of bribery suggested that 
receiving some money was not in itself corruption, as long as it did not affect the 
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judicial process. For instance, interviewee Bruno, who was a judge, made a 
distinction between corruption and tips: “Existe una diferencia entre corrupción y 
propinas. La diferencia es cuándo se recibe el dinero, si se recibe antes de hacer 
el trabajo entonces es corrupción, pero si se recibe después de hacer el trabajo 
entonces es más una propina” (There is a difference between corruption and tips. 
It is corruption when money is accepted before doing the job, but it is a tip if 
money is given after the job is done). The corollary of this assertion was that a 
corrupt act has to influence the process of justice to be defined as such. This 
perspective is similar to other findings on judicial corruption at the state 
judiciaries in Central Mexico (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2010).  
I do not accept this view unchallenged because it is a blurred definition 
that creates uncertainty, and it can be easily modified to disguise wrongdoing as a 
harmless practice. For instance, court employees can delay work or trial 
proceedings intentionally to put pressure on litigants to offer money as tips to get 
things done, when in reality it would be a hidden bribe concealed as gratuity. The 
important point here is to understand the institutional rationality behind this 
practice, which means how some court employees justify certain practices that 
have become socially acceptable within the judicial system.  
 To exemplify what corruption was in the MFJ, some interviewees cited the 
case of a secretary of a district court named Esiquio Martínez Hernández (EMH) 
who was arrested in late May of 2011 for malfeasance in office and potential 
embezzlement (enriquecimiento ilícito). He had 450 million pesos (around $36 
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million dollars) in bank accounts and could not explain where the money came 
from. The indictment was initiated by the Council of the Judiciary after an 
internal investigation, and it became national news when he was detained and put 
under trial (El Universal, 2011b). Because the case was recent, it was used 
indistinctively by some interviewees to argue that there was corruption in the 
federal judiciary and that the head of the MFJ was being transparent and fighting 
corruption by prosecuting this junior official.    
 Not every interviewee agreed with the definition of corruption as a bribery 
issue; a handful of interviewees included nepotism, abuse of power, tips, use of 
connections, and traffic of influence in the same category. More than 50% of the 
sample (24 respondents), however, saw corruption just as acts of bribery. This 
meant that other practices such as influence peddling, favoritism, traffic of 
influence, and even influencing the judicial process for political reasons were not 
corruption or had blurred definitions. These phenomena were not seen as corrupt 
acts because they did not entail receiving money and they were not done 
systematically, but only exceptionally. Since traffic of influence, favoritism, and 
nepotism were confined to administrative matters, such as appointments, they 
were not corrupt acts in the criminal sense of the word, but merely unethical and 
unfair.  
The Perception of Corruption 
 People working in the MFJ perceived corruption as a legal problem in 
general terms. In a context in which agents are law experts, corruption was 
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understood as referring to dishonest personal acts that break the law. This means 
that corruption was primarily defined as a crime rather than an unethical, 
immoral, or cultural problem. The implications of this were that corruption could 
be solved by applying the rule of law and supervising officials’ strict adherence to 
the rules. This perception of corruption is supported by the fact that, overall, more 
than two-thirds of interviewees (37) defined this problem as bribery—sometimes 
other phenomena were included in this definition, but bribery was the most 
noticeable. According to this narrative, bribery would be a personal act that places 
all the responsibility for this misconduct onto individuals rather than onto the 
institution or the system.  
From my perspective, this understanding of corruption repeats the “bad 
apple” paradigm that has been used mostly by scholars from developed countries 
to tackle this phenomenon (William and Beare, 1999). Namely, they blame 
specific individuals for the existence of corruption while ignoring other factors, 
such as context, setting, and culture, which also play an essential role in the 
production and reproduction of these phenomena. By ignoring these factors, the 
head of the MFJ—and its employees—limit the scope to address corruption 
because it overlooks the complexity that surrounds this phenomenon. If there is 
no understanding of the nature of corruption in the federal judiciary, then it cannot 
be changed because any policy or reform to tackle it will be misguided. Finally 
yet importantly, this perception of corruption as mostly bribery reflects the 
monolithic culture of the federal judiciary because it tends to see and define 
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institutional problems as legal matters, rather than including a more 
comprehensive approach.  
 Not everyone perceived corruption as a legal issue only. Nearly 25% of 
the sample (11 interviewees) suggested that corruption in the federal courts was 
intertwined with the cultural context of Mexican society, meaning that the 
institution was only a reflection of a larger and deeper problem in the country. 
These respondents suggested that corruption was more complicated than it 
appeared because different factors could be combined to create the scenarios in 
which corruption could occur. For instance, the kinds of trial, the parties involved, 
the matters at stake, the location of the court, and who the judge was, were all 
circumstances that would decide whether an official had engaged in wrongdoing.  
Measuring Corruption through Judicial Independence  
 The perception of corruption as an exceptional phenomenon was 
consistent with another phenomenon that thrives with low levels of corruption: 
judicial independence. Judicial independence is a variable that closely intertwines 
with corruption because widespread corruption correlates with poor or little 
judicial independence and vice versa. This argument is supported by what most 
respondents said about this theme. Nearly 95% of interviewees (42) suggested 
that judges and magistrates enjoy high degrees of independence to do their job. As 
imperfect as the meritocratic process could be in the MFJ, it has been improved in 
the past decade, and now civil service is much fairer than before because it is 
based on professional merits, with some exceptions as has been argued. As 
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explained earlier, the head of the MFJ uses a mixed policy in the appointment 
process, but at least half—maybe more—of those who become judges and 
magistrates are selected by their personal credentials. This has empowered 
employees and provided legitimacy to their tenure to face off any potential 
influence from outside and above: they do not owe any favors to anyone for being 
where they are.  
It would be interesting to know if senior officials who are appointed 
through favoritism or nepotism enjoy the judicial independence that prevails 
among those who are appointed on their credentials. When explaining judicial 
independence among judges, interviewees did not differentiate among senior 
officials who are recomendados and those who are not. I would assume that 
interviewees included all judges equally; otherwise they would have mentioned 
the differences (if any) between the two. 
More than 50% of interviewees (25) argued that in the Supreme Court 
there is not enough judicial independence because political interests interfere. 
They argued that Supreme Court decisions that have the potential to affect the 
Presidency or powerful nongovernmental groups are always under the threat of 
influence. The President has some decision-making power in the appointment of 
justices, and based on this fact, some interviewees questioned whether the 
Supreme Court could have any judicial independence at all. Interviewee Natalia 
said the following about judicial independence: “En el 99% de los asuntos existe 
imparcialidad, pero siempre hay algún caso en los juzgados donde hay algo. En 
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los asuntos de la corte no me atrevería a hablar porque se manejan otros 
intereses” (In 99% of the cases there is impartiality, but there is always the 
exception with a case in district courts where it could be otherwise. Regarding the 
cases handled by the Supreme Court, I would not dare to say the same because 
there are other [powerful] interests there).    
Comparing the responses on the topic of judicial independence between 10 
senior officials (judges and magistrates) and the rest of the employees (30), the 
former tended to present a more positive image of the judgeship while the latter 
were more neutral, making both negative and positive comments. Regarding the 
Supreme Court, more senior officials had a tendency to depict it as independent 
and only occasionally suffering from political influence, while most junior 
employees argued the opposite. One interpretation of this diversity of perspectives 
focuses on the social context and working conditions of both groups. Senior 
officials have a longer service and have already made a career in the MFJ; they 
enjoy social status, profitable salaries, power, and rule over their courts. Low-
ranking employees, on the other hand, have on average a shorter service in the 
institution, have lower status, make less money than their bosses, have less power, 
and their careers are still in the making. The former have more interests at stake, 
which lead them to be less critical and highlight the best of the MFJ. The latter do 
not have that institutional commitment yet and feel freer to express their opinions 
while challenging the status quo without fear.   
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Corruption in Drug-Related Trials  
Corruption related to drug trafficking and drug-related cases was almost 
not existent in the federal judiciary according to more than 80% of the 
interviewees (37). They suggested that it was extremely difficult for a judge or 
anyone working in the MFJ to be lured by the money and influence of drug 
traffickers, for several reasons. First, court cases are handled by different 
employees throughout the trial until the sentence is released by the judge. These 
employees are familiar with the parties in the case, the content, and the evidence. 
To acquit a defendant requires support from the case and if a judge dares to free a 
criminal because of corruption, many employees would immediately know what 
is going on and the judge will be eventually caught. The evidence of the case has 
to be consistent with the verdict, said interviewee Luis, a judge: “Si algún titular 
fallara un asunto en contra de las constancias del expediente, podría ser motivo 
de sanción penal y administrativa” (If a judge decides a trial without the support 
of evidence in the file, he or she would be severely sanctioned). This statement is 
supported by scholars (Begné Guerra, 2007; Carbonell, 2008) and my own 
experience as a returning member of the judicial system. Furthermore, at least 
two-thirds of the respondents (30) implied that acquitting a defendant without the 
support of evidence would be a remarkable mistake that could be easily proved. 
Second, one of the goals of having good salaries and high quality social 
benefits has been to encourage MFJ employees to be loyal towards the institution 
and have a passion for their jobs. Nearly 20% of senior officials (10) 
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acknowledged the advantages of their work, and they were unwilling to risk their 
positions by engaging in corrupt acts that could eventually destroy their careers. 
Junior officials had similar feelings, although they could be more vulnerable to be 
corrupted, but there was no evidence of this potential phenomenon.     
Third, interviewees said court employees know that dealing with drug 
traffickers is too risky because once someone makes a deal with them it would be 
almost impossible to cut the relationship and say no to future requests. Mexicans 
cartels are known for their “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) approach to dealing 
with their businesses. MFJ employees know this better than anyone else does 
because they see it in their everyday work handling drug-related trials, which 
include grotesque killings, kidnappings, executions, shootouts, and so on. 
Therefore, senior and junior officials pay special attention not to get involved 
with drug traffickers.   
Fourth, at least 10% of interviewees (5) also argued that today’s drug 
traffickers are smart and well informed about the legal system and how difficult is 
to persuade a federal judge to accept a bribe. Instead, what these traffickers do is 
to make a deal with prosecutors, if possible, because it is easier and less 
compromising. This perspective was likely to be embraced by at least 80% of the 
sample (36 employees) because it is consistent with the institutional mindset that 
permeates among junior and senior officials about not risking the job or one’s life.  
Conversely, the prosecutor’s offices in both jurisdictions, state and federal, 
are not professional enough and have suffered from chronic inefficiencies and 
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lack of resources in the past decades (Ferreyra-Orozco, 2012). Nearly 70% of the 
respondents (32) asserted that these deficiencies from the prosecutor’s office 
affected the work of the MFJ because it could lead to freeing criminals based on 
technicalities. More than 50% of interviewees (24) suggested that corruption from 
the federal prosecutor’s office was possible to identify when indictments are sent 
to the MFJ because it is common that evidence is missing from the file. For 
instance, sometimes facts from the indictment are intentionally confusing or 
criminal investigations have been poorly done. These practices reflect obstruction 
of justice to benefit the defendant. Thus, if drug cartel members have an interest 
in influencing a case, they will go to the prosecutor first before the case is sent to 
the federal courts.  
Finally, it was said earlier that employees in the MFJ work many hours in 
the courts and spend more time with their co-workers than with their own family 
members. They know each other well and some develop close ties among 
themselves. They talk about the cases and proceedings they handle and share 
information to get feedback. According to some interviewees, court employees 
even nickname cases, such as using one of the defendants’ names or a particular 
characteristic of the case, as a way to identify them easily. This closeness between 
employees also served to keep an eye on each other about their work performance 
and their boss’s. When a coworker makes a mistake or engages in any sort of 
wrongdoing, the first to know are the people around the office, and this becomes a 
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deterrent factor: Court employees policed each other as part of their everyday 
duties.  
Closeness among employees could also lead to collusion between them, 
but this would be more difficult to carry out because it would imply secret 
cooperation and the agreement of multiple coworkers, which seems unlikely. 
Working in the federal courts is like having a family for several reasons, 
according to some interviewees. Coworkers spend long periods of time working 
together. They develop strong personal ties—usually supporting each other, 
although the opposite may also be true—and, most importantly, they get to know 
each other well. This means that if someone makes a mistake or engages in 
misconduct, sooner rather than later, it becomes known by the rest of the 
courtroom. From my own experience as a former trainee in the judicial system, 
collusion between employees can occur, but those who collude know that their 
secret cannot last long (and this serves as deterrence factor to limit collusion).         
Coping with the Threat of Cartels  
More than 60% of interviewees (28) acknowledged that drug cartels and 
organized crime are threats to employees of the federal judiciary. Although there 
has not been systematic violence against these employees, there have been attacks 
against judges and magistrates in the past years. The most recent attack, which 
some interviewees cited as example of violence, was the case of the federal judge 
Carlos Alberto Elorza Amores, who in August 2010 was attacked by a group of 
gunmen wanting to kill him. His bodyguards confronted the hit men, and one 
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bodyguard was gunned down while another was injured. The judge saved his life 
with only minor injuries (Castillo and León, 2010). 
 The Council of the Judiciary is aware of the risks that judges of criminal 
district courts and magistrates in appellate courts are exposed to and has taken 
some steps to protect them, according to several interviewees. For instance, the 
judges of district courts located in jurisdictions where there is a strong presence of 
cartels and drug trafficking, such as border cities with the U.S., drive armored 
vehicles provided by the Council. The premises of federal courts have guards at 
the entrances and they require identification to access to the courts, something 
that did not exist in the past. These premises also have scanners to check bags and 
suitcases to detect guns and explosives. In addition, court employees have been 
encouraged not to show off their badges at any time, a practice that was common 
in the past to enjoy certain immunity with police officers or to circumvent the red 
tape while dealing with bureaucrats.         
Despite these steps, there have been threats against judges and magistrates, 
and the Council of the Judiciary has set up a particular protocol to cope with 
them. When a senior official is threatened by organized crime, he or she can make 
a direct call to the Council and explain the details of what has happened. Then, 
based on the circumstances of the case, the evidence, and the potential of the 
threat, the Council takes a decision. If the threat is real and harm is imminent, the 
official is usually transferred to another jurisdiction or bodyguards are assigned to 
this official. However, not all threats merit a change of jurisdiction.  
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As a rule, the Council follows a policy of constant job rotation for judges 
who are located in jurisdictions that handle high-profile cases in drug-related 
trials in order to avoid corruption while giving a break to these judges. 
Sometimes, the judges themselves ask to be transferred to another jurisdiction 
once they have stayed the minimum period of time allowed by the Council, which 
is two years.  
 All these arguments and actions to fight the influence of drug cartels in 
the administration of justice have not prevented a few court officials from 
engaging in corruption with them, nor has this been an obstacle for drug 
traffickers who manage to influence particular trials through threats and murder. 
The Michoacanazo case has been a high-profile case that involved different 
degrees of corruption, political interference, and the influence of a particular drug 
cartel on the trial, as will be analyzed and discussed in the next chapter.  
Significance of the Findings 
 Part one of this chapter describes, on the one hand, an institution that 
reproduces the traditional patterns of bureaucracy that have characterized 
Mexican society—hierarchies, complex regulations, and a strong administrative 
system. On the other hand, it presents a culture of intense work in which 
excruciating work schedules, effort-intensive jobs, and stressful environments are 
characteristic of everyday life in the MFJ. Despite these difficult work conditions, 
most employees and judges accept them as natural features of federal courts. 
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Nearly two-thirds of the interviewees (33) suggested that the unifying factor that 
holds this setting together is high salaries and passion for working in these courts.  
 This information sheds light on the ordinary activities of the federal 
judiciary that are little known by most people outside the institution. Knowing 
these activities can provide a different perception of the MFJ and the complexity 
of the administration of federal justice. These data show that the negative image 
that the judicial branch has had in the past overshadows its positive features, such 
as having hard working employees and high levels of professionalization. What is 
more important is that this knowledge provides a better understanding of the 
setting and context of the MFJ, which serves as background to grasp more 
complex phenomena such as nepotism, abuse of power, misconducts, and 
corruption.  
 Part two explained in detail some of the mechanisms of wrongdoing and 
corruption that take place within the MFJ. Practices such as nepotism have 
become normalized in some sectors of this institution—usually among high-
ranking officials—and thus they have lost negative connotations. Nepotism in 
particular is widespread, and nearly 80% of the interviewees (35) acknowledged 
its existence. Because it is not seen as an immoral or unethical phenomenon, there 
is little or no interest from the head of the MFJ to tackle it. Along with nepotism, 
some magistrates and justices engage in wrongful activities such as litigation and 
lobbying in favor of powerful private interests. These practices are accomplished 
through third parties such as relatives or friends so that officials’ names never 
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appear, which makes it difficult to prove any misconduct. The case of Justice 
Balderrama, mentioned as an example of this type of wrongdoing, is paradigmatic 
because it shows a lack of accountability at the top of the MFJ. The fact that no 
one supervises the Supreme Court as a whole, and justices in particular, creates a 
loophole that can lead to abuse of power and corruption.    
Whether it is use of connections, lobbyism, or influence peddling from 
high-ranking officials, these practices still exist because of the culture of strict 
obedience, loyalty, and powerful hierarchies derived from the inertia of the ancien 
régime. According to those respondents who acknowledged misconduct, these 
practices are not common compared to their prevalence in the past, and they have 
been considerably abated. Except for nepotism, misconduct such as influence 
peddling and lobbyism occur only exceptionally, and they are not a huge problem 
within the MFJ, according to interviewees. Interestingly, there is a doublespeak 
discourse from some senior officials; on the one hand, they officially condemn 
these practices as negative phenomena that affect the MFJ, but on the other hand, 
they reproduce them because they benefit from them.   
 Finally, corruption is a phenomenon that remains part of the MFJ in 
relation to the broader context of Mexican society and the legacy from the 
authoritarian regime. More than 80% of respondents (37) admitted that corruption 
takes place at the federal judiciary, but all of them emphasized that it was an 
exceptional phenomenon. Even those who mentioned a percentage of corruption, 
such 1%, 5%, or 10%, added that it was a rare practice within the larger context of 
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the institution. It is important to understand this emphasis on corruption as 
exceptionality because it hints at the institutional mindset of the problem: Yes—
employees would admit—there is still corruption in the federal judiciary, but it is 
not as widespread as it used to be, and compared to the rest of the federal 
bureaucracy, the MFJ is doing better on this issue.  
 The arguments stated by interviewees to explain why corruption is an 
exceptional problem were coherent and convincing. The existence of high salaries 
has reduced the desire to engage in corrupt practices, respondents argued. More 
professionalization, a better career civil service (compared to the recent past), 
social status, and superior social and health benefits were all factors that 
discouraged employees from risking their job for any misconduct. Another 
deterrent factor was that several people throughout the trial handle court 
proceedings and the sentencing process; therefore, if a corrupt act influencing the 
judicial process occurred, someone at some point would detect it. This makes the 
mechanism of corruption more difficult to hide and control because employees 
police each other, respondents asserted.   
 It is a fact that there is corruption in the MFJ—exceptionally, but it occurs. 
Corruption related to drug trafficking and cartels is even rarer than any other kind 
of corruption in the MFJ because the implications of getting involved with cartel 
members are too dangerous to consider as possibilities, interviewees suggested. 
None of the respondents mentioned a single case of corruption related to drug 
trafficking trials. Instead, they said that the opposite was true because hardly any 
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judges or magistrates would do business with cartel members given how 
organized crime conducts their affairs. This does not mean that this type of 
corruption does not take place; it does, but in more subtle and complex 
mechanisms as the Michoacanazo case shows in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
THE MICHOACANAZO CASE STUDY 
Part One 
 The Michoacanazo case was a criminal trial against local and state public 
officials from the state of Michoacán who were indicted by the Attorney 
General’s Office for having ties with the local drug cartel known as “La Familia 
Michoacana.” More than 30 public servants were arrested and then sent to prison 
during a roundup conducted by the federal police in May 2009. Within a two-year 
period, all of them were eventually freed. This case had strong legal and political 
implications nationwide because it pitted the state of Michoacán against the 
federal government as well as pitting President Felipe Calderón´s administration 
against the Mexican Federal Judiciary. Besides the legal facts that supported the 
case (e.g. corrupt local officials and official protection to organized crime), there 
were probably political motivations by the federal government (e.g. to influence 
state elections and to discredit the opposition party in Michoacán) to prosecute the 
local officials indicted in the case. 
Because the political and legal grounds of the trial were blurred, the 
Michoacanazo is a paradigmatic case that provides a glance at the interstices of 
the Mexican federal judiciary when powerful interests collide, and corruption 
intertwines, with politics, a drug cartel, and the complexities of handling drug 
related trials. This is not a typical case in the federal judicial system because only 
rarely does Mexican society see an official confrontation between state powers to 
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the magnitude displayed here. However, the case provides an opportunity to do a 
holistic analysis of context and circumstances on how corruption can operate 
within the MFJ when certain criteria are met.  
On the one hand, the case is descriptive of the social and political conditions 
that surround the federal administration of justice in Mexico. On the other hand, 
the case is explanatory of how judicial corruption is extremely difficult to track 
and why a combination of powerful interests (e.g. political, legal, criminal) still 
echo the weaknesses that the federal judicial system suffered during the 
authoritarian regime of the twentieth century. Besides explaining the complexities 
of researching corruption in the Mexican federal judiciary, the aim of this case 
study is to gain a sharper understanding of the social and political contexts 
influencing the case and why and how it took place.  
It would not be possible to understand the Michoacanazo case study without 
first providing a brief background on the proliferation of drug cartels and the 
surge of extreme violence in Mexico. Drug trafficking is a fundamental piece of 
the Michoacanazo case because it is so intertwined with the performance of the 
federal judiciary and is considered one of the most difficult social issues that 
Mexico has faced in modern history. The first part of this chapter approaches how 
and why drug trafficking became the monumental issue it is today. Then, there is 
an explanation of the connections between politicians and drug traffickers. Next, 
there is an account of the origins and modus operandi of the “La Familia 
Michoacana” cartel, which will help to better explain the connections between 
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politics and organized crime that are in this case study. Lastly, part two of the 
chapter deconstructs the Michoacanazo trial and provides an analysis of the 
evidence, rulings, and ramifications of the whole case. 
Drug Trafficking in Mexico before 2006: Contextualizing the Michoacanazo 
Despite many decades of political pressure from the U.S., during the 
twentieth century, Mexican government did not address drug trafficking as a 
serious public problem. Tolerance, corruption, and sometimes cynical protection 
allowed Mexican drug organizations to flourish under the shelter of the 
authoritarian regime because it was a convenience for both criminal organizations 
and the political establishment. The profitability of drug trafficking gave 
traffickers enough resources to corrupt politicians and law enforcement agents. 
The Mexican government never defined drug trafficking within the “war on 
drugs” approach that the U.S. uses to confront this problem because this illicit 
activity was not officially acknowledged as a serious threat to Mexico’s national 
security. However, when President Felipe Calderón took power in 2006, he 
initiated an official confrontation against drug trafficking organizations. This was 
not strategic or legal, but rather a political decision. The Presidential election of 
2006 was extremely contested and filled with disputes and controversies. 
Officially, Calderón won the election with less than 0.6% of the votes (Instituto 
Federal Electoral, 2006) and took office. For a large majority of Mexicans, he 
was a spurious President. To reverse his fragile political position when he 
assumed office on December 1, 2006, he declared war against the drug cartels. 
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A major shift in this new approach was the militarization of the “war on 
drugs.” Given the prevalence of corruption among the police and the general 
distrust of law enforcement agencies, the army was recruited in order to fight drug 
trafficking on a larger scale. The military have been involved in the eradication of 
drug plantations and counter-drug operations for the past decades. This occurred 
because “the military [was] considered to be the only institution with the 
manpower, capacity and equipment to counter the threat of drug trafficking and 
[was] viewed as less corrupt than the Mexican police” (Meyer, 2007, pp. 3-4). 
This new order from President Calderón gave soldiers the legal authority to patrol 
streets and highways, set up checkpoints, maintain law and order in major cities, 
and conduct law enforcement operations. The policy of the “war on drugs” raised 
President Calderón’s approval ratings significantly. However, it also led to a 
spiral of unprecedented violence and assassinations throughout the country, 
including a record numbers of murders related to drug cartels. Each year, for the 
past six, a new higher record of killings has been set, and this trend seems to be 
continuing unabated. 
The New Mexican Cartels: Coming of Age 
 When the media and law enforcement agencies describe cartels, they 
usually highlight the most significant organizations and associate their names with 
specific cities they control and in which they are thought to have their 
headquarters (Astorga, 2005). Based on this narrative, people and officials tend to 
  
165 
think that their leaders and members are originally from those places. Although 
this can be true, it is not always the case.   
The most powerful and successful traffickers have been those coming from 
Sinaloa state. This is still valid today. The Sinaloa cartel is among the most 
powerful drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) at present. The size of its 
operations in many states and the long-term leadership of kingpin Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzmán have contributed to the reinforcement of the hegemony and the 
resilience of this criminal organization. It has been in business for many decades. 
After its main drug lord, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, was arrested in 1989, he 
managed to divide the organization among his deputies; this action created 
regional cartels, such as Tijuana and Juárez, that later fought amongst themselves 
to control the plazas—Mexican cities under control of a particular DTOs 
(Astorga, 2005). 
The Gulf cartel, another power cartel a few years ago though now fading 
away, did not have as strong of a tradition as the Sinaloa cartel, but it had a robust 
presence in the states along the Gulf of Mexico—hence its denomination. “The 
Gulf cartel grew dramatically during the chaos of the early 1990s, expanding its 
territory into direct sales, while engaging in a host of other nefarious rackets. The 
growth inevitable brought them into conflict with ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán and the 
Sinaloa cartel” (Kellner and Pipitone, 2010, p. 32). The main leader was Juan 
García Abrego, who was arrested in 1996 and deported to the U.S. Osiel Cárdenas 
Guillen took his place. In the earlier 2000’s, he lured elite soldiers from the 
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Mexican Special Forces group to join him by offering them money. Dozens of 
soldiers came and they became known as “Los Zetas.” These elite ex-soldiers had 
specialized training in counter-insurgency, small-group tactics, weaponry, 
intelligence collection, and so on. They had attended the School of the Americas 
in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and were exposed to all the military tactics that 
characterize Special Forces. Soon after the Los Zetas became the hit men of the 
Gulf Cartel, they earned a reputation for efficiency, discipline, and brutality 
(Meyer, 2007).          
Los Zetas have been extremely entrepreneurial in their criminal behavior. 
Besides expanding their repertoire of illicit activities, they also battled with local 
drug traffickers to gain control of cities and corridors located in other states in 
order to expand and export their business. Sometimes Los Zetas created alliances 
with other cartels or smaller groups of mercenaries to take over important plazas 
for the drug trade, and most of the time they were able to remain the bosses. With 
these alliances, they have transmitted their military knowledge to hit men by 
providing them with training and teaching them how to conduct the drug business 
more effectively through other profitable illegal actions. 
Drug trafficking in Mexico and the existence of powerful drug cartels would 
not be possible without the assistance of authorities (politicians in particular) who 
use their government influences to benefit these criminal organizations. This close 
relationship between drug traffickers and politicians had always been a known 
phenomenon during the authoritarian regime because it benefited both parties. 
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That relationship is still alive today, and it played a role in the Michoacanazo 
case.         
Narco-Politics: When Drug Traffickers Meet Politicians 
Luis Astorga correctly argues, “Since the beginning, the best-known drug 
traffickers in Mexico were related to high ranking politicians. More precisely, 
these politicians were suspected of being directly involved in the illegal trade and 
even of controlling it” (Astorga, 1999, p. 14). This scenario is not difficult to 
picture when imagining that this happened almost a century ago. What is more 
astonishing is that this symbiosis between drug traffickers and politicians is 
hardly any different today. It should not come as a surprise then that drug 
trafficking, politics (narco-politics), and corruption (narco-corruption) have been 
intertwined throughout the history of the drug trade in Mexico. 
Drug trafficking requires an enormous network of people in order to 
produce, harvest, transport, distribute, and sell all the drugs. In Michoacán, this 
activity began as a profitable business in which some peasants, middle-class 
individuals, and even wealthy families became involved in order to make quick 
cash, get rich, or just make a living in order to survive poverty. Similar to the 
experience of the state of Sinaloa (Astorga, 1999), in Michoacán, people turned to 
the drug business not because they were criminals, but because they saw the 
opportunity to earn some money. 
In Michoacán as well as in other regions of the country, cultivating and 
harvesting drugs became normalized in society because it was part of the 
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everyday lives of many people. It was much more profitable to grow marijuana 
and poppy than any other crop. There were minimal risks involved with these 
practices because the police and the authorities did not enforce the laws and/or 
were directly related to this business. Many individuals in rural municipalities, 
where the towns and villages are small, were willing to become traffickers 
because everyone knew who farmed poppy and marijuana. Thus, cultivating illicit 
plants became a sort of “natural” enterprise in which many locals, friends, 
acquaintances, and even relatives engaged. The abnormal became normal and 
drug trafficking no longer appeared as a stigmatized and criminal behavior, but 
was rather seen as a lucrative, commercial practice. 
There are two main factors that encouraged the normalization of drug 
trafficking at that time: 1) the nonexistence of violence, and 2) the absence of 
local drug use. The first factor, the nonexistence of violence, was made possible 
because most traffickers lived in the same villages and towns and they either 
knew each other or were related by kinship. This closeness between traffickers 
kept any potential violence at bay because disagreements and rivalries were 
settled by the heads of the households and the older family members. Remember 
that family and kinship ties are strongly rooted in Mexican society. In the same 
manner, community and neighborhood membership are sources of identity that 
create bonds and allows for a backdrop under which reconciliation and 
negotiation processes can occur in order to settle any disputes. The second factor, 
zero drug consumption, allowed the communities to accept traffickers as 
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businessmen and adopt drug trafficking as a regular business activity because the 
drugs were sent to the U.S. and not consumed by locals. There were no immediate 
negative effects locally because of these illegal practices at that time (Recio, 
2002).   
However, everything changed when criminal organizations began to fight 
amongst themselves because each one wanted to take over and control the regions 
where the drugs were harvested, as well as the drug routes leading to the U.S. In 
addition, the fragmentation of large DTOs into smaller organizations with 
regional influences instead of national presences, led to bloody disputes between 
cartels that wanted to maintain control and scare rivals and society. 
Extreme Violence from Drug Traffickers 
Violence is nothing new for criminal organizations. It is one of the most 
effective tools used to carry out their illicit activities. When corruption is not 
enough, drug cartels resort to intimidation, fear, and the threat of physical harm to 
conduct their business successfully. “Corruption and violence are often 
inseparable. When corruption is unsuccessful, traffickers resort to violence: they 
intimidate policemen, judges, and witnesses; they form private armies; they 
assassinate police force members and representatives of state justice, of 
competitors and of enemies” (Toro, 1998, p. 140). What is new in this wave of 
violence, besides the high number of assassinations, is the type of tactics adopted 
by cartels in order to maintain control of their territory, instill terror in rivals and 
citizens, and to settle accounts. These tactics have been characterized by 
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gruesome killings, torture, brutality, and burning or dissolving bodies in acid. It 
also has included beheaded and dismembered bodies being displayed in horrifying 
scenes. For example, severed heads have been left in front of public buildings and 
mutilated torsos have been seen hanging from bridges. 
The Value of a Bad Reputation 
Violence is a powerful recourse that criminal organizations routinely resort 
to because it can be an effective instrument to use when reaching for their goals. 
“Organized criminal groups use force, or threaten its use, to accomplish their 
ends. They engage in killings, beatings, burnings, and destruction” (Finckenauer, 
2007, p. 7). Without violence, criminal organizations would not have leverage to 
conduct their illicit activities. Therefore, it is clearly true that violence is a 
fundamental and distinctive trait of drug cartels. 
 It is, however, not the only effective tool used to instill fear in other 
criminals, victims, and competitors. Criminal syndicates also use and exploit the 
benefits of having a bad reputation (Abadinsky, 2010). A bad reputation creates 
status, power, and a foothold for those who hold it. This bad reputation operates 
as a valuable instrument because it brings advantages to those who have one and 
acts as a defense mechanism that protects them. If a criminal organization, such as 
a drug cartel or a gang is known for its implacable violence, then citizens, victims, 
and rivals will fear them. 
 A reputation is more than a general opinion about something or someone. 
“Reputations are judgments about vices and virtues, strengths and weaknesses, 
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that communities accumulate, process and reprocess about their members. They 
are built up over time, involve a great deal of indirect evidence and often include 
social representations of entire groups” (Bovenkerk, Siegel, and Zaitch, 2003, p. 
27). In the case of criminal organizations, a bad reputation has to be credible 
enough to let rivals and victims know that violence can always be a possibility. A 
bad reputation means that those who enjoy it are capable of extreme violence in 
order to achieve their illicit activities without fearing the authorities. In other 
words, it allows organized crime members to function efficiently is a world of 
criminal chaos. As Kyle and Koslowski (2001) assert, a 
Bad reputation is a valuable asset that permits criminals access 
to criminal markets that would, absent this reputation, be 
closed to them. Victims of potential victims who believe they 
are confronted by some omnipotent force called organized 
crime (or more especially mafia) are more fearful, more likely 
to succumb, and less likely to go to the police than would 
otherwise be true. (p. 170) 
 
Applying this conceptualization to the case of DTOs in Mexico, some 
cartels such as Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana have acquired such a strong 
bad reputation that their rivals and society hold a deathly fear of them. Merciless 
violence and bad reputation are a perfect combination for these criminal 
organizations to conduct criminal business successfully because they give their 
criminal activities impunity and makes things much easier and faster for them. In 
fact, a believable bad reputation helps drug cartels get more things done without 
resorting to the need to use a physical or destructive force. Besides drug 
trafficking, other criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and private 
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protection have been successfully integrated into some drug cartels’ repertoire of 
criminal acts, thanks to a bad reputation. “A credible reputation as a violent or 
effective protector can certainly save production costs: the fiercer the reputation, 
the less need for recourse to the resources supporting it” (Bovenkerk, Siegel, and 
Zaitch, 2003, p. 28). The more aggressive, bloody, and relentless a cartel’s 
reputation is, the more successful their criminal career and control over territories 
will be. 
 The most common path for a drug cartel to gain a bad reputation has been 
through hideous murders, extreme violence, impunity, and martial discipline. For 
many years, Los Zetas cartel was the organization that, above all others, held the 
worst reputation. They were feared by competitors, the Mexican military, and 
society mainly due to their discipline, efficiency, and high-tech tactics. As ex-
Special Forces soldiers, they knew firsthand how to inflict severe damage to rivals 
and create terror among the civilian population (Grayson, 2010). Therefore, using 
their ambition to control more regions, they allied with other groups and trained 
their hit men with their military expertise. Soon, other drug cartels learned to 
instill fear and apply such techniques as dismembering bodies, beheadings, 
torture, and urban guerrilla tactics. These actions helped increase the bad 
reputation of some DTOs, such as the La Familia Michoacana organization, to 
the levels of Los Zetas. 
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La Familia Michoacana (LFM) Cartel   
 Similar to other drug trafficking cartels that had sprung up in the last 
decade, La Familia Michoacana or just “La Familia,” was born in the early 
2000s from members of other cartels, such as Los Zetas and the Gulf, to fight 
local drug traffickers (Grayson, 2010). These members had a convenient alliance 
that mutually benefited everyone. LFM cartel called itself at first La Empresa 
(The Company). Around 2006, La Empresa broke that alliance, severing ties with 
their former partners, and got a new name—La Familia Michoacana (the 
Michoacán Family). This was done based on the idea that all members were from 
the state of Michoacán. As a newly independent organization, LFM made its 
public debut in September 2006, when five severed heads were dropped onto a 
nightclub’s dance floor in the city of Uruapan, Michoacán. The new cartel left a 
sign with a message to rivals, authorities, and society: “The Family doesn’t kill 
for money, it doesn’t kill women, it doesn’t kill innocent people—only those who 
deserve to die. Everyone should know: this is divine justice” (Finnegan, 2010, p. 
40).     
 LFM has used fear and intimidation to pursue their criminal activities 
while simultaneously using a double discourse to gain social acceptance. On one 
hand, LMF proclaims itself as protector of Michoacán’s inhabitants against the 
criminals and drug dealers, usually pointing fingers at members of the Los Zetas 
cartel. On the other hand, the cartel kidnaps, extorts, sells drugs, and kills people 
who do not pay for ‘protection’. According to an expert on Mexican organized 
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crime, “La Familia’s intense propaganda campaign [is] designed to intimidate 
foes, terrorize the local population, and inhibit action by the government. La 
Familia continually asserts its commitment to ridding the state of malefactors” 
(Grayson, 2010, pp. 199-200). 
 La Familia successfully built a social base in regions of Michoacán that 
were poorly developed. It uses a religious cult-like approach that highlights 
family values to brainwash members and create support. It has also challenged the 
authority of the state by creating a parallel government demanding “taxes” from 
businessmen (called cuota, meaning share in Spanish), mediating in legal 
conflicts, financing municipal projects, and even fighting petty crime (Grayson, 
2010). I can corroborate these activities as true from the anecdotal evidence of my 
friends and acquaintances, as well as even once having a close relative of mine 
kidnapped by this organization. We had to pay a ransom, and we were among 
those lucky enough to have our loved one return back alive. Other people have 
not had the same luck. 
   Along with violence and intimidation, La Familia has taken a silver or 
lead (plata o plomo) approach to persuade state and municipal politicians and law 
enforcement agents to join the organization. This means that authorities either 
accept bribes or they—and their families—will be murdered. LFM shows no 
mercy to those who refuse to follow their demands. Dozens of municipals 
officials have been killed in the last six years for refusing to join the LFM cartel, 
among them five mayors, the latest one in early November 2011. 
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 When the LFM cartel became an independent organization, it carried out 
an aggressive strategy to completely take control of small towns all over 
Michoacán. Convoys full of armed men arrived in these municipalities, 
outgunning the local police departments, and looking for the mayors. The LFM’s 
deputy would then say that La Familia wanted to work there, that there would be 
no trouble, crime, or drunkenness, and that they would not cause problems.  Then, 
LFM would own the town and enforce their own rules (Finnegan, 2010). Around 
2006, in a short period of time and in a well-organized manner, this strategy 
quietly took effect. The state government knew of these criminal activities 
because most mayors panicked and asked the governor for help or guidance. The 
state government turned a blind eye, however, either to avoid an open 
confrontation with a powerful organization or because the government was 
already infiltrated by the cartel.       
 The infiltration of the state government by LFM cartel became public 
news soon after the Michoacanazo roundup, when the Attorney General’s Office 
requested a warrant of arrest for Julio Cesar Godoy Toscano, the Michoacán 
governor’s half-brother, who had been recently elected to the lower house of 
Congress. He was accused of being part of LFM, providing information, and 
offering political protection. He denied the accusations by saying that they were 
politically motivated. When his case became even more controversial, the 
Attorney General’s Office leaked to the media a conversation between Toscano 
and a kingpin of LFM. He was eventually impeached by the House, losing his 
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parliamentarian immunity, which forced him to flee and become a fugitive 
(Garduño and Mendez, 2010). 
 This is the context in which the Michoacanazo took place—a context in 
which criminal activities, politics, corruption, ideology, and a rigid criminal 
justice system all intertwined to create dramatic legal confusion. Everything from 
the Michoacanazo files could be true, except that there is no conclusive evidence 
about whether or not the defendants are guilty or innocent. However, the case 
provides enough information to prove that municipals and state officials had ties 
with LFM and that federal courts suffered from external pressure to rule in this 
case. The following analysis begins explaining how I had access to the files that 
held the main content of the case. 
The Michoacanazo Trial: Access to Files 
Part Two 
 The Michoacanazo case study is a paradigmatic example of the tragic 
shortcomings of the Mexican criminal justice system. It shows the convergence of 
several problems that have plagued the Mexican political system: influence 
peddling, abuse of power, political corruption, legalism, impunity, narco-politics, 
and connivance. This case was the cause of a major political dispute between the 
President and the governor of the state of Michoacán when the latter accused the 
former of using the prosecutor’s office for political benefits. The case was also 
used by the President to accuse federal judges of corruption, which led to a 
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confrontation between the executive branch and the judicial branch (El Universal, 
2011a). 
 At a closer look, the Michoacanazo case is tangled in a web of 
controversy, inconsistent evidence, legal contradictions, half-truths, plus 
discretionary and legalistic interpretations of the law. After reading all the 
evidence, it is impossible to tell whether the entire case is true or false. What is 
clear by the end of the story is that all the people who were once accused are now 
free. Mexican society will never know if the case was a genuine attempt at 
curbing organized crime or simply a political maneuver to acquire electoral gains. 
I first read about this case in May 2009 when it became international news 
because of the number of people who were arrested and the context in which it 
took place. High-ranking state officials were among the detainees, and I 
personally knew two of them. One had been my classmate in law school, and I 
had met the other when I had formerly worked as an attorney. Out of curiosity, I 
followed the case in the news to find out what the final decision in the federal 
courts would be. It is important to highlight that President Felipe Calderón was 
born in the state of Michoacán and that most of his extended family still lives 
there. Since he took office, he has shown open interest in fighting the criminal 
organizations that operate in Michoacán. The Michoacanazo case was of special 
interest to the President because it made visible to the society that his “war on 
drugs” approach was working, despite the huge increase in drug trafficking 
murders. 
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 During the final part of the fieldwork in Morelia City, several interviewees 
brought up the Michoacanazo case as an example of potential corruption and 
influence peddling. Morelia was the place where the police operation to arrest 
people in this case had been conducted. The district court that handled most of the 
proceedings was located there. Interviewees during fieldwork in Morelia were 
familiar with the case, and once I heard about it, I began to question them. Several 
interviewees refused to talk, arguing that they did not know anything about it, 
while others referred me to other potential respondents who had direct knowledge 
of the case. One of these referrals led me to the interviewee Ignacio. 
Ignacio has had more than three decades of experience dealing with the 
federal courts and has an outside perspective. Ignacio holds the MFJ in high 
esteem because he contends that the institution protects civil rights and keeps 
authorities who abuse their power at bay. Ignacio and I talked about the 
Michoacanazo case, and it turned out that he had direct knowledge of it and even 
had some copies of the proceedings and the final decisions. He agreed to share 
some of these files with me, as long as I did not mention his name and kept the 
names of the defendants confidential. I assured him that confidentiality would be 
guaranteed, and he handed me the documents.   
These documents and the public records acquired from news, journalists, 
and political analyses, are the sources of most of the information of this second 
part of this chapter regarding the Michoacanazo case. Ignacio handed me copies 
of the main evidence that sustained the case as well as his personal interpretation 
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of it. The discussion and analysis of this chapter is based on those files and 
archive documents and is combined with the information collected from 
interviewees in order to provide a documentary triangulation analysis. 
The Michoacanazo Raid: A Federal Police Operation against the State of 
Michoacán? 
 On May 26, 2009, the Mexican federal government arrested three dozen 
municipal and state employees in the state of Michoacán. The federal Attorney 
General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) headed this 
operation and among the detainees who were brought in were 11 Michoacán 
mayors, one public security director, numerous police officers, a state judge, and 
the Michoacán Attorney General. The federal attorney’s office argued that these 
officials had ties with or gave protection to the powerful regional cartel known as 
“La Familia Michoacana” (Elorriaga and Castillo, 2009). This episode was 
dubbed the Michoacanazo because it took place in the state of Michoacán and the 
detainees were all authorities from this state. 
The arrests were made by federal forces without prior notice to state law 
enforcement agencies or the local government. The news of this event made 
headlines nationally and internationally and created a deep political conflict 
between the state and the federal governments (Elorriaga and Castillo, 2009). 
State elections would take place in only a few months, and because the state 
government was under control by the opposition party (Partido de la Revolucion 
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Democratica, PRD), some pundits viewed these arrests as politically motivated to 
discredit the PRD party and influence the election (Ibarra Aguirre, 2010). 
The detainees were sent to Mexico City and put under a provisional “house 
arrest,” which is called arraigo in Mexican law. The arraigo is a 40-day detention 
period allowed by the Federal Law against Organized Crime (Ley Federal Contra 
la Delincuencia Organizada) to give time to the Prosecutor’s office to collect 
enough evidence to indict someone under organized crime accusations. After the 
arraigo ended, the detainees were formally accused of organized crime 
encouragement (delincuencia organizada en la modalidad de fomento), and most 
of them were sent to a prison located in the city of Tepic, located in the state of 
Nayarit. Because organized crime is a federal crime, the federal judiciary handled 
the indictment. 
Once the defendants’ lawyers began to challenge the indictment and the 
evidence, the defendants were transferred to a prison in Morelia, the capital of 
Michoacán, and the case was also sent to a district court in this city. A year later, 
twenty suspects had been released, and eventually all of them were freed within a 
two-year period. This was mostly due to a lack of conclusive evidence as a result 
of legal technicalities. President Calderón defended the Michoacanazo operation, 
arguing that there was enough incriminatory evidence against all the detainees. 
After they were released, the President suggested that the judge who acquitted the 
defendants had not properly taken into account witness testimonies and telephone 
recordings that were a crucial part of the indictment. 
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The trial evidence in the Michoacanazo case—and how it was interpreted by 
the federal courts—plays a crucial role in understanding the contradictions of the 
Mexican legal system and how corruption can operate within the realm of 
legality. These contradictions are the product of obsolete legislation and the 
rigidity of a legal system that requires strict adherence to the literalness of the 
law. The aforementioned contradictions are mostly reflected in a myriad of ways, 
such as discretionary interpretations of the law, the use of the prosecutor’s office 
as a political tool, and rampant impunity. 
The Evidence in the Michoacanazo trial 
 Legislation dealing with organized crime in Mexico is relatively new. The 
current Federal Law against Organized Crime (FLAOC, 2011) dates back to only 
1996, when the last government of the authoritarian regime felt international 
pressure to take an active role against drug trafficking organizations. The law has 
forty-five articles, and it has been amended many times in recent years. This high 
number of amendments shows that the government is trying to improve the law in 
order to deal better with criminal organizations, but it also displays how the law 
can still have some legal loopholes that can make it quite defective. 
 Among the new legal statutes introduced by the FLAOC was a witness 
protection program (testigo protegido). Provision 35 of the FLAOC regulates 
when and how members of organized crime can collaborate with the prosecutor’s 
office to incriminate other members and receive lesser sentences. There was no 
prior experience of this program in the Mexican legal system before 1996. It was 
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basically borrowed from the American system and then adapted to the Mexican 
reality. Little is known about how favorable the program has been, given the 
secrecy and lack of transparency that characterizes law enforcement agencies in 
Mexico.  
 Whether or not this program has been effective, in November 30, 2009, a 
protected witness—a former commander at the federal police named Edgar 
Enrique Bayardo del Villar—was murdered by hit men when he asked his guards 
to stop to get coffee at a Starbucks in Mexico City. While working as a high-
ranking official, this official was an informant for both the Sinaloa cartel and the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (González, 2009). There have been similar cases 
where protected witnesses have been murdered or have disappeared. These 
examples suggest that there are serious deficiencies in the program that need to be 
addressed if the government wants to use it as a reliable tool against criminal 
organizations.   
Witness Protection Program (Testigos Protegidos) 
Three crucial witnesses of the Michoacanazo case were in the witness 
protection program. According to the files, three former members of La Familia 
Michoacana cartel, nicknamed in the indictment as “Ricardo,” Emilio,” and 
“Paco,” decided to cooperate with the federal Attorney General’s Office. They 
described the criminal activities of this cartel, naming the detainees of the 
Michoacanazo case as collaborators of this organization. According to these 
witnesses, this collaboration between officials and the LFM cartel was done in 
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several different ways: providing police protection, being an informant, and 
turning a blind eye to criminal activities. 
Drug Trafficking Payroll (Narco-nómina) 
An important piece of evidence was a so-called narco-nómina (drug 
trafficking payroll) that was found in the truck of one of the sons of the LFC’s 
kingpin during a police operation in the southern region of Michoacán. In January 
27, 2009, federal police agents were conducting a criminal investigation in the 
Arteaga municipality to track Servando Gómez Martinez (a.k.a. La Tuta)’s illegal 
activities and arrest him. He had been the best-known face of this cartel, and the 
federal government wanted him behind bars. After a roundup, the kingpin was 
able to run away, but federal agents arrested his son Servando Gomez Patiño. 
Among the personal belongings that the son had in his possession were a couple 
of handguns, an AK-47 rifle, ammunition, and some sheets of paper that had a list 
of names, employment positions, cities, salaries, and liaisons. The sheets’ 
information was distributed in five columns with 101 entries. This document had 
the names of dozens of high-ranking state officials in law enforcement agencies, 
as well as mayors, commanders of the state police, police officers, and other 
officials. Among these names were most of the public servants indicted in the 
Michoacanazo trial. This written record became known as the narco-nómina 
because it allegedly described the monthly “salary” officials received from the 
LFM cartel for providing protection. This document was used by the prosecutor 
as a fundamental document to support the indictment.              
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Partes Policiacos (Police Reports) 
 There were at least six police reports issued by federal agents conducting 
intelligence operations about the criminal activities of the LFM cartel during the 
first three months of 2009. One of these reports explains the police operation that 
led up to the arrest of the kingpin´s son on January 2009. Other police reports 
provide information about different activities of members of the LFM cartel, such 
as searches and police reconnaissance operations. However, most of the content 
of these reports have general information about LFM, but nothing specifically 
about the defendants of the Michoacanazo case. The reports provide information 
on some of the illegal activities of this cartel and how it operates without naming 
specific individuals linked to these activities. 
Miscellaneous Evidence     
 Other evidence includes a report from the federal prosecutor´s office about 
a search that took place in Mexico City in October of 2008. During this search, a 
laptop computer was seized, and there were several files of information regarding 
the LFM cartel on it. Among these files were recorded conversations between 
LFM cartel members talking about their everyday criminal activities, using codes 
and the cartel’s slang to communicate. This information was directly related to the 
Michoacanazo trial because the prosecutor used these electronic tapes to support 
the argument that the LFM cartel had ties with some of the defendants in the trial. 
I read the transcriptions of these tapes, but the content of the information is 
sketchy, and the people talking were cautious enough to avoid saying full names. 
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There were some surnames mentioned in several tapes that matched some of the 
defendants’ surnames, but there was no clear evidence that the content of the tape 
referred to any of the defendants directly. At least, the federal prosecutor did not 
make a good case of these tapes. In addition, there was no expert witness saying 
that the voices in the tapes matched any of the accused parties.     
 There was also an anonymous report from December 15, 2008, in which 
the federal prosecutor argued that an unknown person had called the SIEDO— the 
abbreviation for the Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en 
Delincuencia Organizada (Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special 
Investigations on Organized Crime)—to denounce the criminal activities of the 
LFM cartel and how local authorities supported it. In this report, the unknown 
person named several individuals indicted in the Michoacanazo. 
 This was all of the relevant evidence that the prosecutor’s office used to 
indict and request a warrant of arrest against the defendants in the Michoacanazo 
case. The warrants were issued because in the Mexican legal system a criminal 
judge does not need to have conclusive evidence to put someone on trial. The 
prosecutor only has to provide evidence leading to a presumption of culpability of 
the accused party. The verdict, on the other hand, demands that there be an 
establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 To untangle this Gordian knot and understand how each of these elements 
plays a role in the case, let us proceed to an analysis and discussion of the case in 
a chronological order. This analysis will begin with an explanation of the 
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indictment, then a brief summary of the proceedings of the trial, followed by an 
explanation of how and why most defendants were acquitted, and finally, a 
discussion of the consequences of the case. 
Ad Hoc Judges: Favoring the Prosecutor’s Office 
 Interviewee Ignacio, the person who provided me documents on this file, 
had a deep knowledge of the Michoacanazo case. In general, he praised the MFJ, 
but he argued that sometimes federal judges followed orders by the Attorney 
General’s Office and issued warrants for arrests without having enough legal 
merits. Ignacio called these judges ‘jueces de consigna’ (ad hoc judges) because 
they systematically sided with all the prosecutor’s requests. He explained that the 
reason for this was that judges either lacked experience or feared pressure from 
the SIEDO. Ignacio did not suggest that corruption or influence peddling were 
used by the SIEDO to gain the favor of judges. He said that the judges are well 
trained and most enjoy independence in their verdicts—as most interviewees 
argued. However, evidence suggests that ad hoc judges exist in the MFJ and that 
sometimes the Attorney General’s Office does depend on them to indict some 
people. 
The federal judge who issued the warrant of arrests in the Michoacanazo 
case was Carlos Alberto Elorza Amores, located in the jurisdiction of the state of 
Nayarit in Western Mexico. If this name sounds familiar, it should be. His name 
was mentioned in chapter five; he was the same judge that suffered an attack in 
August 2009, when one of his bodyguards died and he barely made it alive. There 
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is some suspicion that this judge favored requests by the Attorney General’s 
Office to prosecute people without legal merits, and there is one example of this 
attitude.  
On May 2010, a year after the roundup of the Michoacanazo, the SIEDO 
wanted to arrest Gregorio Sanchez, who was the mayor of Cancun, a beach resort 
in the Caribbean. He was running for governor on behalf of the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution, which is the same party that governs in Michoacán. He 
was accused of allegedly being linked to drug cartels and money laundering. It 
turns out that the SIEDO originally requested a warrant of arrest against this 
individual in the Sixth District Court located in the state of Mexico. The federal 
judge there denied the warrant, arguing that there was no evidence, not even 
enough for presumption as the law allows for arresting the politician (Resendiz, 
2010). 
This decision did not discourage the SIEDO in requesting a second arrest 
warrant, this time sending the indictment to Judge Carlos Alberto Elorza Amores, 
the same judge who initially handled the Michoacanazo case. The warrant of 
arrest was issued. Fourteen months later, the politician was acquitted by an 
appellate court and released (Resendiz, 2010). This case has striking resemblance 
to the Michoacanazo. In both cases, politicians from the opposition party were 
arrested before a state election. Both indictments relied on testimonies from 
former drug cartel members who were part of the witness protection program. In 
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both cases, the warrants of arrests were issued by the same federal judge. Lastly, 
in both trials the defendants were released due to a lack of conclusive evidence.      
Although it would be difficult to demonstrate with conclusive evidence that 
there are ad hoc judges who profit the federal prosecutor’s office, the 
aforementioned cases suggest favoritism towards the Attorney General’s Office 
by some federal judges. It is not a coincidence that the SIEDO asked Judge Carlos 
Alberto Elorza Amores for an indictment of a Cancun politician after another 
judge had refused to issue a warrant of arrest. The federal government knew that 
judge Carlos Alberto would authorize the detention order. The reason for this 
apparent favoritism, and its extent, remains unknown. 
It is a fact that in the past the Mexican government has used the prosecutor’s 
office as a tool to obtain political benefits, either by falsely accusing opponents of 
the regime or by jailing dissents who oposse the government (Ferreyra-Orozco, 
2012). It is opportunistic and suspicious that, when it is election time, the federal 
government tends to pull out indictments against members of the opposition 
parties. Whether these indictments end up convicting defendants is a different 
story, the goal is to have an impact on the media in order to vilify a political party 
or politician and influence the election. 
This manipulation of the prosecutor’s office is not difficult to carry out 
because the criminal procedural law requires only presumptive evidence of guilt 
to issue a detention order. Although there are legal rules that dictate how to 
proceed, judges have ample discretionary power when assessing the evidence of a 
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case. Think about the common expression of the glass of water being half-empty 
or half-full, and one can see how an idea in some legal cases could be interpreted 
either way: as legally sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest by a particular judge, 
while at the same time, another judge could come up with an opposite perspective 
using different yet valid arguments. I would not say that this is a common practice 
in the MFJ because in most trials the evidence is crystal clear, but given how the 
procedural law has been set up, the door is always open to manipulation.   
Proceedings 
 It was said earlier that organized crime and drug trafficking are considered 
federal crimes in Mexico and that only the MFJ has jurisdiction over these cases. 
According to the federal criminal procedural law (Código Federal de 
Procedimientos Penales), district courts’ jurisdiction is decided by one simple 
rule: they have legal authority to handle crimes that take place in the same venue 
where the district court is located (e.g. city, state, region). District courts receive 
indictments from the prosecutor’s office according to territorial jurisdiction. 
However, when dealing with organized crime indictments, the law allows the 
federal prosecutors a few exceptions. In other words, when dealing with 
dangerous defendants, they can send an indictment to a particular judge or 
jurisdiction.   
 Because the warrants of arrest in the Michoacanazo case were issued by 
judge Carlos Alberto Elorza Amores—whose district court was located in the 
state of Nayarit—the case and the defendants was sent there. Once the 
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proceedings began, through Amparo suits, twelve of the defendants were released 
by a higher court due to a lack of conclusive evidence because of legal 
technicalities. In the meantime, the rest of the defendants asked to be transferred 
to Michoacán where the crimes had occurred. This request took several months 
before being addressed by the judges. Eventually, federal judges sided with the 
defendants in their request to have the Michoacanazo file transferred to 
Michoacán. A district court in Morelia began handling the trial and the defendants 
were sent to this state.    
 It is important to mention that an appellate court upheld the detention 
order of some of the defendants who had appealed the charges at the beginning of 
the trial proceedings (Cambio de Michoacán, 2010). This means that there were 
contradictory legal decisions by several courts of the MFJ. While some 
courtrooms initially confirmed the legality of the evidence, others rejected the 
case arguing that the evidence had not been gathered in strict adherence to the 
law.   
 The Michoacanazo file was sent to the Fifteenth District Court in Morelia, 
headed by Judge Ulises Sánchez Espinoza (pseudonym to guarantee 
confidentiality), at the beginning of 2010. This district court and this judge in 
particular, played a pivotal role in this case because this judge released most of 
the defendants. He also issued an injunction favoring the governor’s half-brother 
that allowed him to swear as a congressman and obtain parliamentarian immunity, 
despite a detention order issued by another federal judge on felony charges 
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(Castillo Garcia, 2010). Some interviewees said that this judge had a reputation 
for being corrupt and that he had favored the defendants of the Michoacanazo 
case one way or another.   
Verdicts 
 Before the case was sent to the Fifteenth Court in Morelia, at least three 
different federal courts had already ruled that the evidence in the Michoacanazo 
trial was too inconclusive to prosecute the accused parties (Castillo, 2010). The 
defendants were gradually released because different strategies were followed to 
overturn the indictments, given that there were more than three dozen detainees. 
For instance, a cluster of defendants requested an Amparo suit, while others 
appealed the indictment. Another cluster proceeded to fight the evidence using 
new evidence to file motions for dismissal. Some others hung on the entire trial 
until the final verdicts were released.     
 The Fifteenth District Court’s judge freed twenty of the defendants in a 
period of several months. According to the judge, the witnesses’ testimonies were 
unreliable because they did not comply with procedural law. The prosecution 
presented these witnesses as eyewitnesses, and the judge concluded that they had 
no credibility because their testimony was inconsistent. He said that witnesses 
failed to provide the context and relevant knowledge of how and why the 
defendants were given protection and/or information to the LFM cartel. The judge 
argued that the witnesses’ testimonies only included general information about 
matters of interest and were not specific on the circumstances of the crime. 
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According to the judge, the prosecutor failed to present the witnesses before 
the court for a confrontation and cross-examination with the defendants, despite 
the requests from the defense and a subpoena by the judge. The judge also 
concluded that two of the witnesses were hearsay witnesses because they testified 
about something that someone else had told them. Unlike in the U.S., these types 
of witnesses are not allowed in Mexican courts by the criminal procedural law, 
and therefore their testimony cannot be used even if what they say is true.        
 The judge of the Fifteenth District Court also dismissed the narco-nómina 
document, arguing that it was not credible enough given that it was not authored 
by anyone and that the prosecutor had failed to demonstrate who wrote it. The 
police reports were also rejected as evidence because their content could not be 
confirmed by any other means. The judge assessed these police reports stating 
that they were insufficient to prove the defendants’ guilt. The same argument was 
applied to the electronic tapes of files found in the computer that was seized in 
Mexico City, as well as the rest of the evidence that was brought to support the 
indictment. Overall, it was not enough to convict the defendants. To conclude his 
argument, the judge said that because there was not a hundred percent certainty 
that the defendants were responsible for committing the crimes, he had to apply 
the principle of in dubio pro reo, meaning that the defendants could not be 
convicted when there were doubts about their guilt. (This is similar to the 
principle of Beyond Reasonable Doubt in American legal system).   
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 Although the law has specific guidelines set up on how to assess the 
evidence in a trial, the judges still enjoy some discretionary decision-making 
power. This power is more relevant when the evidence is blurred and inconclusive 
because the verdict can be either guilty or innocent. Either way the verdict goes, it 
would still be considered legal. In the case under analysis, my personal 
interpretation is that some defendants could have been convicted with the 
evidence on file had the case not been politicized and subjected to external 
influence. The judge of the Fifteenth District Court certainly had enough 
independence to decide the Michoacanazo case, except that the data from 
interviewees points out that corruption played a role in how the defendants were 
acquitted. 
“We Have a Corrupt Judge Here!” 
 According to information from the Council of the Judiciary, Judge Ulises 
Sánchez Espinoza received his law degree from Universidad Michoacana, the 
public university located in Morelia. He worked in several government positions 
in the state of Michoacán, then as a litigant in his own law firm. Later on, he got a 
position in the MFJ as a secretary of a district court in Northern Mexico and 
eventually became a federal judge. In the early 2000s, he was appointed as judge 
in the Fifteenth District Court in Morelia. 
 As explained in chapter five, most federal judges enjoy independence and 
autonomy in their rulings. It is precisely because judges have self-determination 
when it comes to their jobs that corrupt acts can happen. Remember, corruption 
  
194 
exists within the MFJ according to respondents, and although it is not a common 
practice, it ranges from as high as 10% to as low as 1%. Despite the fact that the 
vast majority of interviewees agreed that corruption existed in the MFJ, most of 
them avoided pointing fingers at those who engaged in it—except for the few who 
specifically named Judge Ulises Sanchez Espinoza. 
 There were at least two respondents who explicitly mentioned that the 
head of the Fifteenth District Court was known for being corrupt. Interestingly 
enough, they did not mention the judge’s name, but instead they just said that the 
judge in charge of this court had that reputation. One of those interviewees was 
Quintiliano, a young magistrate who said: “Aqui tenemos un juez que tiene fama 
de ser así [corrupto], todo mundo lo sabe” (Here we have a judge who is famous 
for being like that [corrupt]. Everyone knows it). Even without mention the 
judge’s name, Quintiliano was explicit enough to explain with body language—
using his fingers—that he was referring to District Court Fifteenth. Most senior 
officials at the MFJ, even if they acknowledged the existence of corruption, would 
never mention the names of those who engage in these practices. There is an 
unwritten rule among these officials, a sort of code of silence by which they do 
not accuse peers or senior officials directly because it affects the prestige of the 
institution. The reason Quintiliano confided in me was that we were old 
acquaintances from law school, and he was extremely critical of the traditional 
practices such as nepotism, abuse of power, and tyrannical judges that still plague 
the MFJ. 
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 Another interviewee, Patricia, said that the Michoacanazo trial was not 
free from external influence. She argued that this case was a typical example of 
blatant corruption from all the parties involved. Patricia said, 
 El asunto del Michoacanazo es un caso típico de corrupción e 
intervención de muchos poderes, tanto a nivel federal como 
estatal. En los dos casos, tanto en el ministerio público como en 
los tribunales, para agarrar y soltar inculpados, intervino el poder 
del Estado. Una forma de deducir la existencia de corrupción se 
deriva de que existieron los mismos hechos, con las mismas fechas, 
pero se dieron diferentes resoluciones con criterios distintos.” 
(The Michoacanazo case is a typical example of corruption and 
external influence from different governments at the state and 
federal levels. In both institutions, the Attorney General´s Office 
and the MFJ, the state’s power intervened for arresting and 
releasing the defendants. One way to know that corruption took 
place comes from the fact that the same evidence—and this case in 
particular—was assessed differently by several federal courts using 
diverse legal criteria. There was never a unanimous decision from 
all of the judges who looked at it).   
 
   Patricia referred to the existence of contradictory decisions by district 
courts and appellate courts that confirmed the detention orders and the legality of 
the arraignment at the beginning of the trial, while others did exactly the opposite. 
She also emphasized that the district court in Morelia that had handled the case 
was suspicious because it tended to favor one of the parties. Patricia did not 
mention the judge directly but she implied his identity by naming that district 
court. 
 I informally asked a litigant who has close ties with the federal courts in 
Morelia because he and his partner had worked there, whether or not the 
reputation of Judge Ulises Sánchez Espinoza was true. This litigant did not want 
to be interviewed, but told me off record that he personally knew the judge of the 
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Fifteenth District Court and that his reputation as a corrupt official was true. I 
asked him how the judge could get away with it if the verdicts could be 
challenged through appeals. The litigant said that there were also magistrates in 
appellate courts who could be “bought.” However, in some cases that was not 
necessary because the appellate briefs submitted by the prosecutor tended to be 
defective because of chronic underfunding of the prosecutor’s office. Appellate 
courts could simply dismiss them on technicalities. Besides this, the litigant 
added, judges are not stupid and they know how to use their discretionary 
sentencing power to favor a party without appearing that they are bending the law. 
This power is easier to use when the case is controversial and the evidence is 
blurred. According to the litigant, this is what happened in the Michoacanazo 
trial. 
 I read two rulings from a higher court that had upheld the release of 
several defendants of the Michoacanazo, and they were notoriously suspicious 
when it came to their legal terms. Both rulings came from the same magistrate, 
and in both cases, the verdict did not take into account all the legal arguments that 
the prosecutor had written in the appellate briefs. The arguments were dismissed 
for technicalities and showed a lack of a thorough analysis of the disputed 
evidence because the main argument for the dismissal was written in a couple of 
pages. Given the size of the case, which consisted of thousands of accumulated 
pages, it was remarkable to read such a shallow argument in the appellate verdict. 
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After this court decision, the federal prosecutor does not have any instance to 
challenge it.  
 Having contradictory rulings based on the same evidence and facts 
suggests the existence of corruption, or at least political influence, because these 
rulings did not occur between lower and appellate courts, but among lower courts 
and then appellate courts. In democratic court systems, lower court decisions are 
overturned by appellate courts based on different interpretations of the facts and 
the law. However, in the Michoacanazo trial, at different stages of the legal 
process, different lower courts ruled in opposing ways using the same facts and 
information. For instance, at the beginning of the trial some district court judges 
accepted the evidence as legal while others did not. When some defendants 
appealed their indictments, some magistrates in appellate courts upheld the 
decisions while others did not. These inconsistent rulings suggest some sort of 
influence or corruption because there is no logical or legal explanation for them. 
Besides, if confronted with the context in which the Michoacanazo took place—
as explained below—then this inference of potential corruption is even stronger. 
There is no direct evidence that the LFM cartel bought any judge’s 
influence in the Michoacanazo case, but the context of the social and criminal 
influence of this cartel in the state of Michoacán cannot be ignored. Based on 
fieldwork data, it is known that this criminal organization sent a subtle threat to 
all federal judges and magistrates in Morelia with a message saying, “La Familia 
is watching you” (as explained below). Even if there was not a direct threat to the 
  
198 
judge in charge of the Fifteenth District Court, the judge could have not ignored 
the implications of his decisions regarding the LFM cartel. My interpretation of 
the case is that a combination of factors, such as powerful trial parties, political 
influence, and organized crime, all intertwined to create a context where 
corruption probably took place in the final rulings of the Michoacanazo. Yet, 
evidence of this corruption cannot be provided directly, but only inferred from the 
context and circumstances of the entire case. 
A Judge in the Lion’s Den: Silver or Lead 
 Denouncing a judge as corrupt is a serious accusation that cannot be taken 
lightly. Normally, direct evidence would be necessary to prove that a particular 
judge has engaged in corrupt acts. However, we already know that this would be 
almost impossible to do because of the secrecy that characterizes and surrounds 
corruption. As mentioned in chapter four, as a qualified professional of legal 
matters, a judge would make sure not to leave a trace if he or she were engaging 
in wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it is still possible to infer whether corruption has 
played a role in the case by looking at the context and circumstantial information 
available. 
 The Michoacanazo was a thorny case to handle for many of the judges 
who issued rulings because of the parties who were involved. There were public 
officials as defendants, the federal government, a state government, and a 
powerful and dangerous local cartel with interests at stake. Since the defendants’ 
arrests in May 2009, the case became a battleground between the federal 
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government and the state government of Michoacán. On one hand, the President 
wanted to set up a precedent that narco-politics would not be tolerated anymore, 
and he put pressure on the Attorney General’s Office to have a successful 
outcome. On the other hand, the state government always assumed that the 
Michoacanazo was politically motivated and wanted to clean its name with an 
acquittal for its imprisoned public servants. Both governments were at odds about 
the case, and they were willing to invest any necessary means to reach each of 
their goals. 
The federal government wanted the trial to be handled in a jurisdiction other 
than Michoacán because governors have influence and power in their states, even 
over federal institutions located within the state’s geographic region. The federal 
government gained the upper hand at the beginning of the trial by sending the file 
to a district court in the state of Nayarit. Once the case was moved to Morelia, the 
balance of power favored the governor—and the defendants—because the legal 
dispute went to local territory where powerful law firms, connections, and politics 
would intervene, even if the trial was under the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
More importantly, Morelia had once been one of the most crucial strongholds of 
this LFM cartel, and this fact could put extra pressure on any federal judge who 
was handling the trial. This potential pressure was an important factor to take into 
account given the previous threats from the LFM cartel against senior officials in 
Morelia. In fact, out of all the parties involved in the case, the most risky and 
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difficult one to deal with was the LFM cartel because of the potential 
consequences coming from this criminal organization. 
One direct question asked to interviewees during fieldwork was whether 
drug cartels could constitute a threat for public servants working in the MFJ. Most 
interviewees agreed that these organizations could be a threat at some point if 
they felt that their businesses were affected by the MFJ. During the fieldwork in 
Morelia, a couple of interviewees mentioned that senior officials in the 
Michoacán jurisdiction had been threatened by a drug cartel. According to these 
interviewees, these officials did not say anything to the public, not even to junior 
officials, in order to avoid panic. None of these interviewees knew exactly what 
kind of threat was made or when it was received, but they knew that it had 
happened. It turned out that the penultimate interviewee, Oscar, knew a little bit 
more about these threats. He explained that the LFM cartel had sent out a short 
letter not too long ago to all judges and magistrates of the Michoacán jurisdiction 
with a short text saying: “La Familia los está observando” (The family [cartel] is 
watching you). Oscar confirmed that both the judges and magistrates agreed not 
to tell anyone about it to prevent fear or anxiety in their employees, but many 
junior officials like him ended up finding out about it later.   
It was mentioned earlier how dangerous and violent the drug cartels have 
become. In particular, the LFM cartel has instilled fear with its silver or lead 
approach to buying or controlling local authorities. It is not difficult to imagine, 
then, the mounting pressure that was put on the judge who handled the 
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Michoacanazo trial. Whether or not the judge was explicitly told to benefit the 
defendants, he must have been wary enough of the potential implications of 
upsetting this criminal organization throughout the Michoacanazo rulings. In 
addition to this potential pressure from the cartel, the state government also 
wanted its former employees out of prison, and it would do anything to achieve 
this goal, which also added more stress to the case. 
Remember that Judge Ulises Sanchez Espinoza got his law degree in 
Morelia, which means that many of his former classmates and colleagues were 
already there and possibly held high-ranking positions in the state government. 
Furthermore, some former peers and classmates would be well-established 
litigants who had a close relationship with him as part of their everyday activities. 
It is important to keep in mind that before becoming a judge, Sanchez Espinoza 
was a state employee for a while, which means he has an old social network tied 
to state officials. All of these are not silly assumptions about the context of this 
judge, but rather important implications that help to understand how external 
forces may have influenced the results of the Michoacanazo case. From a 
Mexican legalistic perspective, these assumptions would be inadmissible because 
there is no concrete evidence that support them. However, they can be logically 
deduced from the records available because there is nothing that contradicts the 
information. 
The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) began to notice a pattern of 
favoritism towards the defendants and the state government when the Fifteenth 
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District Court, through an Amparo suit, allowed the governor’s half-brother to 
swear in as a congressman—which gave him parliamentarian immunity—despite 
a warrant of arrest he had for organized crimes charges. There were other trials in 
the same district court in which the judge systematically rejected the petitions of 
the federal prosecutor to allow the arrest of the governor’s half-brother (Milenio, 
2010). These judge’s rulings did not mean that the actions were illegal or the 
result of corruption, but they signaled red flags that suggested potential partiality 
against the AGO.    
The Attorney General’s Office became suspicious of the judge’s impartiality 
when all of the governor’s half-brother’s Amparo suits were “coincidentally” sent 
to the Fifteenth District Court. According to the AGO, the judge also exceeded his 
authority by offering the half-brother legal benefits that were not allowed under 
the criminal code, such as keeping his political right intact to avoid being arrested. 
In addition, the judge had freed several of the defendants of the Michoacanazo 
through motions of dismissal, which was something unusual in organized crime 
trials due to the complexity and seriousness of the matters. Acquittals in these 
cases, if any, are normally granted at the end of the trial (Milenio, 2010). The 
drop that spilled the cup was when the same judge authorized a joinder by which 
all the trials against the kingpin’s son—the one arrested in January of 2009 and 
who was found with the narco-nómina—would be jointed into the Michoacanazo 
trial and decided by the Fifteenth District Court in Morelia. This last decision was 
later reversed by a higher court, and the joinder did not take place (El Siglo de 
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Torreón, 2011). Based on these events, the AGO filed a formal complaint before 
the Council of the Judiciary against the judge, but the Council found nothing 
illegal and the complaint was thrown away. He was the judge of the Fifteenth 
District Court until early June 2012 when he was arrested and arraigned for 
organized crime charges (Carrasco Araizaga and Dávila, 2012).        
Overall, taking into account the political, social, legal, and drug cartel-
related context of the Michoacanazo case, it is obvious that there were clear 
intentions from most parties to influence the outcome of the trial by using any 
means possible. Whether it was political corruption, influence peddling, abuse of 
power, fear from a drug cartel, simply bribery, or a combination of all of them, 
the case was plagued with controversial decisions and sketchy legal facts 
disguised as strict adherence to the rule of law.  
This wrongdoing can be identified in many different aspects of the 
Michoacanazo trial. The federal government acted wrongly by opportunistically 
rushing an indictment against the local government to gain political and electoral 
benefits without first having a solid case that would lead to clear-cut convictions. 
The state government acted wrongly by framing the Michoacanazo case as 
politically motivated and by ignoring the possible ties between its public officials 
and the LFM cartel. It also engaged in a media campaign to challenge the case 
while providing active support to the defendants. The defendants themselves 
acted wrongly by using their connections, money, and political power to find 
loopholes in the case and be freed. It may be difficult to determine whether the 
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LFM cartel actively intimidated or bribed the Michoacanazo’s judge to help the 
governor’s half-brother and the defendants. However, given its bad reputation as a 
violent and ruthless organization and its total control of the Michoacán territory, 
the cartel´s reputation alone could have been enough to frighten any judge 
handling the cartel’s criminal activities.    
It would have been difficult for a federal judge to have impartiality and 
fairness in his rulings because too many powerful interests were at stake in the 
Michoacanazo case. In addition, after analyzing the judge’s background and his 
reputation as a crooked official, a conclusion could easily be drawn that he 
probably favored the defendants and the governor’s half-brother. This favoritism 
does not imply that he necessarily broke the law, strictly speaking. Sometimes, in 
the Mexican criminal justice system, bribery is used to make sure a particular 
outcome in a verdict is guaranteed, which is easier to do when the evidence is 
inconclusive, contradictory, and prone to multiple interpretations, such as in the 
Michoacanazo.    
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the Michoacanazo 
 The Good: Depending on whom you talk to, the Michoacanazo case can 
be seen as a fiasco, a case of corruption, an example of judicial independence, 
and/or a typical political maneuver dating back to the authoritarian regime. 
Despite the results, there are some positive conclusions that can be drawn from 
the Michoacanazo. For instance, the case has now set up a precedent to let 
municipal and state authorities know that colluding with drug cartels may have 
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legal consequences, unlike in the past when the federal government used to turn a 
blind eye to local politicians who were protecting drug traffickers. The case has 
been made a precedent because of the following event: there were municipal 
elections in Michoacán on November 2011, and the new mayors took office on 
January 1, 2012. Dozens of them began to receive threats from a criminal 
organization, the LFM cartel probably, demanding that they appoint one of the 
drug cartel’s members as chief of police. The majors contacted the state and 
federal governments requesting help and guidance. In early February 2012, the 
President sent 4,000 soldiers to protect those municipalities threatened by 
organized crime (Prados, 2012). 
 The Bad: The Michoacanazo confirmed a long-term trend in Mexican 
society, that impunity is the rule and not an exception regarding crime. From the 
file, it was evident that some of the defendants had ties with the LFM cartel. The 
most obvious was the governor’s half-brother. He is a lawyer and used to litigate 
in Morelia. I met him once when I was a litigant because we were counterparts in 
a legal dispute and talked to settle the case. His voice was unmistakable when the 
AGO leaked the tape in which he was caught chatting with the LFM’s kingpin. 
Everyone knew it was him, or at least I did. In fact, the release of this tape 
encouraged congress to impeach him by an overwhelming majority of 384 votes 
and only 21 abstentions (Franco, 2010).  
Despite the evidence, he was eventually acquitted on all the charges, but 
he is still on the run for fear that the AGO may have another hidden indictment 
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against him. On the one hand, it is discouraging that, despite the evidence 
available, the AGO failed to produce a convincing argument to prosecute 
dangerous criminals. On the other hand, it is disappointing that the MFJ 
contributes indirectly to the high degrees of impunity that prevail in Mexico.   
 The evidence of the Michoacanazo case was controversial and 
inconclusive because of the legalistic mentality that still pervades in the Mexican 
judicial system. In general terms, the law requires strict guidelines to prove 
someone’s guilt. If those guidelines are not met, then judges have to free the 
accused parties, even if they are criminals. There was also manipulation of the 
criminal justice system, which is an alarming signal for a country that wants to 
leave behind authoritarian practices. In this regard, the current federal government 
is repeating old tactics that characterized an authoritarian regime that had no 
respect for human rights and democratic principles. This approach should be 
inadmissible in times of democratic transition south of the U.S. border. 
 The Ugly: It appears that the MFJ cannot guarantee the impartiality of 
judgeship in trials involving powerful parties, such as the government, public 
officials, and drug cartels. The Michoacanazo was not the typical case in 
organized crime-related charges, but it was not the first time a state government 
and the President had a confrontation in a federal court. Regardless of this, the 
different and contradictory rulings throughout the trial showed a lack of unified 
judicial criteria to decide controversial cases within the MFJ. Although this 
disparity of rulings could be interpreted as an expression of judicial independence, 
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it can also be defined as a disorganized feature of the institution in which trial 
courts and appellate courts have their own legal agendas, so to speak. As 
interviewee Patricia explained, the same facts, evidence, circumstances were 
interpreted differently, using a broad variety of legal perspectives, and this does 
not contribute to the principles of certainty and legality that should characterize 
the judicial system.      
 The case also confirms what the interviewees said about corruption: it is 
part of the MFJ, even if it is minimal. The probable corruption of the judge in 
charge of the Fifteenth District Court in Morelia falls within this category of 
wrongdoing: There are employees in the MFJ who engage in corruption and profit 
from their positions. A courtroom offers many opportunities to attract corrupt 
practices—which are certainly more prevalent in criminal than civil courts—
because of the interests at stake. The more valuable or important the matter a trial 
handles, the higher the interest from the parties to influence it, either through 
politics, connections, influence peddling, or corruption. This is what happened in 
the Michoacanazo case. It is time now to move on to the conclusions where the 
closing arguments for this case and the entire dissertation will be discussed. 
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter includes some empirical information that was not 
discussed before, such as data on sanctions against employees, gender 
discrimination, and sexual harassment. There are two aims for presenting these 
data here: one is that interviewees brought up these data and therefore are part of 
the fieldwork findings; and two, these phenomena are indirectly related to 
wrongdoing, abuse of power, institutional inertia, and corruption, thus it is 
fundamental to cite them. 
 The topic of sanctions reflects the institutional approach towards official 
cases of corruption and misconduct, and an analysis of this information provides a 
glance at the real attitude of the MFJ on the problem of corruption. Information 
on gender discrimination and sexual harassment provides a context to better 
understand the ethos of the institution because it shows features that are 
interconnected with wrongdoing and misconducts. These features, such as abuse 
of power, patriarchalism, and some forms of authoritarianism, have become 
institutionalized. Despite the fact that they affect the organization and activities of 
the institution, they are taken for granted. The reason for presenting them at the 
end of the thesis is to make the case that MFJ still reflects cultural features that 
characterized the ancien régime. Because these features are usually expressed in 
subtle and euphemistic ways, it is difficult to notice their powerful influence. By 
understanding this cultural context and background, it could be possible to design 
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more realistic policies and measures for addressing the institutional problems 
currently affecting the federal judicial system.        
The Ambiguity of Corruption 
 Most interviewees understood corruption as a dishonest act done to obtain 
benefits—usually money—through unacceptable methods, such as bribery or 
extortion. However, nepotism, the use of connections, and cronyism were not 
defined precisely as corrupt behaviors, but as inconvenient traditional practices 
that were part of the institution but did not necessarily influence the judicial 
process. Not everyone adhered to this perspective, and several respondents 
condemned these phenomena and labeled them in negative ways using different 
categories ranging from inappropriate behaviors and misconduct to gross 
corruption. Their responses ranged from condemnation of the problem to 
resignation to the current status quo, as if simply accepting that nothing could be 
done to change the culture.  
The concept of corruption among court staff and senior officials at the 
MFJ was not monolithic. For some but not all senior officials, accepting any 
amount of money, regardless of the circumstances, was a corrupt act. Other high-
ranking officials had a more flexible view and did not always condemn receiving 
money from the public if the money was intended to be a tip. According to them, 
a tip was defined as a pecuniary expression of gratitude for a job done, occurring 
mostly among low-ranking employees. Because practices such as cronyism, 
connections, and nepotism did not fit this profile, not everyone defined them as 
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corruption per se. Some interviewees—typically the younger generations of 
judges—did condemn these practices as blatant corrupt acts because they have the 
potential to affect the outcome of a trial. 
 According to Transparency International, the non-governmental 
organization that monitors corruption worldwide, judicial corruption is “any 
inappropriate influence on the impartiality of the judicial process by any actor 
within the court system” (Transparency International, 2007, p. xxi). If this 
definition were used as the yardstick to measure corruption in the MFJ, then this 
problem would have a narrower and more specific understanding in which a broad 
range of practices would be labeled as corrupt acts. It would not be so difficult to 
figure out that the use of connections, nepotism, and cronyism can influence a 
verdict, and that they should be defined as corrupt acts without any hesitation.  
Payoffs 
 One of the heuristic questions anticipated that judicial corruption takes 
place through hidden and/or subtle mechanisms by which politicians or 
government officials try to influence MFJ employees in order to benefit 
defendants with drug trafficking charges. Those benefits to defendants would be 
in the form of lesser sentences, parole benefits, and keeping them in state prisons 
rather than subjecting them to supermax penitentiaries. The question also included 
a suggestion that widespread and rampant corruption would not exist in the 
federal judiciary.  
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 The Michoacanazo case offers a glimpse of judicial and political 
corruption where defendants who have ties to a drug cartel probably received 
benefits. These benefits allowed defendants to be released from prison rather than 
be given mitigating sentences. It was striking to find out that benefits went 
beyond the anticipated assumptions of the question. However, the Michoacanazo 
was a murky case, and it does not represent most of the trials that happen under 
federal jurisdiction. The Michoacanazo, though, reveals that corruption exists in 
the institution and that under some circumstances drug cartels can have a 
powerful impact on a trial if they want to.      
 Data from interviewees show that although corruption takes place in 
federal courts, it is not a serious problem nor does it affect the vast majority of 
trials. One may be tempted to say that it is a rare phenomenon because of the few 
official cases of corruption that become public. However, official 
acknowledgement of corruption does not speak for the real number of cases that 
probably occur within the MFJ. A noticeable hint of this inconsistency is the 
number of people sanctioned for misconduct and corruption vis-à-vis the number 
of complaints submitted.  
One revealing piece of information about the official discourse on 
corruption is that the head of the MFJ does not welcome scrutiny in their internal 
affairs. When an official is found guilty of corruption, this word is never 
mentioned anywhere. The Council uses other words, such as serious fault (falta 
grave) or slight fault (falta no grave) to describe employees’ misconduct or 
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corruption. Data from the Council’s website from the year 2011 shows the case of 
an administrative employee who was dismissed for corrupt behavior. The 
behavior was described by the Council as follows: “Obtuvo un beneficio 
económico adicional a la contraprestación que recibe con motivo de sus 
funciones, pues solicito dinero con el compromiso de que se dictara una sentencia 
absolutoria” ([The worker] received an economic benefit in addition to the salary 
that she or he already gets as employee, by asking for money in exchange for the 
promise that the defendant would be acquitted). Although it is true that the word 
corruption does not appear in the Mexican criminal code—instead there are 
specific behaviors such as bribery and malfeasance that are penalized—there is 
reluctance from the Council to name this behavior with negative connotations. 
This attitude dovetails with the stubbornness of the institution to prevent unsavory 
internal issues from going public by disguising them as insignificant problems.  
 The vast majority of interviewees—including high-ranking officials—
acknowledged that corruption exists in the MFJ. The only discrepancy among 
them was the amount of corruption that prevails: estimates ranged from 1% to a 
maximum of 10%. Because more than half of the respondents’ perception was 
between these two numbers, it is possible to deduce that the prevalence of 
corruption varies from 5% to 10% depending on the jurisdiction and the type of 
court. Corruption in this context is based on the definition provided by 
Transparency International—any inappropriate influence in the impartiality of a 
trial within a court by anyone. This definition of corruption includes the use of 
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connections, cronyism, and nepotism, as long as they are employed to affect the 
outcome of the judicial process. 
The Impact of the War on Drugs 
The third heuristic question predicted that death threats from drug cartels 
against court staff and senior officials had become more frequent in recent years, 
and that the MFJ would have to come up with new policies to respond to these 
threats. During interviews, many interviewees acknowledged that drug cartels 
were a threat to the MFJ, but not everyone agreed with this perspective. Those 
who felt intimidated by potential harm from cartels cited cases where MFJ 
officials have been threatened or targeted by these criminal organizations, such as 
the judge from the state of Nayarit who was attacked in August 2010. These 
interviewees usually knew of threats against peers or court employees in their 
jurisdictions or somewhere else, although they did not specify if these threats 
came from drug cartels or someone else.  
Some respondents said that threats from drug cartels against court 
employees were not common because drug traffickers, or their attorneys, for that 
matter, knew that staff and junior officials could not decide a trial. Only the judge 
had the power to free or jail a defendant in a sentence and most judges would not 
dare to acquit a criminal if there is no evidence in the trial supporting that 
decision. The corollary was that high salaries, social status, and the overall job 
benefits of working at the MFJ discouraged most senior officials from engaging in 
corrupt acts.   
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An interesting argument to explain the unlikelihood of a judge or junior 
official accepting bribes from drug cartels is that once someone does it one time, 
she or he has to keep working forever for the cartels. Judges are not stupid, and it 
would be improbable that any high-ranking official would agree to be bribed by 
drug traffickers’ lawyers. Yet, there are exceptional cases in which judges and/or 
magistrates probably accept bribes from attorneys representing drug cartels 
members. Because this statement would be difficult to prove, there is no direct 
evidence of these cases; however, the Michoacanazo trial offers an example of a 
case in which a drug cartel possibly influenced the judicial process, through either 
threats or economic incentives.      
Overall, many interviewees implied that threats against court staff and 
senior officials have increased in the last decade. The number and type of threats 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some threats came via phone calls to 
secretaries, and others were made to process servers face-to-face by angry 
defendants serving time in prisons. In Tijuana once, a junior official received a 
corona de muertos (a funeral wreath) in her office as a threat, implying that she 
would be dead soon. Two interviewees recount the cases of two judges who had 
to flee Chihuahua and Baja California states after receiving credible death threats 
related to the verdicts of trials under their jurisdiction. Another subtle threat 
against senior officials in the jurisdiction of Michoacán was mentioned in chapter 
six: the family is watching you. It was made by the La Familia Michoacana cartel, 
and it surely made some judges feel uneasy given the bad reputation of this 
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criminal organization. There is not enough information from the collected data to 
determine what percentage of these threats comes from drug-related cases, but it 
is reasonable to conclude that not all of the threats were made by drug cartels. 
Sometime angry parties who blame the judge or the judicial system for an adverse 
verdict can also send a threat.   
Regardless of the origins of threats, the MFJ has developed mechanisms to 
cope with them to guarantee senior officials protection against potential harm. 
Among other things, the MFJ now provides armored vehicles for judges in district 
courts who handle high-profile cases of drug trafficking or for those who work in 
jurisdictions along the Mexico-U.S. border. The Council of the Judiciary, in 
coordination with the Attorney General’s Office, supplies bodyguards for senior 
officials who have received credible threats. The efficacy of bodyguards was 
proven when the judge in the state of Nayarit was attacked and guards saved his 
life, although one of them was killed. Job rotation of senior officials in 
jurisdictions with high levels of organized crime has been another way to defuse 
threats and avoid potential cronyism between judges and law firms that do defend 
drug cartel members.  
To protect the federal court premises, the MFJ has hired private security 
officers to guard all buildings that belong to the institution. The Council has 
invested in metal detectors and x-ray machines to scan suitcases, backpacks, and 
any bags that come into the federal courts. All employees and visitors have to 
wear badges while doing business in the courts. Visitors and litigants also have to 
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sign up and show a picture ID to have access to the premises. In addition, people 
who want to talk to a judge need to make an appointment and justify their interest 
in speaking to the judge. Although a decade ago a few of these measures—such as 
wearing badges to access the courts—were irregularly applied, today they have 
become an official policy in all jurisdictions, and they are strongly enforced.  
 These changes have had a positive impact among citizens and the 
community of attorneys that litigate in federal courts because it shows that the 
institution can be professional and well organized. In this regard, the federal 
judiciary distances itself from the state judicial systems, which tend to be less 
organized to protect their employees and premises—with a few exceptions—
probably due to the lack of money and support from state governments. This 
professionalism and better organization are among the positive changes that the 
1994-1995 judicial reform brought to the MFJ. 
Gift-giving in the Judicial Process  
 The last heuristic question suggested that judicial corruption related to 
drug trafficking involved cronyism and social networking in which elite attorneys 
would influence people working in the MFJ though gift-giving and political 
support. Gift-giving would be done in the form of expensive gifts, money, and 
paid services while political support would be provided to help officials move up 
the hierarchy.  
From the collected data, there is not enough information to assume that 
gift-giving takes places in the MFJ. One informant asserted that sometimes 
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magistrates ask for expensive watches or paid trips to foreign countries in 
exchange for benefits to a party in a trial. However, no one else was able to 
confirm this fact. Although it is not unlikely that some senior officials may 
request these gifts to take advantage of their positions, it is improbable that they 
engage in blatant corruption. It could be argued that in cases where the evidence 
is blurred (the typical example of the glass of water being half-empty or half-full), 
chances are that a luxurious gift may incline the balance of justice if the senior 
official is dishonest.  
Nonetheless, gift-giving among public officials in Mexico has been a 
common practice for decades, used to create social networks and circumvent 
bureaucratic procedures. During the authoritarian regime, gifts to the boss in the 
form of bottles of cognac or aged whiskey were a systematic practice to maintain 
cordial relations between clique members, friends, and acquaintances. The 
judicial power was not excluded from these practices, and sometimes low-ranking 
court staff would also receive presents. I remember that during my years interning 
at the state judiciary, occasionally secretaries of the court would accept jewelry or 
perfumes from litigants and law firms that conducted business in their courts. 
Every December, it was common for judges to receive several canastas navideñas 
(Christmas baskets) from law firms that litigated cases under these judges’ 
jurisdictions. In other words, gift-giving in bureaucratic setting was normalized 
because it was a beneficial practice for both giver and receiver and could be done 
without breaking any law. As Riding correctly points out, “The practice of giving 
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presents as a way of reaffirming friendship, expressing thanks or gaining attention 
[was] considered normal, part of a century-old tradition of tribute: the present is 
given in exchange for nothing specific, but it serves as a point of communication” 
(Riding, 1985, p. 122).  
I do not doubt that gift-giving still exists in the MFJ, but it is not as 
widespread as it used to be in the past, and it does not have the same meaning and 
intention as it did before. Many attorneys who litigate in federal courts cultivate 
good relationships with court staff and judges, not necessarily to corrupt them, but 
to enjoy preferential treatment in their trials. Gift-giving is the best strategy to 
strengthen these relationships. Although this might be defined as unethical, it 
would not be seen as corruption in itself, but as a clever strategy to navigate the 
bureaucracy of the judicial system.  
 It is possible that in drug-related cases when the interests at stake are high, 
cronyism, influence peddling, or political connections can influence the outcome 
to benefit defendants, as the Michoacanazo case showed. Nevertheless, I do not 
consider this kind of influence a regular practice because officials generally do 
not want to do business with attorneys who are representing drug cartels for the 
obvious potential implications. As mentioned earlier, the job benefits attached to 
the federal judgeship are so exclusive and of such high quality that the risk of 
losing them for illegal and dangerous associations with drug cartel members 
would be stupid for most of senior officials.    
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 Finally, there is no evidence in the fieldwork of political support or 
benefits to court employees or junior officials to go up the hierarchical ladder in 
exchange for gifts. The recruitment process and the decision-making mechanisms 
to select judges and magistrates are now all in the hands of the Council of the 
Judiciary. There are two ways to become a judge or magistrate: a) highly 
competitive recruitment processes where only the best of the best applicants are 
selected, and b) through connections and nepotism where some applicants are 
selected in ad hoc recruitment competitions. Political support to go up the ladder 
can only come from the Council, not from outsiders.      
To support the aforementioned argument, question number 9 of the 
questionnaire asked whether or not having connections or friends in the Council 
of the Judiciary could facilitate career advancement within the MFJ. Almost two-
thirds of the sample admitted that it would definitely help and that this help does 
not necessarily have to be in the form of favoritism. As one interviewee 
explained, first-hand information about rules on recruitment or inside tips would 
be enough. The perception that having connections and friends at the top is a 
useful way to get ahead is consistent with other negative official practices taking 
place there.  
There was the assumption among many interviewees that bureaucracy, 
cronyism, and nepotism have hampered the transition to a more independent, 
democratic, and inclusive federal judicial system. Additionally, there is strong 
resistance from the people in power at the MFJ to implement large-scale changes 
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to leave behind the shadow of authoritarianism. This resistance has been 
stubbornly asserted in the official discourse addressing corruption because there is 
still an attitude of denial as well as a poor record of prosecuting those who engage 
in such misconduct. This criticism can be corroborated by the institution’s own 
records on how it has managed internal corruption cases.        
Institutional Accountability 
 One way to measure how the MFJ has officially approached 
wrongdoing—corruption in particular—is to look at the sanctions imposed on 
judges and employees when they engage in misconduct. In the past, finding this 
information out was almost impossible because it was kept out of public scrutiny 
so well and was for internal use only. Thus, outsiders were not allowed to know 
the content and decisions regarding these sanctions. Since government 
transparency has become a mainstream policy in Mexico in the past decade, civil 
society has demanded more accountability from all branches of government. Most 
government agencies now must make information, such as their budgets and 
internal affairs, public so that it may be scrutinized. Starting in 2011, the MFJ 
began to publish on its website information about senior and junior officials who 
had been sanctioned for different forms of misconduct (Sánchez, 2012). 
 The Council of the Judiciary, as the administrative part of the federal 
judiciary, has been in charge of imposing sanctions on court employees and 
publishing the information about them. As a rule, the Council always keeps the 
names and personal information of employees confidential. To publish this 
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information, the Council has listed on its website a link under the title 
Sancionados (sanctioned employees), showing a graphic with data distributed in 
rows and columns. Rows account for employees’ positions (e.g. magistrates, 
judges, and secretaries of the court) and columns account for the type of sanction 
an employee has received, such as warnings, unpaid leaves of absence, economic 
sanctions, and dismissals (Consejo de la Judicatura, 2012). According to this 
website, in the year 2011 the Council sanctioned 45 employees. Almost half of 
these (20) were senior officials—judges and magistrates. Among these officials, 
two—one judge and one magistrate—were dismissed for serious misconduct. (See 
table below.) 
Table 1.3 Official sanctions against employees for year 2011 
Sanciones que se han impuesto derivadas de los asuntos 
tramitados en la Secretaría Ejecutiva de Disciplina 
      2011 
   
APER. 
PRIV. 
AMON. 
PRIV. 
APER. 
PÚB. 
AMON. 
PÚB. SUSP. INHAB. DEST. 
SAN. 
ECON. TOTAL 
Magistrados de 
Circuito 3 3 0 1 3 0 1 0 11 
Jueces de 
Distrito  1 2 0 1 3 0 1 1 9 
Secretarios de 
Tribunal  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Secretarios de 
Juzgado 3 1 0 4 2 1 0 0 11 
Actuarios 
Judiciales 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 6 
Defensores 
Públicos 
Federales 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oficiales 
Administrativos 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 6 
Total 9 6 1 6 16 3 3 1 45 
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On the same webpage, a link under the name Conductas (behaviors) 
explains, case by case, the context and basic information of each sanction 
imposed. For instance, a judge was dismissed for lacking professionalism and for 
not performing his or her work according to the rules, such as leaving the court 
earlier than expected and delegating sensitive responsibilities to junior officials. 
There is another case from 2011 in which a judge was sanctioned for serious 
misconduct, but it did not merit dismissal, just an economic penalty. Most of these 
45 sanctions were not defined as serious faults (faltas graves) according to the 
Council’s criteria; however, there are no guidelines available to know what those 
criteria are or how they are defined.     
 According to the Council’s data, since its establishment in 1995 and as of 
December of 2011, there have been 1,035 sanctions against MFJ employees 
(Consejo de la Judicatura, 2012). Out of this number, almost 60% (627 sanctions) 
have been against judges and magistrates; the remaining 40% (408 sanctions) 
were against secretaries of the court, process servers, and typists. Out of these 627 
sanctions against senior officials, only 82 have been considered serious faults that 
merited a dismissal. Among them were several cases in which judges acquitted 
defendants who were accused of drug trafficking crimes and kidnapping. Other 
officials were dismissed for meeting with litigants representing cases under the 
judges’ jurisdiction or for asking for money in exchange for a favorable verdict 
(Sánchez, 2012). This is the first time that the MFJ has officially acknowledged 
the existence of corruption. However, this latter information was not published on 
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the Council’s website, but only came out when requested by a Mexican magazine 
called Contralínea, which did an investigative report on these data. See table 
below (Sánchez, 2012). 
  Table 1.4 Overall complaints against employees 1995-2011 
 
Limitations of Accountability 
Despite efforts to make the MFJ’s official approach against wrongdoing 
and corruption more transparent, some practices still undermine progress. They 
are discretionary decision-making actions, an inefficient sanctioning process, and 
defective bylaws. In most of the procedures to determine whether someone was 
guilty of misconduct or corruption, it took more than a year—sometimes almost 
two—to impose the sanctions (Consejo de la Judicatura, 2012). This means that a 
dishonest federal judge or employee who has been accused of wrongdoing can 
still work for months or even years before being dismissed if he or she is found 
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guilty. More often than not, this delay was the result of bureaucratic procedures 
that still prevail in the MFJ. The existence of this bureaucracy should not be a 
surprise for an institution characterized by strong hierarchies and rigid 
regulations. What is disappointing is the persistence of authoritarian judicial 
criteria disguised as legality to address these problems. This issue merits a close 
examination.  
New Council, Same Old Administrative Procedures 
 According to Provision 132 of the Organic Law of the Federal Judiciary 
(Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Federal, 2012), the procedure to sanction an 
employee requires conclusive evidence (elementos probatorios suficientes in the 
Mexican judicial jargon). This evidence has to be in the form of documents or 
tangible factors that can determine without a doubt that someone is responsible 
for wrongdoing or misconduct. There is no other official way to investigate 
corruption or misconduct because Mexican law has set up strict guidelines when it 
comes to prosecuting public officials. The MFJ has failed to update their own 
bylaws to include new technology that could allow more flexible requirements 
when it comes to collecting evidence. This failure has kept in place traditional 
legislation that makes it complicated to uncover and sanction wrongdoing in their 
internal affairs. Without new approaches able to cope with the challenges of the 
twentieth-first century, the traditional methods to sanction employees seem 
obsolete and reproduce the conventional pattern of impunity that has 
characterized corrupt acts among public servants.  
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    One striking example that highlights the inefficiency of the Council is the 
disparity between the number of complaints against MFJ employees and the 
sanctions imposed: There have been more than 22,000 documented allegations of 
misconduct (inconformidades in the jargon) throughout a 16-year period—1995-
2011—in the Council. Out of this number, only 1,035 have ended in a sanction 
against an employee, which means less than 5% (Sánchez, 2012). This 
dissimilarity between complaints and sanctions could be due to several factors, 
such as false accusations or dissatisfaction with a verdict, but more often than not, 
it is because of how difficult it is to prove, without hardcore evidence, that a judge 
or employee has engaged in wrongdoing. As mentioned earlier, as professionals 
of the law, officials at the MFJ know better than anyone else how to cover their 
tracks in cases of misconduct and corruption. Despite this fact, the Council has 
not challenged its own procedures to facilitate the prosecution of wrongdoing, and 
this omission has contributed to the existence and reproduction of corruption 
because perpetrators know that impunity will surely prevail.  
Two more serious loopholes also weaken official efforts to cope with 
corruption. One is that none of the sanctions imposed by the Council leads to 
criminal prosecution. That is to say, regardless of the seriousness of a judge or 
employee’s behavior—whether they are illegally freeing criminals or abusing 
power—the only punishment the Council imposes is a non-criminal sanction. 
Indeed, the prosecutor’s office can indict a federal judge for crimes such as 
embezzlement or bribery, but it would require an accusation and evidence 
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provided by the Council. This rarely occurs because the MFJ has had a non-
written policy of “not airing its dirty laundry in public.” The few exceptions for 
accusing an employee are high profile cases, such as the secretary of the court 
caught with millions of pesos in bank accounts mentioned earlier.  
The second loophole comes from the impossibility of changing a verdict 
that has been the result of corruption or misconduct. If a senior official decides a 
trial on the basis of external influence (whether it be bribery or political 
corruption) and she or he is eventually found guilty and sanctioned for this 
misconduct, the Council cannot reverse the verdict: According to bylaws, the 
head of the MFJ cannot interfere with the judges’ sentencing power. Of course, a 
verdict from a trial court can always be appealed, although this does not guarantee 
that it will be reversed. Verdicts from appellate courts, however, cannot be 
challenged by the prosecutor’s office, even if corruption has played a role in 
them. The Michoacanazo case is an example of this loophole. The Attorney 
General’s Office’s only option for complaint against potential corruption from the 
judge of the Fifteenth District Court was to file an administrative complaint, but 
this did not change the verdicts.     
 The official record dealing with wrongdoing and corruption in the MFJ 
shows that the head of the institution does not want to embrace far-reaching 
changes to transform the status quo. There is resistance to adopting a new legal 
paradigm to keep up with the demands of justice in the twentieth-first century. 
The inertia from traditional ways of defining and understanding the law and its 
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institutions limits the scope of the MFJ to think differently when coping with 
challenging issues.  
Among many senior officials, the attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” 
prevails and contributes to resistance of major changes. Many of them think that 
the 1994-1995 judicial reform is still unfolding and that enough dramatic changes 
have already occurred since the creation of the Council of the Judiciary. These 
officials, in both the Supreme Court and the Council, assume that legality is a 
sacred tenet of judgeship. Yet they have failed to realize that blind obedience to 
the law can lead to injustices when there is a disconnection between the legal 
system and the demands of everyday social reality.     
When the Rule of Law Leads to Impunity 
The MFJ has been praised for its unconditional respect for the rule of law. 
The institution itself is proud of this principle, and it has an official policy to 
protect individual rights based on strict obedience to the law even if this generates 
impunity. For the MFJ, legality trumps punishment of criminals and justice for 
victims. The most striking example of this attitude—and, unfortunately, the most 
common—is when criminals walk free from prison due to legal technicalities or 
mistakes from the prosecutor’s office. A judge in a district court shared a case 
under his jurisdiction to explain this official policy for applying the rule of law 
unconditionally:  
Un caso que me pasó recién llegué a este juzgado es que había un 
juicio donde dos personas habían sido detenidas por delitos 
graves, y aunque sí eran responsables del delito, por la forma en 
que se llevaron a cabo esas detenciones fueron arbitrarias y 
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violando gravemente las garantías de los detenidos de modo que 
resolví dejarlos en libertad. (When I first came to this jurisdiction, 
I had a case where two people had been arrested for felony 
charges. Although they were responsible for their crimes, I had to 
free them due to serious infringements to their civil rights and the 
arbitrariness of their arrests.)         
 
This description is the archetypical representation of the most known face 
of impunity and injustice in the Mexican federal judicial system. The MFJ is not 
the only one to blame for these maladies. Other government agencies in the 
criminal justice system as a whole also play a role in this process, and errors such 
as deficient criminal inquiries, inadequate police investigations, defective work 
from the prosecutor’s office, and a literal interpretation of the law contribute to 
the problem. Then, when a federal judge looks at the whole indictment, the case 
appears deficient and inconclusive, which eventually leads a decision that frees a 
perpetrator. It would unfair to blame only the MFJ for releasing criminals on the 
grounds of process violations. The work of the prosecutor’s office is crucial to 
producing a credible conviction, and many times, it fails to provide enough 
evidence to get a conviction. In fact, defective indictments are the main reason 
why judges release criminals based on technicalities. However, the MFJ has also 
contributed to the problem by reproducing judicial criteria and jurisprudence that 
reinforce legalism and a blind adherence to the law. 
Interviewee Quirina, an expert in the federal judiciary, was extremely 
critical of this common practice in the MFJ. She said that legitimacy in a trial 
should be justified by rational verdicts that bring justice to those who resort to the 
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judicial system. Instead, she said, the MFJ has taken a path that solves disputes by 
strictly applying the law without really providing justice. She pointed out, 
Los operadores de la ley—jueces, magistrados, ministros, personal 
de los tribunales—todavía funcionan con una mentalidad 
autoritaria porque los criterios judiciales con que justifican sus 
resoluciones y trabajo son rigoristas, legalistas, y olvidan la 
esencia de un juicio. (The operators of the law—judges, 
magistrates, justices, and court staff—still perform their duties 
with an authoritarian mentality because the judicial decisions 
behind their verdicts and general work are rigorous, legalistic, and 
they forget the essence of a trial).  
 
To contextualize her criticism, Quirina said that after the 1994-1995 
judicial reform that resulted in the establishment of the Council of the Judiciary, 
all of its “new” members belonged to the MFJ’s rank and file—justices and 
counselors were appointed from a pool of federal judges and magistrates—who 
already had a preconceived notion of what judgeship meant. According to her, 
their judicial criteria and sentencing guidelines reproduced the authoritarian 
thinking and patterns that had prevailed within the MFJ during the tenure of the 
ancient regime. By not introducing a new generation of law experts, who probably 
would be exposed to different legal paradigms and interpretations of the law, the 
MFJ only changed its façade, but the mental framework remained the same. 
In many ways, the MFJ keeps repeating old practices (e.g. nepotism, rigid 
judicial criteria, cronyism, and bureaucracy) that do not reflect well upon a branch 
of government that should maintain exemplary behavior in a transitional 
democracy. As long as the MFJ refuses to acknowledge the need for an overhaul 
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of its bylaws and sentencing criteria, Mexican society will continue blaming this 
institution for the impunity and the lack of justice in Mexico. 
The Generational Gap: Old vs. New Judges 
 The 1994-1995 judicial reform eventually led to internal changes that 
brought up a new generation of senior officials. The appointing system designed 
by the Council to select new judges and magistrates opened the door to a new 
generation of lawyers. Many interviewees argued that there were currently two 
kinds of judges within the MFJ: 1) those who belonged to the old guard (los de la 
vieja guardia), meaning the older segment of the MFJ population), and 2) those 
who were part of a new generation (los nuevos jueces). The old guard judges 
(which included magistrates) had been appointed long ago based on the traditional 
system of cliques, political favors, and traffic of influence that was predominant 
in the institution before the judicial reform. The new generation has been 
appointed through rigorous examinations and based on credentials, rather than 
due to political influence. Interviewees used other nicknames to designate these 
two types of senior officials, such as the new wave vs. the old wave and the new 
school vs. the old school. I will use the term old and new guard to identify them.  
 Not surprisingly, several interviewees characterized the old guard as more 
traditional, hierarchical, older, and more conservative in their behavior and 
sentencing criteria. They tended to be labeled as “tyrannical judges” and less 
prone to develop an equal relationship between the judge and subordinates. The 
new guard was more inclined to new ideas and to creating better relationships 
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with their subordinates. Ernesto, a secretary of a district court with 15 years of 
experience, had this to say on the topic: 
Hay dos tipos de jueces, los de la nueva escuela que son más 
liberales y flexibles y los de la vieja escuela que son más duros y 
difíciles de tratar. Afortunadamente abundan más los de la nueva 
escuela los cuales tienden a simplificar las cosas y ser más 
abiertos. (There are two types of judges, those who belong to the 
new school, who are more liberal and flexible, and those of the old 
school who are tougher and difficult to deal with. Fortunately, 
there are more of the former judges and they tend to simplify 
things and be more open-minded.)  
 
 This generational gap has been an unintended consequence of the 1994-
1995 judicial reform. Judges and magistrates who are appointed based on 
competition and credentials are empowered to speak their minds because they do 
not owe their positions to anyone but themselves. These officials are now 
challenging many of the traditional practices that characterized the MFJ, such as 
rigid sentencing criteria and bureaucracy, by introducing theories of law and 
vanguard ideas from abroad.  
The Council campechanea to appoint senior officials selects judges on 
personal merits or based on nepotism or favoritism. When the system works, it is 
extremely competitive, and candidates have to be well prepared in theoretical and 
practical grounds. It is not unusual for these candidates to hold masters and 
doctorate degrees in fields related to law or criminal justice, which give them an 
edge on new ideas and critical thinking. One advantage of well-educated judges is 
that they tend to challenge the paradigm of positivism, which is deeply embedded 
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in the mindset of traditional senior officials, whose only knowledge of judging 
and law comes from within the institution and through personal experiences.     
Confrontation between the old guard and the new generation of senior 
officials takes place mostly when deciding cases in appellate courts because it 
requires consensus. Remember, appellate courts are called Collegiate Courts and 
they are made up of three magistrates, which demand some kind of agreement in 
every verdict. Consensus here can be reached when at least two magistrates agree 
with a sentence.  
Quintiliano, the youngest magistrate in the history of the MFJ to reach this 
position at the age of 33, described the generation gap:  
Los magistrados de mayor edad no tienen mucha capacitación 
porque confían más en su experiencia de los años. Esto es un gran 
problema al momento de sentar criterios porque la vieja guardia 
es tradicional y se resiste a innovar porque no conoce mucha 
teoría y técnica jurídica. Me tomó mucho cabildeo y votos 
particulares para que al menos uno de mis compañeros entendiera 
una perspectiva innovadora. Los criterios añejos tienen mucho 
positivismo y eso ya está superado, y si yo aceptara eso seria como 
un ‘infierno jurídico’ porque solo se aplica el derecho de manera 
rigorista y no hay justicia. (Older magistrates do not have very 
much schooling because they trust their experience from years in 
the judgeship as the only source of knowledge. This is a serious 
issue when deciding a trial and setting up precedents because the 
old guard is traditional and resists innovation due to a lack of legal 
theory and juridical technique. It took me a lot of lobbying with 
my peers and many dissenting opinions to convince at least one of 
my colleagues to undertake a more progressive perspective in the 
sentencing guidelines. The sentencing criteria these elder 
magistrates apply are too positivist and archaic. If I were to accept 
that archaic notion, it would be like a “juridical hell” [for me] 
because that approach is a rigorous application of the law without 
true justice.)      
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Although innovative ideas from the new generation of judges are a 
positive trend in the MFJ, they are far from becoming mainstream policy. It will 
take several decades before these ideas to bear fruit because progressive judges 
will first have to reach the top of the MFJ and then gradually introduce the 
changes. Unlike common law that allows judges to make law when there are no 
precedents, the Mexican legal system prohibits this action and legislative statutes 
regulate the sentencing guidelines. Thus, judges cannot apply innovative theories 
and concepts in their verdicts if they are not allowed by the law and/or binding 
precedents. In fact, it is illegal to decide a trial using arguments that are not 
explicitly approved by legal doctrine set up by appellate courts and the Supreme 
Court. Judges who do otherwise can face serious sanctions, including dismissals. 
The legal principle stare decisis (to stand by decisions)—by which judges must 
respect the precedents set up by higher courts in prior decisions—is a cornerstone 
of the Mexican legal system and all judges in both the state and federal judiciaries 
must comply with this legal standard.  
Structural and Institutional Inequalities at the MFJ 
 A similar problem in the MFJ, rooted in patriarchalism and 
authoritarianism from the past, is structural and institutional inequality. This 
inequality, or rather inequalities, had not been acknowledged until recently. 
Inequalities in the MFJ are subtle, but well established, in both the institutional 
and cultural realms. Culturally speaking, the MFJ’s ethos reflects traditional 
values, patriarchalism, centralism, hierarchical divisions, formalism, bureaucratic 
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organization, and a strong resistance to innovation. These features are represented 
in a myriad of ways, in wage disparities, labor divisions, office space, social 
status, and above all in gender discrimination.  
First, there is a huge income gap between justices and council members 
and low-ranking officials, despite the fact that most of the intellectual and 
physical work is done by the latter. Gender discrimination has led to inequalities 
in which many women have been confined to clerical work while men hold most 
of the powerful decision-making positions. According to the Council of the 
Judiciary, more than 50% of the employees in the MFJ are women, but they 
account only for 20% of judges and magistrates. At the top of the institution, this 
disparity is even worse: out of eleven justices, only two are women, and there is 
not a single woman among the seven members of the Council of the Judiciary.  
Patriarchalism and deep Catholicism are two factors that have intertwined 
for centuries to keep Mexican women in traditional roles, such as housewives and 
mothers, or to constrain them to doing jobs defined as feminine. This is not the 
case anymore in the larger conditions of Mexican society, where women have 
been able to reduce the gender gap and make gains in urban settings in the past 
two decades. Nevertheless, broad gender inequalities still remain.  
What came as a surprise during the fieldwork were the arguments 
interviewees used to justify gender inequalities. Except for one female, all 
interviewees agreed that the MFJ did not discriminate against women. The reality 
was—according to these respondents—that women did not want to become 
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judges or magistrates because it conflicted with their roles as mothers and wives. 
They cited the long working hours, frequent job rotation in multiple jurisdictions, 
and sketchy schedules—including working on weekends—to support their claim. 
Magdalena, a female judge with 32 years of experience in the MFJ, 
responded to question 12 with these words: “No es discriminación sino una 
decision personal de las mujeres de no participar porque ello implica muchos 
otros compromisos de cambiarse de adscripción y si se tienen hijos o están 
casadas lo piensan mucho” (It is not discrimination [against women] but a 
personal decision not to participate [in the selection process to become judge] 
because it means too much hassle, such as moving out to other jurisdictions, and 
they [women] think twice about doing this if they have children or are married). 
Another interviewee, Sara, a brand new judge, said, 
Muchas mujeres privilegian la vida personal por encima de 
cuestiones laborales y se resisten a ser titulares porque saben que 
van a tener cambios de adscripción, lo cual implica moverse con 
toda la familia y es difícil que el esposo siga a la esposa.  (Many 
women choose personal life over a professional career, and they 
decide not to become judges as a personal choice given that they 
would have to move frequently with their family. Not to mention 
how difficult it is for the husband to follow the wife.)    
 
These two respondents represent how most of the interviewees would 
explain the gender gap among judges and magistrates. Although these arguments 
are true in the sense that gender inequalities in Mexico have long been present and 
are visible in many institutions, the MFJ has failed, first, to acknowledge this 
unequal treatment against women, and second, to implement changes to reduce 
gender disparity.   
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Traditional Gender Roles and Stereotypes 
Preconceived notions of gender roles are usually hidden in practices that 
have been present for decades and have become naturalized norms. For instance, 
the work schedule and setting in district courts has been organized in a way that 
seriously limits female employees from performing their duties as mothers and 
heads of households. Unpredictable work demands from many judges do not 
allow mothers to pick up children from school on a regular basis or bring work 
home. 
Although the nature of the job requires extended periods of work, the MFJ 
has not set up clear-cut regulations to allow employees with particular family 
needs to take time off. It is up to every senior official to manage the employees’ 
work schedule. The way court work is distributed in the MFJ treats males and 
females identically in order to avoid labor preferences and discrimination, but this 
approach ignores the biological and sociocultural implications of motherhood and 
parenting in Mexican society, which puts most of the burden on women. To end 
this gender inequality, the work setting in the MFJ would require a more flexible 
treatment for employees with parenting responsibilities. This is something that the 
institution refuses to acknowledge and change.  
Interviewee Ramón, a scholar specialized in the MFJ who at some point 
worked in a district court, summarized the gender discrimination in these words: 
 Falta equidad de género en el PJF. La institución no discrimina 
en sí, pero no ha llevado a cabo políticas que compensen las 
desventajas que padecen las mujeres por su rol tradicional en la 
sociedad de tener hijos, ser madres, atender el hogar, además de 
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trabajar. (There is a lack of gender equality in the MFJ. The 
institution does not discriminate per se, but it has not carried out an 
active policy to offset the disadvantages that women suffer from 
their traditional roles in society for having children, being mothers, 
caring for the household, and having jobs).   
 
Only recently has the MFJ begun to take steps towards addressing this 
problem. For instance, in 2008, the Supreme Court, aware that gender 
discrimination may exist, created a new office called Coordinación General del 
Programa de Equidad de Género del Poder Judicial Federal (General 
Coordination of the Gender Equality Program of the Mexican Federal Judiciary). 
This office and its program aim to create awareness about the topic of gender 
equality among judges and personnel. The goal was for employees to be familiar 
with gender equality in their sentencing guidelines and to construct a work setting 
free from gender discrimination and violence (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación, 2012).  
This new Office of Gender Equality conducted ethnographic research in 
2008-2009 within the Supreme Court to find out whether there was any 
discrimination against women and how pervasive the problem was. It also carried 
out a national survey among MFJ employees that included all jurisdictions 
(Dirección de Equidad de Género de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, 
2009). The findings from these two studies maintained that institutional 
discrimination against women exists throughout the MFJ. The glass ceiling is one 
mechanism that perpetuates the problem.   
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The creation of an office about gender equality means nothing if there are 
no specific actions taken towards changing the status quo. Although it is 
understandable that any policy intended to reverse the long-term patterns of unfair 
treatment against women would take years to effect institutional change, there is 
evidence that gender inequality is not a priority for the head of the MFJ or other 
branches of government. Several trends reinforce this conclusion. For instance, a 
woman has never been a Chief Justice. Neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Council has ever considered installing a gender quota so that more women could 
have access to high-ranking positions. If there were a real intention to reverse 
gender discrimination, the Council would set up a recruitment process for female 
employees to help fill the judge and magistrate positions. However, this process 
would be considered discriminatory against men because there is a 
misunderstanding of what gender equality means in the work setting. Many 
employees, some women among them, think that gender equality means to treat 
men and women equally without any consideration of the social roles of mothers 
and wives play in the conservative Mexican society. This hegemonic male 
worldview has been institutionalized and, because the leadership of the MFJ is 
overwhelmingly made up of men, it seems unfeasible that there will be a change 
of the status quo in either the short or the medium term. 
A graphic example of how pervasive structural gender inequalities are in 
both the MFJ and the Mexican society is the process by which the latest Supreme 
Court justice was appointed. In September of 2010, Justice José de Jesús Gudiño 
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Pelayo died of a heart attack while vacationing in London. President Calderón 
sent a triad of female candidates to the Senate for the selection of one of them 
(Excélsior, 2010). None of these candidates was able to receive at least two-thirds 
of the votes and be appointed. Apparently, the reason was a political dispute 
because none of these women—all of them district court judges—had party 
affiliations, and this undermined consensus among senators.  
This shows that politics do intervene in the composition of the Supreme 
Court, but first and foremost, it makes visible a hidden attitude that consists of 
considering women less capable of assuming high-ranking positions. This belief 
was highlighted in the conclusions of the national survey conducted among MFJ 
employees: respondents said men have more capacity to be bosses than women 
do. Although the Supreme Court did not directly intervene in the aforementioned 
appointment process, it surely maintained contact with the President to provide 
feedback on the candidates’ credentials. The fact that no women were included in 
the second triad sent by the President suggests that the MFJ did not lobby or argue 
enough to accommodate a female candidate and make the Supreme Court more 
gender equitable.   
As a direct consequence of the prevailing gender discrimination in the 
federal judiciary, there is another serious problem that the institution has done 
little or nothing to tackle: sexual harassment. Unwanted sexual advances happen 
to both males and females within the MFJ, but overwhelmingly women suffer the 
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most from this behavior—typically by males in powerful positions. Due to its 
implications, this issue is addressed next.  
The Persistence of Sexual Harassment    
 Not every interviewee acknowledged that sexual harassment existed in the 
MFJ, mostly because they had not experienced it or had never heard of it in their 
everyday activities. Almost one-third of the interviewees—mostly females—
declared that unwanted sexual advances were something that many women 
employees faced, usually coming from judges and magistrates, and that it created 
a stressful situation for them. According to several interviewees, sexual 
harassment was typically conducted in subtle but systematic ways through 
innuendos, suggestive remarks, and behavior disguised as part of the socialization 
process between coworkers while doing everyday activities. Secrecy characterizes 
sexual harassment, and this makes it difficult to witness and investigate when it is 
occurring.   
 Some respondents said that sexual harassment was not a common practice 
within the MFJ, but given that it does not take place in explicit ways, it well may 
be that some employees know and others do not, depending on their gender or 
position. What seems to be certain is that it happens more often than is 
acknowledged by senior officials. Since women suffer the most from it, it is 
possible that many males just ignore it because of the patriarchalism that prevails 
in the institution. The fact that this practice is not known or experienced by many 
employees does not mean it is nonexistent. In other words, unwanted sexual 
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advances may be dispersed, but they take place on a regular basis against some 
women.   
Two female interviewees, Teresa and Karla, recounted in detail their 
experiences as victims of sexual harassment by a judge and a magistrate, 
respectively. The circumstances and sequence of events were similar in both 
stories: a) the victims were both young, single, and pretty and belonged to the 
lower levels of the hierarchy; b) they were directly hired by the harasser to work 
in a closer and personal setting with him; c) unwanted sexual advances increased 
gradually as time passed; d) the victims had to quit their positions when the 
situation became unbearable for them; e) the victims never reported the 
harassment because they needed to keep their jobs and they feared that reporting 
would have led to reprisals, and f) in neither of these two cases did the harassers 
face any legal punishment for their behavior.    
 Karla, who suffered aggressive sexual harassment twice, said, 
Sí existe acoso sexual en el PJF, lo he visto y lo he experimentado 
directamente en muchas ocasiones pero dos experiencias en 
particular me han marcado. Una fue en Tlaxcala donde me 
ofrecieron trabajar en un colegiado y el magistrado desde el 
primer día que llegué me empezó a hostigar de manera indirecta 
primero, y luego directamente. La otra experiencia también 
ocurrió con un magistrado aquí, que me contrató de su secretaria 
particular y empezó a hostigarme de manera sutil y después las 
cosas se fueron haciendo más tensas hasta que tuve que renunciar. 
(Yes, sexual harassment exists in the MFJ. I have seen and 
experienced it personally several times, but two experiences in 
particular left an unforgettable mark on me. One was in the 
jurisdiction of Tlaxcala where someone offered me a job working 
in an appellate court and since day one, the magistrate began to 
harass me, subtly at the beginning and openly later on. The second 
experience took place here [in the jurisdiction where the interview 
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was conducted] with a magistrate, too. He hired me as his private 
secretary. He began to harass me in subtle ways and then things 
developed into a tense situation where he would not stop, and I had 
to quit working for him).  
 
 For most victims of sexual harassment in the federal judiciary, it is 
difficult to confront and stop harassers because the legal and social environment 
of the institution is against them. As explained by some interviewees, victims 
think twice before reporting unwanted sexual advances for several reasons. First, 
there is no a clear and safe process through which to channel complaints. When a 
victim reports sexual harassment, the Council opens an investigation that 
normally takes months to conclude, and peers and coworkers eventually have to 
testify in it. In the meantime, the victim usually keeps working under the 
harasser’s authority. This allows time for retaliation in different ways, such as 
putting pressure on the victim to work exhausting schedules or possibly 
dismissing the victim and making her look like a deficient employee. Most of the 
time, if the harasser is found guilty (depending on the circumstances of the 
harassment), he only receives a warning and reprimand as punishment. The 
victim, on the other hand, becomes labeled as troublemaker and hardly anyone 
would hire her again in the MFJ because her references from the former superior 
would all be negative.   
 Second, it is complicated to investigate and gather conclusive evidence of 
sexual harassment because witnesses would be coworkers and peers and they 
probably would refuse to accuse their boss of any misconduct in order to protect 
their own jobs. Remember, the internal rules to impose sanctions against junior 
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and senior officials rely on traditional procedures, which require concrete and 
unmistakable evidence to declare someone guilty. This is hard to carry out in 
sexual harassment cases, although not entirely impossible. In 2006, a magistrate 
in Mexico City was put on a six-month unpaid leave of absence for sexually 
harassing a subordinate employee; it was not until May 2011 that he was finally 
dismissed for this misconduct (Méndez, 2011).    
 In addition, harassers tend to prey on powerless victims who usually need 
the jobs and/or want to secure permanent status in their positions. It is unlikely 
that the daughter of a senior official working in a district court would face sexual 
harassment because her father’s social status protects her. Unfortunately, sexual 
harassment is relatively easy for harassers to perform because the sociocultural 
setting of the institution favors its existence. The prevalence of other practices 
such as strong hierarchies, abuse of power, tyrannical judges, and a male-centered 
culture, all intertwine to reproduce this problem, leaving few or no consequences 
for the perpetrators. Patricia, an interviewee with 30 years of experience in federal 
courts, said that the higher up the hierarchy the more common the problem is. She 
explained, “Sí existe el acoso sexual y es parte de la cultura de muchos titulares 
de tener una secretaria particular que es bonita y que tenga un cuerpazo. Y a 
mayor nivel de la jerarquía este aspecto es mucho más visible” (Yes, sexual 
harassment exists [at the MFJ], and it has become part of the culture for many 
senior officials who want to have a private secretary, one who is pretty and has an 
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attractive body. The higher the official is up the hierarchy, the more common this 
problem becomes).      
 According to interviewee Teresa, by not having appropriate institutional 
remedies available, what most victims typically do when tackling unwanted 
sexual advances is walk a fine line between running away and openly rejecting 
the harasser. This is unfair and should be unacceptable, but it is the most 
convenient and pragmatic approach for those females who find themselves 
powerless and caught in the hands of abusers.    
 This information is supported by the two studies conducted by the 
Supreme Court between 2008 and 2009 that were mentioned earlier. One study 
found that sexual harassment exists in the MFJ and that women were far more 
likely than men to suffer from it. The other one concluded that there is not a 
special mechanism available for victims to resolve sexual harassment cases in the 
entire MFJ (Dirección de Equidad de Género de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de 
la Nación, 2009). If confronted with the sociocultural setting that characterizes the 
MFJ, the existence of sexual harassment fits in naturally—so to speak—with the 
ethos of the institution. In any organization that is male-centered, traditional, 
hierarchical, centralist, and reluctant to acknowledge gender discrimination, 
sexual harassment will find fertile soil in which to thrive. This has been the case 
in the MFJ, and for the time being, it remains that way. Structural changes may 
take place over time that may alter this, but it remains to be seen.  
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 It would be unfair not to acknowledge some of the small steps that have 
occurred in the recent past that do address sexual harassment. The Council of the 
Judiciary has become more vigilant about senior officials’ behavior and has 
encouraged a professional judgeship in and out of the courtrooms, to be respectful 
and have consideration for all subordinates. It has also improved the process for 
filing complaints against superiors—not only for sexual harassment but also 
against any type of abuse. The Council systematically investigates any 
misconduct and usually follows a protocol that includes a whole process to gather 
evidence and reach a conclusion for each complaint. However, bureaucracy, 
traffic of influence, and the use of cliques sometimes undermine the impartiality 
of this process because those harassers who have connections in the Council can 
get away with their crimes. Interviewee Ramón had this to say on the topic: 
“Cuando le presentan una queja a un juez siempre se aconseja que vaya a ver a 
un consejero para amarrar el asunto” (When there is a complaint against a judge, 
people recommend visiting a Council member to fix the issue in advance).  
What Ramón is explaining is that having connections or friends in the 
Council helps to avoid being sanctioned. Besides connections, there are other 
factors—such as who the victim or the harasser is, in what jurisdiction the 
harassment occurred, and the circumstances of it—that can play a role in whether 
a harasser is sanctioned. However, data from the Council suggest that the 
probabilities of avoiding a sanction are higher than the opposite.   
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Overall, despite some steps towards addressing institutional inequalities, 
there is no consistency between what the head of the MFJ says and what it does. 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court claims that the institution is an archetype of 
a new judicial branch, promoting a positive image of itself in media campaigns. 
On the other hand, this seems like empty rhetoric because the institution keeps 
reproducing policies, attitudes, and practices that reinforce inequalities and 
contradict this so-called new image. There is a simple fact that summarizes the 
discrepancy between the discourse and the reality of the federal judiciary: those 
senior officials in charge are the first who benefit from the status quo, and there is 
no real interest in changing because that would affect their power and privileges. 
For the final section of the conclusion, I will lay out the various arguments on the 
positive changes that have taken place in the MFJ, as well as the negative 
practices that still affect it today. 
Studying Corruption in the MFJ: What We Have Learned 
 This research sheds light on many misunderstandings and hidden aspects 
of corruption in the Mexican federal judicial system. First, corruption does exist at 
this institution; it is not as widespread as it is usually thought, but it occurs 
depending on different variables, such as the type of case, the trial’s parties, the 
judge, and the interests at stake. Fieldwork data show that corruption accounts for 
5% to 10% of the cases. These percentages might be seen as high, but considering 
the context of corruption in Mexico, where this problem is prevalent, the MFJ has 
managed to have low levels of corruption. Furthermore, compared to state judicial 
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systems, the difference in corruption levels between the MFJ and the local 
judiciaries is even greater, with the former having far fewer problems than the 
latter.   
 Given the complexities of everyday activities in federal courts, it is not 
easy to influence the judicial process by a simple act of corruption, as many 
people believe in Mexican society. There was a consensus among respondents 
that work setting, procedural law, peer surveillance, permanent supervision by the 
Council, and public scrutiny all make it harder to engage in corruption. 
Nevertheless, this has not prevented some officials at all levels of the hierarchy 
from committing corrupt acts. The emphasis of this statement should be that, 
compared to the twenty years ago, there has been serious progress in tackling 
corruption in the MFJ.    
 Second, although corruption in the MFJ is mostly associated with bribes, 
this concept has multiple definitions, a characteristic that is widespread in 
Mexican society. Besides bribery, corruption can also mean influence peddling, 
cronyism, traffic of influence, nepotism, abuse of power, petty corruption (e.g. 
mordidas and tips), and even sexual harassment. This pluralistic definition of 
corruption suggests that corruption is a contested idea within the MFJ, and 
employees as well as high-ranking officials disagree about what phenomena 
should be categorized as corruption. Likewise, corruption was understood mostly 
as a legal problem, meaning the breaking of the law, although beneath this 
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interpretation there was an understanding by interviewees that sociocultural 
elements play a determinant role in the larger social realm in Mexican society.  
 Fourth, respondents had a clear notion that corruption cannot be eradicated 
completely from the institution. Court officials understand that corruption always 
will be part of the judicial system. Nevertheless, interviewees pointed out that it is 
possible to reduce the problem to minimal levels. In this regard, high salaries, 
professionalization, and an authentic civil service career (compared to the recent 
past before the 1994-1995 reform) have been crucial to reducing corruption and 
encouraging judicial independence.      
 Finally, phenomena such as patriarchalism, nepotism, abuse of power by 
some judges, cronyism, gender inequalities, and sexual harassment have become 
normalized within the MFJ. These practices were defined as part of the MFJ’s 
ethos, and they reproduce a work setting where misconduct and corruption are 
more likely to occur because personal and group interests overcome the rule of 
law. This scenario suggests that corruption in the MFJ—even if it is minimal—
cannot be addressed as an isolated problem because it would not change the 
circumstances where corruption nourishes. Instead, any action or policy to tackle 
corruption in the federal judiciary must include a holistic perspective that also 
deals with the aforementioned practices.        
Improvements and Challenges of the MFJ for the Twentieth-first Century   
 There is no doubt that the Mexican federal judiciary has changed for the 
better in the last 16 years since the 1994-1995 judicial reform. These changes 
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have operated in different spaces and times throughout this period and have 
created a distance from the past authoritarian regime that governed Mexico until 
2000. Among the most visible changes of the recent past are the following:  
1) There has been a professionalization of the judgeship in which new 
generations of lawyers who are younger, well-educated, and eager to shift the 
legal paradigms are filling in high-ranking positions; 2) there has been an 
institutionalization of a civil service career based on meritocracy that generally  
works, but sometimes is undermined by nepotism and the use of connections; 3) 
there was a substantial increase on salaries at all levels—except for typists—to 
reward professional standards and decrease potential misconduct, which has 
contributed to professionalizing the judicial career; 4) there has been a 
considerable reduction of petty corruption—more evident for the absence of 
mordidas—to the point where no grease payments are needed to carry out every 
day proceeding in trial courts; 5) there has been an increase in the number of 
district courts and appellate courts throughout the country to provide better 
service to society; 6) as a result of professionalization and good salaries, judges 
and magistrates have become more independent in their decision-making power; 
7) the institution has become more transparent and accountable, although not 
enough to claim victory; 8) the adoption of technological and digital tools has 
made the administration of the justice as well as the employees’ work more 
efficient and easier; 9) there is more willingness to receive public scrutiny in both, 
internal issues and decisions taken in cases under the federal courts’ jurisdiction, 
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but still secrecy is preferred by those in power; 10) some first steps have been 
taken to tackle corruption and misconduct among senior officials by exercising 
more control and scrutiny on them; 11) there has been an unprecedented policy to 
train and educate employees to become better public official through courses, 
workshops, and lectures from the Institute of the Judgeship, and 12) the 
implementation of recruitment processes to select judges and  magistrates through 
rigorous competitions—except when nepotism and connections play a role in the 
appointment process—has become a crucial policy for guaranteeing judicial 
independence.  
There have been other subtle changes, which are not as visible as the ones 
mentioned above, such as the greater availability of material resources. These 
positive improvements have taken years to take root, and some of them are still in 
progress and are far from being perfect but are heading in a direction in which 
they could become institutionalized and part of the everyday activities of the MFJ. 
Contrasting these changes with the context before the 1994-1995 judicial reform, 
they seem like a giant step in the administration of justice because the difference 
is quite evident between the “before” and the “after.” Behind all these changes lie 
the political implications supporting them. The MFJ has been able to distance 
itself from the sphere of influence that the executive branch had for decades. The 
strong Presidentialism that prevailed during the 71-year rule of the party-
government kept the federal judiciary in the shadows. Slowly but steadily, the 
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MFJ has gained more autonomy and independence—compared to the past—to 
perform the true separation of powers that is required in any democracy.  
Nevertheless, there are still many challenges ahead for the MFJ before it 
can become a fully independent and reliable branch of government in the context 
of the 21
st
 century. Yes, the institution is more independent than before but still 
legal and political contingencies make it susceptible to influences from the two 
other branches. There are two realms where these contingencies take place: in the 
budget and in the appointment of justices and Council members. According to 
law, the MFJ still depends on the President and Congress to approve its annual 
budget, which requires that the Chief Justice lobbies every year to obtain higher 
allocations of resources to meet the MFJ’s needs. This allows some political 
intromission from the executive and legislative branches to maintain certain 
control over the federal judiciary. The best scenario would be to have a 
percentage of the whole government budget regularly directed to the judiciary 
with no need for lobbying. The law that dictates this budget policy dates back to 
the ancient regime’s epoch, and there is no political willingness to change it; thus, 
it will remain as it for the near future. 
Regarding the appointment of justices and Council members, this process 
is essentially a political one. This process has become influenced by ideologies 
and political parties, which end up selecting justices on the grounds of politics 
rather than merits and credentials. This eventually can affect case decisions by the 
Supreme Court that are dealing with high profile trials. This is similar to the U.S. 
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justices who are typically selected by the President according to political 
ideology, but in the Mexican case, the selection process goes beyond ideological 
realms and turns into cronyism, connections, and possibly political interference. 
Because of these undesirable effects, the MFJ cannot claim itself as a fully 
independent branch. 
There are other issues mentioned throughout this dissertation that have 
thwarted the federal judiciary from becoming a branch of government that 
effectively performs its checks and balances of power and brings justice to those 
who demand it. Most of these issues come from old practices that were 
institutionalized in the past and are difficult to uproot because of the inertia of 
bureaucracy and unwillingness by senior officials to adopt new paradigms. To 
make matters worse, these issues are intertwined in the sophisticated network of 
traditions, culture, socialization, hierarchies, and mores that characterize this 
institution. Among the most common of these problems are the following: 
1) The existence of nepotism, a practice deeply rooted in most of the 
minds of people working in the MFJ that has become normalized because its 
negative connotation has been erased; 2) there are excessive hierarchies that 
emphasize obedience and loyalty above the goal of serving justice. Although 
power structure is necessary to organize any institution, the command hierarchy in 
the MFJ goes beyond this target leading to cronyism, cliques, and rivalries 
between groups that undermine the judgeship; 3) there is strong centralism, in 
both power and resources. This feature complements in a negative way the 
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hierarchical structure in place because sometimes abuse of power is tolerated 
which affects those at the bottom of the ladder the most; 4) there is resistance to 
full openness for public scrutiny, and total transparency has not been fully 
achieved because personal and pragmatic interests prevail; 5) bureaucracy in 
some sectors of the judiciary still exists, and those who benefit from the status 
quo resist any changes; 6) many senior officials do not teach professionalism and 
honesty by example and do not serve as desirable models to peers and court staff. 
There is inconsistency between senior officials’ words and their actions; 7) the 
MFJ tends to be defensive and unwilling to acceptance criticism. It does not 
encourage self-criticism to improve what is not working properly; 8) the 
institution does not reward honesty and good work, nor does it punish corruption 
and misconduct in a systematic manner. This leads to impunity for employees 
who engage in misconduct; 9) the MFJ has not set high standards of behavior for 
court staff and senior officials; and 10) justices are not accountable for their 
personal behavior because nobody supervises their actions. Although they can be 
impeached for gross misconduct, they usually get away with practices such as 
nepotism, cronyism, and influence peddling because there is no one who oversees 
their activities. The case of Justice Balderrama mentioned in other chapters is a 
clear example of this institutional weakness. 
 A particular phenomenon that deserves special attention is the 
responsibility of the federal judiciary in the problem of impunity in Mexican 
society. The MFJ is still caught in old schemes of legalism that perpetuate this 
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problem in the name of adherence to the rule of law. For most federal judges—in 
trial and appellate courts—the rule of law is considered a sacred paradigm by 
which verdicts have to adhere to a literal interpretation of the law. This strict 
judicial criterion has allowed many criminals to be freed, and senior officials 
justify their decisions on legalistic grounds. Even if this is true, the MFJ should be 
more flexible in their interpretation of the law in order to keep up with the 
dynamics of social reality. Because of this failure, there is a disparity between 
what the law holds as legal and the real world of everyday life, and many times 
the work of the federal judiciary is unable to make a connection between these 
two realms. 
These are the major challenges that the Mexican federal judiciary must 
face in the coming years in order to leave behind the negative practices that still 
prevailing within the MFJ. It is impossible to predict how long it will take for this 
branch of government to transform into the institution that Mexican society 
demands. Regardless of this uncertainty, it appears that only when the new 
generation of judges have filled in positions as justices and council members at 
the top of the MFJ—to exert a majority in the Supreme Court and the Council of 
the Judiciary—then this institution will be able to leave behind the conservative 
and rigid thinking inherited from the past century. Then will come a time when 
corruption, misconducts, and wrongdoing will be rare occurrences because the 
principles governing this branch will be professionalism, honesty, kindness, 
ethics, and respect. Hopefully, this will be the case.   
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Date__________Hour_______ 
City_____________________ 
Position__________________ 
Seniority_________________ 
 
1. In the Mexican legal community, the Mexican Federal Judicial (MFJ) has a 
reputation of being an extremely demanding institution for those who work here, 
is this true? What do you think about this reputation? Do salaries offset 
responsibilities? What about work schedule? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
2. What is the most difficult task of working in the MFJ? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
3. According to your experience, what is the best feature of the MFJ and what 
would be need an overhaul? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
4. How see themselves people working in the MFJ and how would you define 
their job duties?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
5. Overall, Mexican society has a negative image of the judicial power based on 
the idea that there is systematic corruption there, what do you think of this 
reputation? Could it be possible to reverse this reputation? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
6. Would you consider that the job of the prosecutor’s office impacts the 
performance of the MFJ? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
7. How centralized the MFJ is? If so, does this affect the institution? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
8. How much discretional power a judge or magistrate has to organize and rule his 
or her courtroom? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. Would you think that having friends or connections within the Council of the 
Judiciary helps to climb up the hierarchical ladder of the MFJ? 
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
10. Do you think that the appointment of judges and magistrates is absolutely 
impartial sometimes the use of connections can influence who is appointed in a 
particular jurisdiction? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
11. Considering the historical context of the Mexican political system, do you 
think the judicial branch, in particular the Supreme Court and the Council, have 
become fully independent from the executive branch, or there are still 
reminiscences of this influence? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
12. More women than men work in the MFJ and yet most of the judges, 
magistrates, and justices are males, what do you think is the reason for this gender 
difference? Does this suggest a subtle but real institutional discrimination against 
women? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
13. Do you think there are cases of wrongdoing or corruption in the MFJ? If so, 
what type of corruption would that be (feel free to explain in detail)? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
14. Given the violence and economic power of drug cartels, is there any potential 
risk for employees of the MFJ who handle organized crime and drug-related 
trials? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
15. Do you know instances where employees in the MFJ have been threatened or 
intimidated for doing their job? If so, without mentioning names could you please 
explain how and why that happened? How has the head of the MFJ reacted to 
protect its employees from threats? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
16. What types of trials are more prevalent in this jurisdiction? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
17. Considering the social inequality that prevails in Mexico, would you think that 
the salaries of judges, magistrates, justices, and council members are justified? 
How the court staff’s perception of these high ranking officials’ salaries? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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18. Would you consider that there is absolute impartiality and independence in 
trial courtrooms and the Supreme Court during proceedings and the verdict?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
19. Based on your experience, are there any topics about justice and impartiality 
which I did not ask but should have asked? Please feel free to add whatever you 
think is important. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Fecha______________Hora________ 
Ciudad_________________________ 
Cargo__________________________ 
Antigüedad_____________________ 
 
1. ¿Entre la comunidad jurídica mexicana, el Poder Judicial Federal (PJF) tiene 
fama de ser una institución muy exigente para quienes laboran aquí, qué tan cierto 
es esto y porqué? ¿Horario, salario compensa responsabilidades, vida privada es 
posible, más difícil para hombres que mujeres? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
2. ¿Cuál es la tarea más difícil de trabajar en el PJF y porqué? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
3. ¿De acuerdo con su experiencia, qué está funcionando bien en el PJF y que 
requeriría algún cambio para mejorar la institución? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
4. ¿De qué manera la gente que trabaja en el PJF se ve a sí misma y cómo 
definiría sus responsabilidades laborales? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
5.  En general, la sociedad mexicana tiene una idea negativa del poder judicial 
asociándolo con la corrupción sistemática que ha afectado al país por décadas, 
¿qué tan cierto es esta imagen negativa? ¿Qué cree usted debería hacer el PJF para 
revertirla? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
6. ¿Estimaría usted que el trabajo (integración de averiguaciones previas) del 
ministerio público federal repercute en el desempeño del PJF para brindar un 
mejor servicio público a la sociedad? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
7. ¿Qué tan centralizado está el PJF y porqué? ¿Cómo afecta esto a la institución? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
8. ¿Qué tanta discrecionalidad tiene un juez o magistrado para organizar y mandar 
en un juzgado o sala? ¿Cuáles serían las ventajas y desventajas de esta 
discrecionalidad? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
9. ¿Consideraría usted que tener amigos o contactos en el Consejo de la Judicatura 
ayudaría para avanzar más fácilmente en la carrera judicial dentro del PJF?  
__________________________________________________________________
  
270 
__________________________________________________________________
10. ¿Considera usted que las designaciones de jueces y magistrados en el PJF son 
absolutamente imparciales o algunas veces el uso de relaciones pudiera influir en 
quien va a determinada jurisdicción? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
11. Considerando la historia del sistema político mexicano, ¿Se ha liberado el 
PJF, y en particular la Corte y el Consejo, de la influencia política e injerencia que 
el poder ejecutivo ejerció en el pasado o todavía existen reminiscencias de ello? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
12. Más mujeres que hombres trabajan en el PJF y sin embargo la mayoría de 
jueces, magistrados y ministros son varones ¿A qué cree usted que se deba esta 
diferencia de género? ¿Acaso existe una discriminación sutil pero real en la 
institución en contra de las mujeres? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
13.  ¿Consideraría usted que existe algún tipo de deshonestidad o corrupción en el 
PJF? De ser afirmativo, ¿de qué clase? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
14. ¿Dado su poder económico y la violencia con que se conducen, cree usted que 
los carteles del narcotráfico constituyen una amenaza para los funcionarios del 
PJF? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
15. ¿Conoce usted de casos en este juzgado donde alguien del personal haya 
recibido amenazas o intimidación por hacer su trabajo como funcionario? 
¿Conoce de atentados a algún miembro del PJF? ¿De qué manera el PJF ha 
respondido para proteger a sus empleados? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
16. ¿Qué tipo de juicios/asuntos son los que más abundan en este juzgado? ¿En 
qué porcentaje estos juicios son mayoría comparado con otros juicios? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
17. ¿Considerando la desigualdad social que prevalece en México, estimaría usted 
que están justificados los sueldos de los jueces, magistrados, ministros y 
consejeros del PJF?  ¿Cómo percibe el personal de los juzgados el salario que 
ganan los funcionarios aludidos? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
18. ¿Considera usted que existe absoluta independencia e imparcialidad tanto en 
los juzgados de distrito como en la Corte para resolver asuntos? 
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
19. ¿De acuerdo con su experiencia, considera usted algún otro asunto que afecte 
la pronta y expedita impartición de justicia en el PJF que debamos abordar en esta 
entrevista? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Challenges for the Mexican Federal Judiciary in the 21st Century: An  
Ethnographic Study 
Dear _____________________Date______________________ 
 
 My name is Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco, I am a lawyer and a graduate student 
under the direction of Professor Doris M. Provine in the Department of Justice 
Studies, School of Social Transformation at Arizona State University.  I am 
conducting an ethnographic research to study the Criminal Courtrooms of the 
Mexican Federal Judiciary.  
I am inviting your participation, which will involve a semi-structured 
interview one hour long, where I will ask you some questions about the following 
topics: How the MFJ is organized and structured according to the employees’ 
perspective; what are the best assets within the MFJ and what needs to be changed 
or improved; what the risks or dangers are for handling trials that involve 
organized crime and drug cartels and if employees are exposed to any threat from 
them; what employees working at the MFJ think about the current wave of crimes 
perpetrated by the cartels; whether this image of violence affects how employees 
handle and decide everyday trials related to drug trafficking; what kinds of 
wrongdoing, if any, occur or may occur within the courtrooms; and if there are 
any kinds of corrupt practices present in the courtrooms.  
You do not have not to answer any question, and you may stop the 
interview at any time. Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You can 
choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will be 
no penalty. You will not have any benefit in this research and there are no 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. However, your participation 
is extremely valuable for a better understanding of the MFJ. 
To guarantee absolute confidentiality, the interview will not be recorded, 
nor will any personal information be requested, except your position (e.g. judge, 
secretary, process server, etc.). Only fieldnotes will be taken during the interview. 
The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications but 
your name will not be known.  
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact 
the research team at: School of Social Transformation, ASU, P.O. Box 974902, 
Tempe, AZ 85287-4902, Doris Marie Provine, e-mail: marie.provine@asu.edu 
and Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco gferreyr@asu.edu. If you have any questions about 
your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been 
placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional 
Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at 
(480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you wish to be part of the study. 
 
Gabriel Ferreyra-Orozco_____________________________ 
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Retos del Poder Judicial Federal en el siglo XXI a la luz de una investigación 
etnográfica. 
 
Estimado Lic._________________________Fecha_________________________ 
 
 Mi nombre el Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco, soy abogado titulado por parte de 
la Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo y estudiante de posgrado 
bajo la tutela de la profesora Doris M. Provine en el departamento del Estudios 
sobre la Justicia, afiliado a la Escuela de Transformación Social en la Universidad 
Estatal de Arizona. Estoy llevando a cabo una investigación etnográfica sobre el 
Poder Judicial Federal (PJF), en particular los juzgados de distrito.  
Por medio de este documento lo invito a participar en esta investigación, 
lo cual consiste en una entrevista entre usted y el suscrito de aproximadamente 1 
hora de duración, donde le formularé una serie de preguntas relativas a los 
siguientes temas: 
El objeto de esta investigación es estudiar desde una perspectiva interna la 
estructura y organización del PJF, qué piensan sobre el PJF quienes laboran en 
esta institución, qué tipo de trabajo es el más desgastante, y qué tipo de juicios 
son los que más prevalecen. De igual forma, dadas las condiciones de violencia 
extrema en el país, se busca saber si existe algún tipo de riesgo para la seguridad 
de los empleados del PJF encargados de manejar juicios relacionados la 
delincuencia organizada y los carteles de la droga. Saber si existen amenazas en 
contra de los funcionarios y cómo ha respondido el Consejo de la Judicatura ante 
esta nueva realidad. Asimismo, se busca saber a qué tipo de presiones están 
sujetos quienes trabajan en el PJF y cómo se hace frente a las mismas. 
Finalmente, (sin mencionar nombres) qué tan frecuentes son los casos de 
deshonestidad en el PJF y cómo se resuelven los mismos. 
Usted tiene el derecho de no responder a cualquier pregunta cuando lo 
considere conveniente y también tiene el derecho de dar por terminada la 
entrevista en cualquier momento que lo desee. Su participación en esta 
investigación es totalmente voluntaria y si considera no participar o cancelar la 
entrevista al momento que así lo considere conveniente, no hay ningún problema 
de mi parte.    
 Su participación en esta investigación es extremadamente valiosa para 
lograr un mejor entendimiento del Poder Judicial en México y saber entender 
mejor esta institución. La finalidad es recabar información científica que una vez 
publicada pueda servir de sustento a promover mejores políticas en los tribunales 
federales que beneficien a la impartición de justicia. En esta investigación no 
existe ningún perjuicio ni beneficio a su persona por participar o no participar. 
 Para proteger la confidencialidad de esta entrevista, no se recabará ningún 
dato personal, excepto el cargo que usted desempeña en el PJF y su antigüedad. 
Durante la entrevista únicamente se tomarán notas y apuntes por parte del suscrito 
para recordar los temas abordados en la misma. Los resultados de este estudio 
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podrán ser usados en reportes, presentaciones y/o publicaciones siempre 
guardando estricta confidencialidad sobre la fuente personal de la información.  
 Si tiene alguna pregunta en relación a la presente investigación, además de 
mi persona puede contactar al Investigador Principal de este estudio. Doris M. 
Provine, correo electrónico: marie.provine@asu.edu y al suscrito 
gferreyr@asu.edu. Si tuviera alguna otra pregunta en relación a sus derechos en 
cuanto participante de este estudio si considera que ha sido puesto en alguna 
situación de riesgo, usted puede contactar al Jefe del Consejo Institucional Sobre 
Asuntos de Investigación Social al teléfono (480)965-6788 en Arizona. 
 
Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco_______________________________ 
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